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This project studies how bureaucratic behavior influences policy implementation.  
It presents a novel bureaucratic access points and leverage theory, which help us 
understand how policies are successfully implemented in the midst of bureaucratic 
challenges resulting from organizational roles and responsibilities and contrasting 
assessments.  The concept of access points has traditionally involved lobbyists and 
interest groups accessing elected officials and their staffs.  I ask what is the effect of 
bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats directly in the policy implementation process and its 
subsequent evaluation.  I argue that bureaucrats leverage other bureaucrats during policy 
implementation proceedings, which adds the notion of power to access points theory.  
The focus of this investigation is the relationship between humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief (HA/DR) agencies and associated Department of Defense (DOD) 
components, particularly DOD medical components providing wellness intervention.  
Bureaucratic access and leverage enables a more unified implementation of over-arching 
HA/DR policy by disparate agencies with unique missions, resources, capabilities, and 
assessment measures.  The existing literature does not fully capture how such agency 
differences are mitigated and overcome in implementing policy that spans multiple 
entities.  Bureaucratic access points and leverage theory offers bureaucrats the analytical 
 v 
capability to know who is controlling policy implementation.  It also presents a tool they 
can use to maintain and increase their own influence and power within a policy domain. 
 vi 
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Chapter 1:  Bureaucratic Access Points Matter 
Introduction 
This project studies bureaucratic access points theory, and an emerging theory of 
leverage, which help us understand how policies are successfully implemented in the 
midst of bureaucratic challenges resulting from organizational roles and responsibilities 
and contrasting assessments.  It focuses on the relationship between U.S. Government 
(USG) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) agencies (i.e., United States 
Agency for International Development and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) and 
associated Department of Defense (DOD) medical components, particularly from U.S. 
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), that respond to HA/DR events.  Bureaucratic 
access and leverage enables a more unified implementation of over-arching HA/DR 
policy by disparate agencies with unique missions, resources, capabilities, and 
assessment measures.  The existing literature does not fully capture how such agency 
differences are mitigated and overcome in implementing policy that spans multiple 
entities.  This study is valuable because it helps to fill important gaps in the 
implementation and policy change literature. 
Bureaucratic access points allow communication of vital information at the time 
of HA/DR events.  This access and associated leverage, coupled with the common end 
state goal of assisting peoples who have experienced disasters, helps create the notion of 
one common mission.  Bureaucratic access points and leverage are the key components to 
HA/DR policy implementation, and the resulting theory is generalizable to other policy 
domains.  
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Interagency challenges are largely due to different missions and different 
assessment measures carried out by agencies within a policy domain.  Therefore, access 
is an important idea in this study.  The notion of access points has traditionally involved 
lobbyists and interest groups accessing elected officials and their staffs.  I ask what is the 
effect of bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats directly in the policy implementation process 
and its subsequent evaluation.  More importantly, I argue that bureaucrats take advantage 
of access points to other bureaucrats in the form of leverage during policy 
implementation proceedings.  This study offers the novel perspective that access points 
for HA/DR bureaucrats, to include those in the DOD, are readily available during the 
punctuating event (i.e., the natural disaster itself) and may be evaluated through the 
notions of information, resources, and capabilities they possess and can leverage during 
these punctuations. 
The HA/DR policy domain offers a descriptive, puzzle-driven case to study these 
various phenomena.  How do street-level, or in this case, "disaster-level" bureaucrats in a 
minuscule office found deep within an independent, sub-cabinet-level agency come to 
dictate the role and resource expenditures of the massive Department of Defense?  
Carpenter’s notion of “bureaucratic autonomy” begins to explain this phenomenon.1  
Some agencies are politically differentiated or insulated from those who may wish to 
control them because they possess the unique capacities to assess and analyze, and to 
                                                
1 Carpenter, Daniel. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy 
Innovations in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
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solve problems by developing new ideas and efficient programs.2  Carpenter argues that 
these agencies are able to escape congressional oversight due to this autonomy, 
particularly when “bureaucrats take actions consistent with their own wishes, actions to 
which politicians and organized interests defer even though they would prefer that other 
actions (or no action at all) be taken.”3  Politicians defer to autonomous agencies because 
failing to do so would sacrifice the public’s – in this case, the world’s – benefits of 
agency competence, and the agency has partnership building ability that would make 
confrontation politically dangerous or untenable for the politicians.4  In sum, 
“bureaucratic autonomy requires political legitimacy, or strong organizational reputations 
embedded in an independent power base.”5 
While the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is granted the authority 
of being the USG's lead federal agency (LFA) for HA/DR efforts, the DOD and the 
Department of State (DOS) could choose to ignore and shirk their responsibilities.  The 
LFA mandate gives OFDA the authority, but bureaucrats accessing and leveraging one 
another is how it becomes reality that an obscure office of less than 350 bureaucrats 
dictates the use of resources commanded by the behemoth DOD and other USG agencies.  
The overarching case study used to evaluate the bureaucratic access and leverage theory 
is the HA/DR policy domain with the associated OFDA and DOD personnel as the 
particular actors being investigated.   
                                                
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., p.4. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., p.14. 
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The findings and emerging theory from this project are important.  Bureaucratic 
access points and leverage will play a larger role with regard to who gets what, when, and 
how in the fiscally-constrained and uncertain future of USG budgetary policy.  More 
efficient policy initiatives and implementation measures are needed now more than ever.  
Bureaucratic access points and leverage theory offers bureaucrats some analytical 
capability in terms of knowing who is controlling policy implementation, and it also 
presents a tool they can use to maintain and increase their own influence and power 
within a policy domain.  
This study augments the fields of political science and, to a lesser extent, public 
administration.  Having established the purpose, frame, and value of the project, the 
following literature review provides this study’s foundation based on organizational 
structure, mission, conflict, and goal assessment.  Chapter Two delves into the HA/DR 
agencies focusing on their structures and roles.  It also presents the foundation for the 
bureaucratic access points and leverage theory and the research questions that guide the 
project.  Chapter Three discusses the research design and explains why qualitative 
methodology is used to investigate the bureaucratic access points phenomena and 
associated research questions.  Chapter Four offers an analysis of HA/DR bureaucrats’ 
interview data.  Chapter Five augments the interview findings with applicable HA/DR 
missions case studies and formalizes the bureaucratic access points and leverage theory.  
The final chapter discusses what the results mean from a theoretical and practical 
perspective.  In particular, the bureaucratic access points and leverage theory is shown to 
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be highly generalizable to other policy domains.  Policy recommendations, project 
limitations, and ideas for future research conclude the study. 
Policy Implementation 
 Policy implementation enjoys a vast literature.  This project is interested in policy 
outputs, organizational assessments, and the bureaucrats in the HA/DR policy domain.  
Therefore, a brief review of implementation literature covering outputs and outcomes and 
bottom-up and top-down theoretical approaches follows.  Organizations literature and 
access points theory literature will be discussed after this foundational perspective.   
 Policy outputs are the means by which policy is implemented.  For the bureaucrat, 
outputs are the task environment results of the policy.  Policy outcomes are the results of 
what happens when a given policy is implemented.  These may be viewed as the goals of 
the politicians legislating the policy.  While bureaucrats can play the latter role, as well, 
this study will focus more on the former role of the bureaucrat in terms of outputs.  
Literature discussing regimes and subgovernments6 and formal implementation game 
theory informs the output versus outcome perspective.  Of particular relevance to outputs 
and outcomes is Bardach’s ideas on resources (i.e., how they are distributed), goals (i.e., 
                                                
6 Stoker, Robert. 1989. “A regime framework for implementation analysis: Cooperation and reconciliation 
of federalist imperatives.” Policy Studies Review, 9(1):29–49. 
McCool, Daniel. 1990. “Subgovernments as determinants of political viability.” Political Science 
Quarterly, 105(2):269–293. 
Worsham, Jeffrey. 1998. “Subsystem dynamics and agenda control.” American Politics Quarterly, 
26(4):485–512. 
May, Peter. 1991. “Reconsidering policy design: Policies and publics.” Journal of Public Policy, 
11(2):187– 206. 
May, Peter. 1995. “Can cooperation be mandated? Implementing intergovernmental environmental 
management in New South Wales and New Zealand.” Publius, 25(1):89–113. 
May, Peter, Joshua Sapotichne, and Samuel Workman. 2009. “Widespread policy disruption: Terrorism, 
public risks, and homeland security.” Policy Studies Journal, 37(2):171–194. 
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how they gain support and evolve), administrative challenges (i.e., policy control and 
management), agency reputation, and delay.7  Bardach’s game consists of at least a 
provider and solicitor, and the delays in policy implementation with two actors occur 
with the number of decision points and transactions and issues of project management.  
When additional players are involved the delays occur with the onset of different goals 
(i.e., brought by each actor), uncertainty, and negotiations.  This is very similar to what 
Pressman and Wildavsky found in their study of the Economic Development 
Administration’s failed employment effort in Oakland.8 
 Moving on to the theoretical approaches to studying policy implementation, a 
brief description of the bottom-up and top-down evaluations follows.  A bottom-up 
approach focuses a lens on the actors in the implementation process.  It concerns itself 
with the influence of multiple actors, mission conflict, organizational structure, and the 
compromising of and within the legislative process.  A top-down approach is policy 
centered.  The legislation itself provides the central decision maker structure and 
uniformity, degrees of control (i.e., monitoring the policy and its implementation), 
authority and coordination (i.e., federalism and policy coherence on federal, state, and 
local levels), legitimacy (i.e., internal checks, such as bureaucratic professionalism, 
norms, and rules), and coordination.  These lenses yield very different “results” in terms 
                                                
7 Bardach, Eugene. 1977. The Implementation Game. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.   
An example of the HA/DR formal game may be found in the Appendix of this paper. 
8 Pressman, Jeffrey, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1973. Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington 
Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of 
the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build 
Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
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of evaluating policy implementation.  Which viewpoint one takes – the street-level 
bureaucrat’s or the central decision maker’s – results in different perspectives of what is 
policy success, efficiency, and effectiveness.  Much literature has been devoted to these 
two approaches9 with Sabatier providing a unique “best of” compilation.10  Elmore may 
provide the most succinct top-down, bottom-up combination with his authority down and 
expertise up idea.11  In summary, the myriad literature on implementation evaluates 
policy from the following perspectives:  evaluation and success; goals and goal conflict; a 
causal model; and trade-offs (i.e., goals are interdependent and who gets what is always 
at the cost of something or someone else).  With this implementation literature covering 
outputs and outcomes and bottom-up and top-down theoretical approaches as a 
foundation, we now turn to how organizational mission affects policy implementation.  
                                                
9 Top-Down theory led by (small sampling only): 
Mazmanian, Daniel, and Paul Sabatier, Paul. 1983. Implementation and Public Policy. Chicago: Scott 
Foresman and Co. 
Pressman, Jeffrey, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1973. Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington 
Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of 
the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build 
Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Van Meter, Donald, and Carl Van Horn. 1975. “The Policy Implementation Process: A conceptual 
framework.” Administration and Society, 6:445-488. 
Bottom-Up theory led by (representative sample only): 
Elmore, Richard. 1979. “Backward mapping: Implementation research and policy decisions.” Political 
Science Quarterly, 94:601–616. 
Lipsky, Michael. 1971. “Street Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform.” Urban Affairs 
Quarterly, 6:391-409. 
Berman, Paul. 1978. “The study of macro- and micro-implementation.” Public Policy, 26:157-184. 
10 Sabatier, Paul. 1986. “Top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research: A critical 
analysis and suggested synthesis.” Journal of Public Policy, 6:21–48. 
11 Elmore, Richard. 1979. “Backward mapping: Implementation research and policy decisions.” Political 
Science Quarterly, 94:601–616. 
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Organizational Mission and Policy Implementation 
An organization’s mission is its purpose or why it exists.  When Congress creates 
legislation, they necessarily create an entity to accomplish their goals with that 
legislation.  The goals of legislation may be specific or assumed from the mandate itself 
or by the means by which Congress empowers the responsible agency(ies) to account for 
its plans, procedures, and performance in the achievement of those goals.  There are two 
general schools of thought on the interplay between organization and mission.  One 
school, led by Moe, argues that organizational structure largely determines mission.12  
March leads the other school of thought that posits mission largely dictates an 
organization’s structure.13   
The mission and structure theories are rather limited in their ability to explain 
institutions and organizations and be practically applied by bureaucrats.  New, more 
diverse theory is needed in both political science and public administration literature.  
This project’s emerging leverage theory, stemming from the novel use of access points in 
investigating bureaucratic behavior and policy implementation, answers this demand for 
more explanatory theory and practical application.  Beyond the structure or mission 
argument, it is the current environment that most assuredly plays a vital role in the 
determination of policymakers’ goals and sets the organization’s mission.   
                                                
12 Moe, Terry. 1980. The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political 
Interest Groups. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  And Moe, Terry. 1984. “The new economics of 
organization.” American Journal of Political Science, 28:739– 777. 
13 March, James, ed. 1965. Handbook of Organizations. Chicago: Rand McNally.  And March, James, and 
Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds. 1986. Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military 
Decision Making. Boston: Pitman.  And March, James, and Herbert A. Simon. 1958. Organizations. New 
York: Wiley.  And March, James, and Johan Olsen. 1984. “The New Institutionalism: Organizational 
Factors in Political Life.” The American Political Science Review, 78 (3):734-749. 
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The context of the policy arena and policymakers’ and groups’ ability to frame 
their issue and target certain audiences is a common theme in works by Jones, 
Baumgartner, and Wilkerson, to name but a few.14  Jones and Baumgartner base much of 
their work on bounded rationality.  Their concept of maximization of returns (2009) 
argues that the policy agenda space is finite due to our cognitive limits (i.e., rather short 
attention spans).  The implications of a finite space in which only a certain number of 
policies can be dealt with at a given time even though many policy areas exist relates to 
the formulation of policy and, by extension, the organizational missions they inform and 
empower.  More vital to this paper’s focus on HA/DR agencies and policy 
implementation, May, Workman, and Jones discuss bureaucratic attention as a function 
of elites and elite agenda control rather than having a reliance on public attention in the 
policy making process.15  In summary, the preceding literature provides a foundation that 
places the HA/DR policy domain in a finite space where mission, influenced by 
organizational structure, matters and elites control the agenda.  The next step is to 
determine the latitude the HA/DR agencies may have within that finite space.  Wilson’s 
four political environments provide an informative context for the notion of agency 
latitude.  
Wilson attributes bureaucratic inefficiency to rules, standard operating procedures 
                                                
14 Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 2009. Agendas and Instability in American Politics, 2nd Ed. 
University of Chicago Press. 
Jones, Bryan and Frank Baumgartner. 2005. The Politics of Attention. University of Chicago Press. 
Jones, Bryan, Heather Larsen-Price, and John Wilkerson. 2009. “Representation and American Governing 
Institutions.” Journal of Politics, 71:277-90. 
15 May, Peter, Samuel Workman, and Bryan Jones. 2008. “Organizing Attention: Responses of the 
Bureaucracy to Agenda Disruption.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18:517-541. 
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(SOPs), norms, goals, incentives, constraints, culture, and values.16  In other words, 
context matters.  Wilson’s work offers a few key ideas about the context of the HA/DR 
policy arena.  First, bureaucrats are likely more concerned with processes than 
outcomes.17  The different assessment measures used by the HA/DR agencies are an 
example of this observation.  Next, agencies often have many bureaucrats responsible for 
and performing similar tasks (i.e., much similar, overlapping responsibility).18  The 
overlapping DOD and USAID responsibilities, coupled with the separate assessment and 
accountability measures of the HA/DR agencies, are clear illustrations of this idea.  
Finally, various agency constraints may increase the prevalence and power of outside 
influences.19   
Wilson posits four political environments that capture the effects of outside 
interests on an agency.  His notion of outside interests is what we typically understand as 
interest groups.  This study replaces interest groups with other agencies (or bureaucrats 
within those agencies) and elected officials as the outside interests in these environments.  
The first environment involves a “client agency,” and this occurs when an agency favors 
and supports another agency's goals.20  For example, the DOD supports the goals of 
HA/DR efforts and responds to OFDA requests.   
The second political environment relevant to the HA/DR arena is that of an 
                                                







“entrepreneurial agency” in which an agency is created to solve a particular problem.21  
OFDA’s role as LFA for HA/DR missions may be an example of this environment.  The 
“problem” (i.e., the disaster) is very specific and only OFDA maintains the experts to 
address it.   
Wilson’s third political environment involves competing agencies that vie for 
influence over the “interest group agency.”22  Because HA/DR efforts offer an occasion 
for public attention and praise, the DOD and the State Department may view their 
supportive roles as opportunities to leverage success and relevance when it comes to 
budgetary considerations.  They may compete for roles and responsibilities deemed 
necessary by OFDA.   
The fourth relevant political environment is referred to as a “majoritarian 
agency,” in which no particular outside agency attempts influence.23  As long as OFDA 
performs its duties to everyone’s satisfaction, the DOD or other agency will likely not 
attempt to influence or possibly wrest its authority as LFA during HA/DR events.  If 
OFDA fails in its mission, the DOD or other agency may view it as a liability to their 
missions or an opportunity to expand their missions.  These four political environments 
offer a context within which to place the notion of latitude.  
Latitude, or discretionary autonomy, begins with focus – a clear understanding of 
what an entity brings to the table in terms of responsibility, resources, information, 





capabilities, and reputation.  Focus enables strategic planning,24 which allows the 
possibility of control of future interactions, a key ingredient in autonomy.  An 
organization’s strategic planning helps identify its policy niche and advantages it may 
enjoy in strengthening its position.25  If “policies are inherently unstable and transitory” 
as Peltzman26 asserts, their associated goals and the missions of the agencies employed to 
accomplish those goals must be unstable and transitory, as well.  Alford argues that the 
mission (and purpose) of organizations is largely determined by exchange, cooperation, 
and compliance (i.e., in terms of the customer, but his overall point is the key here).27  In 
other words, an organization’s mission is not necessarily static because the goals may be 
adjusted, allowing the organization to anticipate different ways of implementing the 
legislation, or goals, that they are charged with accomplishing.  Thus, we have our basis 
for HA/DR agency latitude in a fixed policy space.  As will be discussed in Chapter Two, 
this flexibility or fluidity opens access points within the bureaucracy and the legislature.  
But first, an introduction to the HA/DR agencies is in order. 
                                                
24 Birnbaum, Bill. 2004. Strategic Thinking: A Four Piece Puzzle. Costa Mesa, CA: Douglas Mountain 
Publishing 
25 Fairholm, Matthew, and Gilbert Fairholm. 2009. Understanding Leadership Perspectives:  Theoretical 
and Practical Approaches. New York: Springer Publishers. 
26 Peltzman, Sam. 1989. “The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation.” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Microeconomics, 1-59. 
27 Alford, John. 2002. “Defining the client in the public sector: A social-exchange perspective.” Public 
Administration Review, 62(3):337-346. 
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Chapter 2:  The Agencies, Bureaucratic Access Points, and Research 
Questions 
Figure 1.  The Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Bureaucracy 
  
The Agencies 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)  
carries out U.S. foreign policy by promoting broad-scale human progress at the 
same time it expands stable, free societies, creates markets and trade partners for 
the United States, and fosters good will abroad… to promote broadly shared 
economic prosperity; strengthen democracy and good governance; improve global 
health, food security, environmental sustainability and education; help societies 
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prevent and recover from conflicts; and provide humanitarian assistance in the 
wake of natural and man-made disasters (USAID, 2011). 
 
With a budget of thirty billion dollars and 8,000 personnel, USAID is the 
independent and principal federal agency that extends assistance to countries recovering 
from disaster, attempting to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms.28  It 
receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State but, importantly, is 
an independent, sub-cabinet-level executive agency.29  USAID “supports long-term and 
equitable economic growth and advances U.S. foreign policy objectives by supporting 
economic growth, agriculture, and trade; global health; and democracy, conflict 
prevention, and humanitarian assistance.”30  The agency plays a critical role in U.S. 
national security and foreign policy.  USAID’s development efforts address poverty in 
foreign nations caused by insufficient economic opportunity, a fundamental cause of 
violence.31  Foreign development joins diplomacy and defense as one of three 
components of the nation’s foreign policy triad.  USAID “promotes peace and stability by 
fostering economic growth, protecting human health, providing emergency humanitarian 
assistance, and enhancing democracy in developing countries… to improve the lives of 
millions of people worldwide, represent U.S. values, and advance U.S. interests for peace 
and prosperity.”32 
Assistance and development is provided in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Near 
                                                
28 USAID, 2012. 
29 Ibid. 
30 U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-1. 
31 USAID, 2012. 
32 Ibid. 
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East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Eurasia.33 U.S. strength and 
diplomacy is projected through its many field offices throughout the world and presence 
in nearly 100 developing countries.  Examples of the assistance USAID provides include:  
technical assistance and capacity building; training and scholarships; food aid and 
disaster relief; infrastructure construction; enterprise loans and funding; budget support; 
and credit.34  USAID’s authority and responsibility includes managing a network of 
foreign nation programs for economic and policy reforms that encourages sound 
economic growth, political freedom, and good governance.35   
One of USAID’s primary missions is serving as the lead agency responsible for 
coordinating the USG response to declared disasters and emergencies worldwide.36  
Through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), USAID carries out the 
President’s authority to provide emergency relief and long-term humanitarian assistance 
in disaster relief efforts as declared by the ambassador within the affected country or 
higher DOS authority.37  Important to this study is the authority USAID/OFDA has in 
expediting “interventions at the operational and tactical levels through NGOs, IGOs, and 
other sources of relief capacity,” which includes the DOD.38 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011. 
36 USAID, 2012. 
37 U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011. 
38 U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-1. 
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The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is 
the office within USAID responsible for facilitating and coordinating U.S. 
Government emergency assistance overseas. As part of USAID’s Bureau for 
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), OFDA provides 
humanitarian assistance to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the 
social and economic impact of humanitarian emergencies worldwide (OFDA, 
2011). 
 
When a disaster is declared, OFDA has primary responsibility for initiating and 
coordinating the USG response.39  “The Administrator of USAID, as the Special 
Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, has delegated the authority to 
coordinate response to international disasters to OFDA, which is organized under 
USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA).”40  
With a budget of eight hundred million dollars and a staff of 350 personnel (150 of whom 
are contractors),41 OFDA is responsible to:  “1) Organize and coordinate the total USG 
disaster relief response; 2) respond to embassy and/or mission requests for disaster 
assistance; 3) initiate necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation; and 
4) coordinate assistance efforts with operational-level NGOs.”42  It is organized into three 
divisions.43  The Disaster Response and Mitigation Division coordinates the provision of 
HA/DR supplies and provides region-specific technical assistance.  Within the Disaster 
Response and Mitigation Division, the Technical Assistance Group provides scientific, 
                                                
39 USAID, 2012. 
40 U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-2. 
41 USAID, 2012. 
42 U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-2. 




technical, and analytical knowledge and skills in specific areas (e.g., agriculture and food 
security, natural resources, nutrition, public health, etc.) to make OFDA’s activities and 
decision making processes more effective and efficient.  The Operations Division is 
responsible for developing and managing logistical, operational, and technical support for 
OFDA field offices and disaster responses.  The Program Support Division provides 
administrative support, such as budget and financial services, procurement planning, 
contracts and grants administration, training, information management and technology 
services, and communications support. 
OFDA is the USG lead federal agency (LFA) for HA/DR events and formulates 
U.S. HA/DR policy in coordination with other USG agencies.44  “OFDA works with 
national and international foreign affairs agencies, DOD, DOS, UN agencies, IGOs, 
NGOs, and the private sector in disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, 
and rehabilitation… funds and procures relief supplies and administrative support for 
short- and long-term disaster situations and provides humanitarian relief, rehabilitation, 
and reconstruction assistance to foreign disaster victims.”45 
Finally, and most important to this study of bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats, 
USAID/OFDA calls on the aforementioned agencies and organizations to coordinate and 
accomplish the USG’s response to HA/DR events.  These agencies and organizations rely 
on USAID/OFDA for advice and assistance in accomplishing their assigned 
responsibilities. USAID/OFDA currently has agreements with the DOD “for matters 
                                                
44 Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC), 2011. 
45 U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-5. 
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concerning defense equipment and personnel provided to the affected country and for 
arranging DOD transportation.”46  DOD Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, 
establishes the interagency relationship between the DOD and USAID/OFDA. 
The U.S. Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) HA/DR 
missions and programs are central to efforts to enhance security and stability in 
Central America, South America and the Caribbean.  Humanitarian assistance 
focuses on the provision of health care, infrastructure improvements and aid to 
populations temporarily or chronically underserved.  Disaster relief is the 
response to reduce human suffering associated with natural disasters that cause 
the disruption of normal transportation and commerce and destroy infrastructure” 
(USSOUTHCOM, 2011, “Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief”).  (Note: 
“The U.S. Southern Command Area of Responsibility encompasses 31 countries 
and 15 areas of special sovereignty… includes the land mass of Latin America 
south of Mexico, the waters adjacent to Central and South America, [and] the 
Caribbean Sea (USSOUTHCOM, 2011, “Area of Responsibility”).   
 
In its entirety, the DOD has a budget of over six hundred billion dollars and 
nearly three million personnel (i.e., military members, civilian employees, and 
contractors).  The authority for the provision of U.S. military foreign assistance is a 
product of various pieces of legislation beginning in 1949.  The Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act of 1949 (MDAA) resulted from the development of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization.  The MDAA stated, “[I]n view of the coming into force of the North 
Atlantic Treaty…, “the President is hereby authorized to furnish military assistance in the 
                                                
46 U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-7.  OFDA maintains agreements with following USG 
agencies, as well: USDA’s U.S. Forest Service and the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land 
Management for emergency managers, logisticians, communicators, and firefighting experts; 
Commissioned Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
for health assessment and to provide medical personnel, equipment, and supplies; U.S. Geological Survey 
for notification and assessment of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions; NOAA for typhoon, hurricane, and 
cyclone reporting and assessment; and FEMA for training in disaster management, emergency 
preparedness, and relief for HN disaster specialists (U.S. military joint publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-7). 
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form of equipment, materials, and services to such nations as are parties to the treaty and 
have heretofore requested such assistance.”47  Further, the MDAA granted the President 
the use of the vast USG resources in these assistance missions stating in, “[T]he President 
may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such agency 
or officer of the United States as he shall direct.”48  
The Mutual Security Act of 1951 was enacted to “maintain the security and to 
promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and 
technical assistance to friendly countries.”49  The act created the Mutual Security Agency 
and the office of Director of Mutual Security, which was responsible for coordinating and 
supervising the military, economic, and technical assistance allowed in the act.  The 
President was given the authority to appoint the director and the U.S. military carried out 
the operations.  However, the Mutual Security Agency was soon abolished, and the 
Foreign Operations Administration assumed its foreign assistance mission.  Nearly as 
quickly, in 1955, Executive Order 10610 abolished the Foreign Operations 
Administration and transferred its responsibilities to the DOD and the DOS.50  This 
constitutes an important shift from foreign assistance being an executive office function 
to that of an executive agency function.  It also created the interagency dynamics we see 
today by sharing the responsibilities between the DOD and the DOS, albeit for only six 
years (1955-1961).   
                                                
47 Public Law 81-329, 1949. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Public Law 165, 1951. 
50 USAID History, 2012, and Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011. 
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The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (i.e., U.S. Code 22) granted “continuous 
supervision and general direction” of U.S. foreign assistance to the DOS and created 
USAID.51  That authority has rested in the DOS under the direction of USAID for the last 
50 years due to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA 1961).  But the initial shared 
responsibilities between the DOD and DOS and the FAA 1961 have continued to create 
interagency conflict and points of contention as we see in the following discussion. 
According to FAA 1961, the President is authorized to provide military assistance 
by “acquiring from any source and providing (by loan or grant) any defense article or 
defense service; [and] assigning or detailing members of the Armed Forces of the United 
States and other personnel of the Department of Defense to perform duties of a 
noncombatant nature.”52  The FAA 1961 makes the Secretary of State responsible for the 
“continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military 
assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to 
determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action).”53  In the 
eventuality of military assistance, the act stipulates the following responsibilities to the 
Secretary of Defense:  the “determination of military end-item requirements; the 
procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits its integration with service 
programs; the supervision of end-item use by the recipient countries; the supervision of 
the training of foreign military and related civilian personnel; the movement and delivery 
of military end-items; and within the Department of Defense, the performance of any 
                                                
51 USAID History, 2012, and Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
52 Foreign Assistance Act, Section 503, 1961. 
53 Foreign Assistance Act, Section 622, 1961. 
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other functions with respect to the furnishing of military assistance, education and 
training.”54  Furthermore, the “establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery, 
and allocation of military equipment” is a responsibility of the Secretary of Defense.55  
These rather imprecise responsibilities and overlapping jurisdictions are manifested in 
interagency tension and have spawned various acts and attempted clarifications by 
Congress. 
For example, the 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act, which increased congressional 
oversight of such sales, resulted from a congressional report that was concerned about the 
ramifications of a large military sales program.56  The concerns included the possible 
development of regional arms races that could shift economic resources from other needs 
and thereby create regional tensions.57  A more lengthy evolution of a facet of the FAA 
1961 concerns peacekeeping operations. 
In 1974, the policy on foreign police training58 was amended.  Peacekeeping 
operations funds could only be spent on police training in order to assist and augment 
military peacekeepers in particular foreign assistance operations.  President Kennedy had 
established a public safety program to train foreign police and gave responsibility for the 
program to the Agency for International Development, now known as USAID.59  The 
program was in response to growing concerns over the spread of communism.  The U.S. 
                                                
54 Foreign Assistance Act, Section 623, 1961. 
55 Ibid. 
56 House of Representatives Report Number 1641, 1968. 
57 Ibid. 
58 This prohibition did not allow police training – or related advice – in foreign countries to be paid for by 
foreign assistance funds.  It was formally added in Section 660 of the updated 1973 FAA. 
59 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011. 
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was funding such police training in 34 countries to the tune of 60 million dollars per year 
by 1968.60  Congress became involved in the early 1970s when questions regarding 
insufficient public safety program policy guidelines and the use of funds to support 
countries known for human rights abuses surfaced.61  The updated FAA in 1973 
effectively ended the public safety program.  Multiple amendments to the FAA since 
1974 have allowed exceptions to the funding rule.  For example, since 1985 funds are 
allowed for foreign police training “with respect to a country which has a longstanding 
democratic tradition, does not have standing armed forces, and does not engage in a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”62  
Additionally, since 1996 funds can be used “to reconstitute civilian police authority and 
capability in the post-conflict restoration of host nation infrastructure for the purposes of 
supporting a nation emerging from instability, and the provision of professional public 
safety training, to include training in internationally recognized standards of human 
rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption, and the promotion of civilian police roles that 
support democracy.”63  An interesting side note is that the President maintains waiver 
authority “under 22 USC § 2364 when ‘…important to the security interests of the United 
States.’”64   
The preceding examples illustrate the evolving nature of the FAA and the HA/DR 
policy arena.  They also point out the fact that little guidance is provided for the 







humanitarian assistance portion of the term “security assistance” in this policy65.  But a 
more encompassing, if still unclear, piece of guidance added to the security assistance 
policy in 2004.  The notion of “security cooperation” sheds light on the HA/DR policy 
and mission. 
DOD Directive 5105.65 delegates “administration of security cooperation 
programs in whole or in part to the Military Departments and Combatant Commands” 
(e.g., USSOUTHCOM).  Furthermore, the directive granted the military departments and 
combatant commands the authority to “oversee formulation of security cooperation 
programs in accordance with approved guidance and policies.”  However, it did not 
define “security cooperation.”   
A 2004 DOD publication defined security cooperation as all “DOD interactions 
with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific 
U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense 
and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency 
access to a host nation.”66  Further elaboration of the term security cooperation was 
offered in 2008 in DOD Directive 5132.03, which states that such activities include “all 
DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-
administered security assistance programs, that:  build defense and security relationships 
                                                
65 Security assistance is defined by U.S. military joint publication 1-02 as a “group of programs authorized 
by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as 
amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, 
and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and 
objectives.”  
66 U.S. Military Joint Publication 1-02, 2004. 
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that promote specific U.S. security interests…; develop allied and friendly military 
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations…”  While not overly precise, 
these guidelines generally place U.S. military-related HA/DR missions and capabilities 
within the security cooperation construct.  One matter that is clear, however, is that the 
lack of specific HA/DR guidance in DOD policy places USAID and OFDA firmly in 
control of those missions.  This calls for more interagency communication and agreed 
upon assessment measures.    
Table 1.  Major Types of Security Assistance Programs67 
Type of Security Assistance Program     Administered by   
Foreign Military Sales        DOD   
Foreign Military Construction Services       DOD   
Foreign Military Sales Credit       DOD   
Leases          DOD   
Military Assistance Program        DOD   
International Military Education and Training     DOD   
Drawdown          DOD   
Economic Support Fund        DOS   
Peace Keeping Operations         DOS   
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement    DOS   
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related Programs   DOS   
Commercial Export Sales Licensed Under Arms Export Control Act DOS   
 
 
The interagency challenges associated with this responsibility sharing have 
become a concern.  Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified before the 
Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on House Appropriations stating, “[I]n recent 
years we have struggled to overcome the patchwork of authorities and regulations that 
were put in place during a very different era – the Cold War – to confront a notably 
                                                
67 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011. 
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different set of threats and challenges.”68  And then Under Secretary of Defense Eric 
Edelman commented, “[W]e need new, more responsive authorities enabling us to 
expedite the training and equipping of partner nations” in a hearing before the Committee 
on House Armed Services.69  The DOD clearly wants more authority and opportunities to 
be valuable in this time of budget cuts and agency scrutiny.  And it is not only the DOD 
that sees the need for new policy.  The following examples of authority changes have 
been recommended by the DOS:  allow DOD assistance to non-military security forces; 
single-year security-related appropriations should be expanded to multi-year periods; 
repeal or amend the ban on assistance for civilian law enforcement units with regard to 
peacekeeping operations (PKO) funds (i.e., the previously mentioned Section 660 of the 
1973 FAA).70 
It has been argued that new authorities are needed for faster and more accurate 
budgetary funding and accounting.  According to the current congressional budget cycle, 
the Executive begins planning for the allocation of foreign and military assistance a full 
two years prior to the fiscal year in which the funding will be used.71  The DOS and 
USAID face the same foreign assistance budget-allocation dilemma, but their difficulties 
are exacerbated by the fact that nearly all of their funding is controlled by earmarks and 
                                                
68 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011.  (Testimony: March 29, 2007.) 
69 Ibid. (Testimony: April 7, 2006.) 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid.  In the case of foreign military financing, funding to deal with emergencies may not be available 
for up to four years in the future.  Of the $4.6 billion FMF account, only $80 million was available for 
discretionary use by the DOD (Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011). 
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various other legislative limitations.72  Congress has, at the same time, lauded and 
expressed concern regarding calls for increased DOD authority.  Then-Chairman of the 
House Armed Services Committee Ike Skelton (Dem., MO) praised the DOD’s effort to 
“jumpstart, and take responsibility for resourcing, an interagency process” but was 
concerned with “what appears to be the migration of State Department activities to the 
Department of Defense.”73  Then-Secretary of Defense Gates responded to Rep. 
Skelton’s concern by positing, “building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military 
requirement – irrespective of the capacity of other departments – and its authorities and 
funding mechanisms should reflect that reality.”74  Once again we see that the 
interagency challenges and responsibilities are points of contention – even when one 
agency is willing to cede some authority to the other. 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
Humanitarian assistance in the USG HA/DR agency context refers to relief, not 
development.75  The Foreign Assistance Act (September 4, 1961) created USAID and 
OFDA.76  It was due in large part to the Marshall Plan (June 5, 1947), which outlined the 
need and purpose of the U.S. providing humanitarian aid and specifically by President 
Kennedy’s inaugural speech (January 20, 1961).  While an important humanitarian 
responsibility and diplomatic tool, less than one percent of the USG budget goes toward 
                                                
72 USAID, 2012, and Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011. 
73 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC).  USAID/OFDA produces and presents an educational 
workshop to prepare DOD personnel to work collaboratively with OFDA during HA/DR operations.  I 
attended one of these workshops July 28-29 in San Antonio, Texas. 
76 USAID, 2011. 
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foreign aid, yet over 50 USG agencies are involved with the delivery of foreign aid 
(including HA/DR efforts) with the Departments of State, Agriculture, and Energy 
mainly responsible.77  The State Department, USAID/OFDA, and the DOD are the main 
agencies involved in HA/DR-specific missions.78  This project will focus on USAID, 
generally, and OFDA and USSOUTHCOM, specifically.79 
USAID is a sub-cabinet level position and is not a part of the State Department.  
USAID does not report to or through the DOS, and its budget is separate from the DOS 
(i.e., “administratively” its monies flow through the DOS, but the DOS does not 
determine how or where those monies are spent).80  USAID and DOS, jointly, promote 
peace and security, support democratic government, invest in people (e.g., 
health/wellness, education, etc.), and support local economic growth and humanitarian 
assistance when required.81  Specifically, USAID provides humanitarian assistance in the 
form of:  1) recovery from disaster; 2) escaping poverty; and 3) engaging in democratic 
reforms.82  In keeping with these responsibilities, OFDA is charged to:  1) save lives; 2) 
                                                
77 JHOC, 2011. 
78 Ibid. 
79 USSOUTHCOM was chosen as the subject DOD entity in order to provide more specificity and 
nuanced observations rather than studying the entire DOD.  This combatant command is representative of 
the DOD in that it includes a joint (i.e., Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine forces) perspective and its 
readiness and training and real world missions are HA/DR related.  The command has a long history of 
such missions, dating back to its origin as the Caribbean Defense Command, 1941-1947 (USSOUTHCOM, 
2012).  And although the command honorably served the efforts of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, its 
geographic location and mission mitigate, to a larger degree than that of similar commands, the influence 
those wars had in terms of responding to HA/DR events. 
80 JHOC, 2011. 
81 Ibid. 
82 USAID, 2011, and JHOC, 2011. 
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alleviate human suffering; and 3) reduce the economic and social impact of disasters.83  
The third charge includes mitigation and pre-disaster planning and preparation (e.g., 
table-top exercises; building up and storing resources, supplies, and other capabilities in 
specific areas of the world).84  And USSOUTHCOM is one of nine unified combatant 
commands within the DOD (i.e., a joint command including Air Force, Army, Navy, and 
Marine personnel and resources) and is “responsible for providing contingency planning, 
operations, and security cooperation for Central America, South America, the Caribbean 
(except U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions)… [and] the defense of the 
Panama Canal and canal area.”85  Its specific HA/DR mission is described above. 
The organizational structures of these agencies resemble most USG bureaucracies 
in that they are vertical and hierarchical.  OFDA, however, is more flat due to the fact it 
has only about 350 personnel, roughly 150 of whom are contractors.86  (Please see 
USAID and OFDA organization charts in Appendix.)  Once a disaster is declared by the 
U.S. ambassador or her/his designee (e.g., Chief of Mission) or the Assistant Secretary of 
State for the region (i.e., located in Washington D.C.; this is the case if the U.S. does not 
have an embassy in the country affected) OFDA becomes the LFA and coordinates all 
                                                
83 JHOC, 2011. 
84 Ibid. 
85 USSOUTHCOM, 2011. 
86 JHOC, 2011.  Notes: The $800M figure may seem small for an agency with such responsibilities, but 
OFDA does not need to “own” the resources as it has all of the USG HA/DR capabilities and resources at 
its beck and call as LFA.  Mitigation efforts account for ten percent the OFDA budget, and it is estimated 
by OFDA that those pre-disaster efforts save seven dollars in response dollar spending for every dollar 
spent for mitigation.  USAID includes roughly 8,000 personnel and a budget of $30B for FY2011. 
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foreign disaster assistance efforts to include requesting support from other USG entities.87  
In other words, this office of 350 controls the vast HA/DR resources of the USG, 
including the DOD.  This incredible power is discussed more fully in the forthcoming 
interagency discussion, but the ramifications of this phenomenon cannot be overstated.  
The host, or affected, country is in charge of the relief effort – certainly to varying 
degrees – and the U.S. ambassador is the U.S. lead in the country, but OFDA is in a 
dominant position because of its LFA status, vast expertise and information, and control 
of myriad USG resources.  Its small size in terms of personnel is a bureaucratic challenge 
as more USG agencies become involved. 
May (and Winter) in their work on domestic disaster policy discuss this paradox 
that OFDA faces.88  Their observation involves the effect of multiple agencies and 
entities having a responsibility in the response – the more entities involved, the greater 
the dispersion of control and accountability and the more difficult it is to centralize a 
response.  Organizational and, in some sense, policy domain structure changes come with 
opportunity costs due to the fact that centralization creates difficulties with disparate 
sources of information and expertise.  Therefore, the substance of the policy matters in 
terms of the information coming from entities who are not experts, and this creates a fog 
of command and control and, ultimately, implementation. 
                                                
87 JHOC, 2011. 
88 May, Peter. 1986. Disaster Policy Implementation: Management Strategies Under Shared Governance. 
New York: Plenum Press.  And May, Peter, and Walter Williams. 1985.  Recovering From Catastrophes: 
Federal Disaster Relief Policy and Politics. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.  And May, Peter, and Søren 
Winter. 2009. "Politicians, Managers, and Street-Level Bureaucrats: Influence on Policy Implementation." 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19(3): 453-476.  And May, Peter, and Søren 
Winter. 2007. "Collaborative Service Arrangements, Patterns, Bases, and Perceived Consequences." Public 
Management Review, 9(4): 479-502. 
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The perplexing result of this fog is that the conflicts and problems with 
information confuse what could be a synergistic relationship that could effectively 
respond to multiple policy goals at one time.  For example, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) transitioned to a terrorism focus after 9/11 and nearly 
eliminated the natural disaster response or relief verbiage in their policy hearings.89  In 
various ways the response to a terrorist act and a natural disaster – as far as what FEMA 
would be responsible for – would likely be similar.  The idea that both responses can be 
handled similarly is how the DOD often addresses the dual roles of readiness and HA/DR 
efforts.  Section 401 of the Title 10 U.S. Code, DOD Directive 2205.2 (October 1994), 
and DOD Instruction 2205.3 (January 1995) dictate that military resources and funds be 
used for training and readiness.  But funds are authorized for military forces to engage in 
HA activities if they help obtain and advance the security interests of the U.S. and the 
host nation and enhance the operational readiness skills of the military members 
performing the HA mission.90   
The training and readiness exercises that prepare and assess military resources for 
fitness and competence for duty in war and other conflict is used as humanitarian 
assistance that also prepares military resources to respond to disaster relief efforts.  
Moynihan discusses the Incident Command System (ICS) and its use in crisis response 
                                                
89 May, Peter, Joshua Sapotichne, and Samuel Workman. 2009. “Widespread policy disruption: Terrorism, 
public risks, and homeland security.” Policy Studies Journal, 37(2):171–194.  And Workman, Samuel. 
November 2, 2011.  Note: Former citation, generally; latter citation, specifically. 
90 U.S. Code: Title 10, Chapter 20, Section 401. 
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efforts that require a temporary hierarchical structure among the associated agencies.91  
The ICS attempts to address the coordination difficulties stemming from disparate views 
and the compilation of multiple entities identified by Wildavsky and Pressman and, more 
recently, May, et al.  The manner in which authority is shared and contested, and the 
importance of trust in determining and maintaining control are key components of the 
ICS.92  Having discussed the missions and organizations of USAID/OFDA and 
USSOUTHCOM and the fog of multiple entities combining to address the disaster, we 
now turn to the interagency conflicts associated with assessment measures and how they 
affect HA/DR policy implementation.  
Interagency Conflicts and Bureaucratic Challenges 
Interagency conflicts and bureaucratic challenges affecting implementation are 
largely due to different missions and different assessment measures.  As mentioned, 
OFDA, an agency with 350 individuals, in many ways controls DOD resources in these 
HA/DR situations.  That in and of itself is unique in terms of mission and 
implementation.  Assessments of what is required to meet the disaster event’s needs and 
differences in how those assessments are measured are the prime reasons for conflict in 
the HA/DR policy domain. 
 
                                                
91 Moynihan, Donald. 2009. “The Network Governance of Crisis Response: Case Studies of Incident 
Command Systems.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19(4): 895-915. 
92 Ibid. 
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We begin with the categorized types of disasters.  The HA/DR community places 
disasters into three main categories:  
1) Rapid Onset (e.g., earthquake, volcanoes, tsunamis depending on time/warning);  
2) Slow Onset (e.g., drought);  
3) Complex Emergency (CE), which have elements of conflict associated with them 
(e.g., the recent situation in Libya and many of the disasters in Africa).93 
 
There are three main criteria for determining when disaster relief will be offered by the 
USG. They include the following with a fourth criterion that may play a larger 
role in the future: 
1) The host, or affected, country must ask for or be willing to accept USG assistance. 
2) The disaster is of such magnitude that it is beyond the host country’s ability to 
respond adequately (i.e., therefore, most USG efforts will be in developing 
nations). 
3) It is in the interest of the USG to provide assistance.  Note: OFDA has always 
responded with DR efforts when #1 and #2 have been met; but a disaster in 
Venezuela, for instance, may be an example in which #3 changes the overall 
decision to provide DR.  Other countries may view U.S. relief efforts in 
Venezuela (or a similar situation) as a “way in” politically to change that 
country’s political course, and “ulterior motives” of DR must be kept to a 
minimum if U.S. assistance is to be accepted in the future. 
4) Only #1-3 are “official” USG criteria, but a fourth may be resources and, in 
particular, money.  Will budget cuts begin to dictate US involvement, and should 
                                                
93 JHOC, 2011. 
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they?  This, in conjunction with #3, introduces the idea that morality trumps 
practicality in many cases in U.S. policy.94  
 
OFDA responds with relief efforts that include funding, humanitarian 
commodities, and personnel.  Most of the USG funding for particular DR efforts goes to 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations (UN).  As an aside, the 
Stafford Act, which deals with monies for DR causes, does not impact OFDA because it 
addresses domestic disasters only.  Humanitarian commodities include plastic sheeting, 
water treatment units, blankets, etc.) but not food or specific medicines (i.e., other 
agencies are responsible for these).  OFDA offers much expertise and its personnel offer 
specific HA/DR knowledge and lessons learned and are aware of cultural issues and 
sensitivities, are familiar with the region’s disaster profile, and have vital relationships 
and contacts in every region.95  Unfortunately, the way OFDA divides the globe into 
regions does not align with the DOD combatant commands’ (e.g., USSOUTHCOM) 
areas of responsibility.  Therefore, OFDA may be dealing with multiple combatant 
commands simultaneously.  One policy suggestion would be to streamline 
communication and interagency coordination by aligning OFDA regions with DOD areas 
of responsibility. 
                                                
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid.  OFDA personnel are included in the following: Assessment teams, which are sector 
specialists/experts (i.e., medical, water, sanitation, health, food, shelter) who provide the right resource, at 
the right place, at the right time; Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), which are the least used 
response option, but have the highest visibility and expertise and manage USG relief efforts on the ground 
for the Ambassador (under Ambassador’s authority); Response Management Team (RMT), which are 
initiated if a DART is placed and serve as liaisons for the DART and deals with the political/information 
(i.e., at the strategic level) requirements from Washington D.C. and allows the DART to do its job on the 
ground without having to “feed the information beast” consisting of politicians and the media. 
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Assessments 
With these foundations of what constitutes a disaster, how the decision to provide 
relief is assessed, and the components of the relief we can turn to the assessment 
measures of what constitutes “need” in DR situations.  Again, this is the main point of 
conflict in this interagency amalgam.  First, and foremost, the DOD still does not have 
measures of effectiveness; they assess based on what they can do (i.e., what they can 
bring to the table in terms of capabilities).  OFDA assesses on needs, not what could be 
done, but what needs to be done to return the host nation back to the state it was in one 
minute before the disaster occurred.   This is a very important distinction, and it is not 
merely semantics – “assessment” means something very different to the DOD than it 
does to OFDA and other relief agencies.  In addition to the DOD pushing (i.e., in 
assessment and its capabilities) while OFDA pulls (i.e., determines needs first, then 
requests capabilities), the U.S. military tends to plan for worst case scenarios, while 
OFDA looks at the particular need for the particular incident or event.  These are 
important differences that can cause friction between the agencies. 
  The friction created by different assessment measures not only thickens the fog 
of DR implementation in the immediate response, but it makes it difficult to transition 
from relief to plans for development and effectively, efficiently transitioning out of the 
country.  The “simple” question of what constitutes success and mission accomplishment 
is therefore skewed by the differences in the initial assessments and what they are based 
upon.  This conflict has much to do with measures.  If the USG HA/DR policy goal is to 
get the host nation back to its pre-disaster level or state of functioning, why is this a 
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difficult transition?  International organizations (IOs)96 and NGOs play a role in the 
conflict, but the cultures, goals, rules, and norms97 that inform the assessments employed 
by the USAID/OFDA and DOD bureaucracies are of particular interest to this discussion. 
The following table offers organizational differences between humanitarian and 
military entities. 
Table 2.  Humanitarian and Military Cultures:  Differences98 
HUMANITARIAN MILITARY 
Independent Highly disciplined 
Decentralized authority Hierarchical command 
On-the-job training Extensive training 
Few field manuals/guidance Rules and regulations abound 
Long-term perspective Immediacy (accomplish mission and 
leave) 
 
But these groups are alike in more philosophical ways.  Both groups are 
motivated by service and a desire to improve a situation.  Both spend much time away 
from their loved ones often and for extended periods.  Both are selfless and understand 
the intrinsic benefits of being a part of something larger than themselves.  The differences 
and commonalities are generalities, but few would argue the overall ideas presented here.  
                                                
96 Examples: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which focuses on conflicts/complex 
emergencies; the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), which is the 
“traditional” Red Cross most think of; the International Organization for Migration, which deals with 
anyone who voluntarily moves across a border in search of economic gain; and, of course, the UN and its 
subgroups (e.g., the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UN’s equivalent to OFDA), 
all of which is large and decentralized resulting in command and control issues that affect coordination and 
collaboration. 
97 Please see previous literature review for references. 
98 JHOC, 2011. 
 36 
Yet, conflict remains in this policy domain and steps have been taken to mitigate the 
deleterious effects. 
DOD and USAID/OFDA efforts are coordinated by the “Oslo Guidelines.”  These 
guidelines provide non-binding guidance for the use of foreign military and civil defense 
assets in disaster relief efforts.99  For example, the military is only to be used when a 
civilian asset cannot perform the task and the military provides that unique, critical tool 
or capability.  An important point here is that OFDA objectives and definitions of 
humanitarian action are couched by an emphasis on humanity, impartiality, neutrality, 
and independence.100  These ideals variously espouse the notion that humanitarian action 
should do no harm, that allocation of resources should be based on need, and that the goal 
is to strengthen the host country’s capacity so it can move forward and recover on its 
own.  Under these conditions, neutrality may be the most important concept because 
USAID/OFDA (and NGOs) cannot be seen as favoring the military or acquiescing to 
other-than-humanitarian goals or objectives.  The humanitarian aspect can also come into 
conflict with the purpose of DOD involvement in pre- or extra-disaster relief efforts, 
which is to train U.S. troops and prepare them for deployments, not necessarily for the 
delivery of wellness or medical services to the host nation (i.e., Title 10 stipulations).  
Finally, assessments of the type of required assistance is guided by whether the need calls 
for direct, indirect, or infrastructure support.101  Direct assistance entails the military 
                                                
99 “Guidelines On the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief - “Oslo 
Guidelines.” 2006. (Revision 1.1 November 2007) 
100 JHOC, 2011. 
101 Ibid. 
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providing a capability no other entity can provide (e.g., aeromedical evacuation).  An 
example of indirect assistance would be the provision of DOD equipment for use by 
relief workers (i.e., U.S. military provides assets such as trucks, tents, etc.).  
Infrastructure support sees the U.S. military providing the means for the accomplishment 
of some task (e.g., air or sea transportation, expertise, etc.). 
In summary, this interagency conflict section has focused on the assessment 
differences leading to potential civil-military issues and confusion in HA/DR efforts.  
The following is a brief list of the important components to avoid, or at least lessen, this 
conflict: 
- The USG HA/DR policy goal is to bring the host nation back to the level 
of pre-disaster status (not improve it); 
- Know the context; 
- Know the priority needs; 
- Be sensitive to partner concerns; 
- Do not duplicate efforts; 
- Do not compare living conditions to U.S. standards; 
- Focus on institutional support (i.e., institutions, not people) and help the 
system to help the populace. 
 
These are important fog of friction points to ponder because the U.S. military is 
used more often in these situations, and the military is inviting itself to help in HA/DR 
efforts besides being asked or requested by OFDA/USAID.  Finally, actors in this policy 
domain would do well to remember that OFDA is LFA and is responsible for determining 
the appropriate USG HA/DR contributions and validates the humanitarian requirement 
(i.e., needs assessment) and the following keys to OFDA and DOD coordination. 
- Communication; 
- Exchanging/embedding liaisons; 
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- Sharing information; 
- Understanding the mission and the unique capabilities at appropriate 
levels (i.e., needs/pull, rather than capabilities/push); 
- Right resource, at the right place, at the right time; 
- Validating the mission; 
- Understanding local capability; 
- Transition and phase-out (i.e., mission accomplishment); 
- One team, one fight; 
- Managing expectations is very important (i.e., again, return to pre-disaster 
conditions only, not improving the host nation’s situation beyond that 
criterion).102 
Please see Appendix for more information on the criteria for DOD involvement 
and how OFDA requests DOD resources.    
  
The preceding sections have provided a foundation based on organizational 
structure, mission, conflict, and goal assessment.  The next step is determining the access 
points that may be the bureaucrats themselves or available to the bureaucrats and 
agencies.  To Hammond, structure is the agenda.103  Which actor makes a decision and at 
what level that decision is made is what matters.  Span of control is an issue in terms of 
what is delegated and what is reported directly, and that is based on the structure of the 
organization.  The structure is determinative of the agenda and the outcome is based on 
what information is paid attention to, again, based on what level and which actor is 
making the decision.  Importantly, Hammond’s theory assumes that structure is malleable 
and can be adjusted.  This provides the opportunity for access points to appear in the 
implementation process.  Bureaucrats may be points of access themselves, and 
bureaucrats may be accessing other bureaucrats in this construct.   
                                                
102 JHOC, 2011. 
103 Hammond, Thomas. 1986. “Agenda control, organizational structure, and bureaucratic politics.” 
American Journal of Political Science, 30(2):379–420. 
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Access Points Theory 
Interest group politics literature provides a foundation for the notion of access 
points.  The literature discussing interest group influence can be divided into two camps:  
1) interest groups dominate and elected officials acquiesce to their demands; and 2) 
interest groups’ influence is limited by the information sought by elected officials, and 
the limited time and attention of elected officials regarding specific interests further 
mitigates groups’ power and influence.  The first camp consists of various scholars 
generally following Schattschneider’s early argument that well organized groups control 
legislators and that the latter then ignore everyone else.104  They include Truman and 
Lowi to name two of the more notable contributors.105  Bauer, de Sola Pool, and Dexter 
are the forerunners of the second camp that finds business is more constrained than is 
generally thought.106   
Lobbying activity exhibits immense skewness.107  Few issues enjoy massive 
amounts of activity; the majority are specialty, or niche, issues that receive activity from 
only a few groups (i.e., which tend to be business groups).108  In nearly all cases, 
                                                
104 Schattschneider, E. E. 1935. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in 
Pressure Politics, as Shown in the 1929-1930 Revision of the Tariff. New York: Prentice-Hall. 
105 Truman, David B. 1971. The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Public Opinion. New 
York: Knopf. And Lowi, Theodore J. 1979. The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United 
States. New York: Norton. 
106 Bauer, Raymond, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Dexter. 1963. American Business and Public Policy: 
The Politics of Foreign Trade (New York: Atherton Press). 
107 Baumgartner, Frank, and Beth Leech. 2001. “Issue Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest 
Group Involvement in National Politics.” Journal of Politics. 63:1191-1213. 
108 Ibid. 
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government attention leads to lobbying and largely dictates lobbying activity.109  And 
the status quo prevails in most policy domains.110  While these broad perspectives 
provide a general foundation, Baumgartner and Leech argue that interest group literature 
fails to cumulate existing approaches, theories, and frameworks.   
The lack of accumulated knowledge about interest groups stems from narrow, 
poorly generalizable studies.111  It also results from an absence of a clear, set definition 
for terminology, the lack of large, comprehensive data that would allow for the 
formulation and testing of larger theories, and a failure by scholars to include context into 
their models and theories.112  In other words, we need to know the systematic causes of 
interest group politics.  These arguments and realizations reveal other important 
contributions of this project.  Bureaucratic access points and leverage theory is 
generalizable across policy domains.  At the same time, the study reveals deep contextual 
features within the subject HA/DR policy domain.  Therefore, we turn to the concept of 
access points theory. 
According to Ehrlich, access points theory espouses that 
a single underlying feature of many different types of political institutions 
provides answers to both the questions of whom policy favors and whether policy 
is complex or simple across a wide range of different policy areas.  The central 
                                                
109 Leech, Beth, Frank Baumgartner, Timothy La Pira, and Nicholas Semanko. 2005. "Drawing Lobbyists 
to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy." Political Research Quarterly 58:19-
30. 
110 Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1962. “Two Faces of Power.” American Political Science Review 
56:947-952.  And Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1963. “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical 
Framework.” American Political Science Review 57:632-642. 
111 Baumgartner, Frank, and Beth Leech. 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and 
in Political Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
112 Ibid. 
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insight…is that the more points of access provided to interest groups, the more 
complex policy will be, and if one side of the debate has an advantage in 
lobbying, the more biased policy will be toward the side with the advantage 
(p.5).113 
 
A subtle, yet key, nuance in Ehrlich’s definition and my theory of access points is 
that he considers as an access point every policymaker who can be lobbied and who has 
influence in a policy domain.114  This stems from economic theory that holds the greater 
number of access points, in this case, the less cost to the interest groups to get their 
message heard because the increase in the supply of access points (i.e., again, 
policymakers) increases the demand for the resources (e.g., information, campaign 
contributions) provided by the groups.  The notion of access points has traditionally 
involved lobbyists and interest groups accessing elected officials.  I reason that 
bureaucrats may be seen as quasi-policymakers in how they implement policy and are, 
therefore, access points.  Furthermore, and most importantly, I argue that bureaucrats use 
other bureaucrats as access points in a similar fashion as do interest groups and their 
lobbyists when accessing elected officials and their staffs. 
The notion of bias in Ehrlich’s definition is an important aspect of access points 
theory, and three works from the early 1960s inform my interpretation and expansion of 
the theory.  Schattschneider introduced the “mobilization of bias” idea (i.e., dominant 
values, beliefs, and institutional procedures put in place to benefit certain persons or 
groups at the expense of others) in describing how groups attempt to influence policy 
                                                
113 Ehrlich, Sean D. 2011. Access Points: An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
114 Ibid., p.6. 
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(outputs) and thereby garner benefits (outcomes).115  Schattschneider also argues that 
when an interest group sees itself at some disadvantage, it will want to expand the 
conflict.116  Such expansion creates more access points.   
Bachrach and Baratz add control of the policy process through power to the 
mobilization of bias theory.117  They focus on the dynamics of nondecision making, or 
the continuance and maintenance of the status quo by limiting the scope of decision 
making to only “safe” issues and policies.  Control of the agenda is crucial, and it relies 
on the mobilization of bias.  This bias is sustained through nondecision making (i.e., by 
force or threat of sanctions; norms, values, rules, procedures, etc.), thus assuring certain 
persons or groups and their perspectives and issues are kept off of the policymaking 
agenda and not heard.  Agenda limitation or constraint is accomplished through what they 
refer to as the restrictive face of power.  The strength of Schattschneider’s and Bachrach 
and Baratz’s analytical framework is that it is simple and direct.  Its weakness is the lack 
of applicability for policymakers in terms of access points that in turn affect policy 
implementation.  Tangentially related to this discussion is Olson’s work on the collective 
action problem faced by groups within a policy domain.118  
                                                
115 Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America. 
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1962. “Two Faces of Power.” American Political Science Review 
56:947-952.  And Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1963. “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical 
Framework.” American Political Science Review 57:632-642. 
118 Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press.  And Olson, Mancur. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven: 
Yale Press. 
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Bias may be viewed as Laswell’s “who gets what, when, and how” definition of 
politics119 and, especially, the amount one side gets of the “what” in relation to the 
amount received by the other side.120  The benefits of the mobilization of bias lead to 
access points in a quid pro quo arrangement between the seekers of access and the access 
points themselves.  Bureaucrats, lobbyists, and interest groups offer similar benefits to 
their sought after access points:  information, expertise, and the ability to stir media and 
increase the public’s intensity of interest (Dahl121).  But, bureaucracies have the 
legitimacy of the state behind them, interest groups do not and there are no policies 
without bureaucracy.122   
Accessing Bureaucrats 
Croley argues that it is the value of the information bureaucrats possess that is 
vital to their rule making power, which, in turn, enables the aforementioned autonomy123 
enjoyed by the HA/DR agencies.  Bureaucrats make the rules as to how the legislation 
will be implemented.  This power is nearly as important as the power to make the 
legislation in the first place. 
Agencies lead the policy rule making process due to Congress delegating much 
authority to them without guidelines and standards in what Lowi described as interest 
                                                
119 Laswell, Harold. 1958. Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How. New York: Meridian Books. 
120 Ehrlich, Sean D. 2011. Access Points: An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
121 Dahl, Robert. 1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago. (p.113) 
122 Workman, Samuel. 2 November 2011. 
123 Croley, Steven. 2007. Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory 
Government. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  Note: Croley argues that the agency’s 
administrative law function (i.e., the legal decision making procedures that determine regulatory processes 
and the associated regulatory environment of the agency) determines its autonomy.  
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group liberalism where “[L]iberalism replaces planning with bargaining.”124  Well funded 
and better organized interest groups are able to take advantage of this situation by 
bargaining and influencing agencies during the rule making phase.  The 1946 
Administrative Procedure Act “states that a rule means the whole or part of an agency 
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect intended to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”125  This broad power allows agencies the capacity 
to, in effect, make policy and makes rule making a vulnerable, fertile access point of 
opportunity for other bureaucrats to influence policy.   
I have established a causal theory in terms of why bureaucrats are access points 
themselves.  But, more important to this study is whether bureaucrats see and use other 
bureaucrats as access points and when they may seek to access them.  The following 
section and its novel theory of bureaucratic access points is informed by the preceding 
organizational mission and structure, implementation assessment, and “traditional” access 
points literatures.  
A Theory of Bureaucratic Access Points 
As I have postulated, bureaucrats take advantage of access points, especially 
during policy implementation proceedings.  This study offers the novel perspective that 
access points for HA/DR bureaucrats, to include those in the DOD, are readily available 
during the punctuating event (i.e., the natural disaster itself) and may be evaluated 
                                                
124 Lowi, Theodore. 1979. The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 2nd Edition 
(New York: Norton), p.67. 
125 Kamieniecki, Sheldon. 2006. Corporate America and Environmental Policy: How Often Does Business 
Get Its Way? Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press) p.106. 
 45 
through the notions of timing and the information and capabilities they possess and can 
leverage during these punctuations.  The following framework of HA/DR policy 
implementation and the associated access points research questions help frame the 
investigation. 
Policy implementation can be framed in terms of governmental performance or 
democratic accountability.126  For HA/DR policy, the attention is decidedly on 
governmental performance in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation stages.  In 
many ways it is “given” that the U.S. will assist other nations dealing with natural 
disasters, so the democratic accountability aspect only comes into play in which nations 
the U.S. would not assist and for what reason and the effective, efficient use of resources 
in disaster relief efforts as determined in the evaluation stage.  Policy outputs are key at 
the time of the disaster relief effort.  Policy outcomes are the focus in the evaluation 
process. 
 
Table 3.  Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Policy Implementation 
 Governmental Performance Democratic Accountability 
Outputs During Event (“Given”) 
Outcomes During Evaluation Stage (Use of taxpayer dollars) 
  
                                                
126 Workman, Samuel. October 26, 2011. 
 46 
Research Questions:  Bureaucratic Access Points 
- Assessment Measures, Policy Implementation, Mission, and Structure: 
o Interagency conflicts and bureaucratic challenges are largely due to 
different assessment measures and missions carried out by the agencies. 
o Policy implementation and mission assessment influence interagency 
relations in terms of tension and/or cooperation between bureaucrats.  
How are mission requirements and success assessed?  
o Does mission drive structure, or does structure drive mission?  How does 
this understanding influence policy implementation? 
- Bureaucratic Access Points: 
o HA/DR agencies’ bureaucrats have the unique opportunity for access 
points to other bureaucrats during the disaster event itself and at times of 
policy implementation (e.g., lead agent responsibilities, humanitarian 
assistance missions).   
o Timing (in terms of opportunity for the HA/DR agency and criticality of 
the response time itself in saving lives and property) creates an access 
point for HA/DR bureaucrats based on their information, resources and 
capabilities, and leverage. 
o Information is key to interagency relations when those agencies have 
different missions and assessment measures but are responsible for 
implementing over-arching or over-lapping policy. 
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o The capabilities and resources that agencies possess create opportunities 
for bureaucratic access at times of policy implementation (e.g., lead agent 
responsibilities, humanitarian assistance missions). 
o Bureaucrats leverage information (including timeliness of information) 
and resources and capabilities in order to access other bureaucrats and 
maintain their own information, resources, and capabilities. 
 
Baumgartner and Jones develop the theory of punctuated equilibrium and policy 
monopolies.127  Periods of stability are punctuated by rapid change.  In the agenda setting 
stage changes occur incrementally (i.e., Lindblom's "muddling through"128) or rapidly 
(i.e., Kingdon's multiple streams129).  According to punctuated equilibrium theory, both 
stability and rapid change are the result of the interplay within and among subsystems.  
The subsystems are representative of the incremental agenda setting process, but this 
theory moves well beyond that idea and is a counter to incrementalism.  The macro level 
represents the more dramatic changes in agenda setting.  A policy monopoly occurs when 
the subsystem is dominated by a particular interest that has a “monopoly” on a popular or 
powerful belief or image that translates well into policy.  Such a monopoly maintains the 
status quo.  Policy monopolies are generally very stable.  But, if external pressure (i.e., 
exogenous shocks that redefine the policy issue) is applied at a high enough level the 
                                                
127 Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
128 Lindblom, Charles. 1959. “The Science of ‘Muddling Through.’” Public Administration Review 19:79-
88. 
129 Kingdon, John. 2003. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd Edition. New York: Longman. 
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equilibrium or status quo may be punctuated and bring in other actors. By definition, 
natural disasters would be considered exogenous shocks, but not for HA/DR agencies.  It 
is why they exist and their express mission is to provide relief in those situations. 
Access points for bureaucrats during the punctuation (i.e., the disaster itself) are 
more available than in other policy domains because timely information – information 
held by the HA/DR agencies before anyone else has access to it because they are on the 
ground and at the site of the disaster relief efforts – will be demanded by other 
bureaucrats and elected officials, alike.  A quid pro quo, of sorts, is thus created in which 
the politician or other bureaucrat wants information and the HA/DR bureaucrat wants 
additional resources and autonomy.  Money, in terms of a relief budget, is not the main 
issue, for it will flow in most cases, regardless.  Furthermore, HA/DR bureaucrats do not 
need to seek relevance or credibility because they are the only ones who can perform the 
job.  Therefore, armed with the resources, the credibility as experts and the sole source, 
and the information, HA/DR bureaucrats possess what is being sought at the time.  Put 
another way, they have leverage, which equates to access points and more demands that 
will likely be met. 
But with most political matters, it is not that simple.  Information about the 
HA/DR event is demanded from elites in Washington D.C., to include the Pentagon, 
almost immediately.  The demand for information should not be discounted.  It takes 
valuable time and resources to answer myriad questions, many of which cannot be 
answered quickly.  This immediate demand for information and inevitable delay in 
answering creates friction between elites and the HA/DR agency representatives on the 
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ground and in Washington, D.C.  The friction can influence policy implementation by 
delaying resources, challenging lines of authority, and shifting focus, goals, and 
definitions of mission and success. 
In this chapter, I have presented the case that bureaucrats take advantage of access 
points to other bureaucrats during policy implementation proceedings.  Access points for 
HA/DR bureaucrats, to include those in the DOD, are readily available during the 
punctuating event (i.e., the natural disaster itself) and may be evaluated through the 
notions of timing, information, and the resources and capabilities they possess and can 
leverage during these punctuations.  This discussion was a practical presentation of how 
bureaucratic behavior influences policy implementation.   
The following chapter discusses the research design and explains why qualitative 
methodology is used to investigate the bureaucratic access points phenomena and 
associated research questions.  I use the findings from interviews of HA/DR bureaucrats 
to study the bureaucratic access points and emerging leverage phenomena in detail.130  
The coding scheme below is presented here to link the forthcoming interview data and 
HA/DR missions case studies with the emerging theory.131 My coding approach is 
generally similar to the coding scheme developed by Dutton and Dukerich132 but uses the 
categories of mission and structure (i.e., does mission determine structure, or does 
                                                
130 Please see the interview questions in the Appendix.  
131 I tested two computer-assisted analysis of qualitative data (CAQDAS) packages, Ethnograph 
(http://www.qualisresearch.com/) and NVivo (http://www.qsrinternational.com/), and did not find 
additional themes or uncategorized phenomena.  To be fair, I was testing free versions of the software; the 
for-purchase software may have provided more capabilities.  However, for my purposes, CAQDAS 
packages do not appear to be beneficial. 
132 Dutton, J.E. & Dukerich, J.M. 1991. Keeping an eye on the mirror: Image and identity in 
organizational adaptation. Academy of Management Journal, 34(3):517-554. 
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structure determine mission), policy implementation and assessment (i.e., interagency 
relations and bureaucratic challenges), and the overarching investigation of bureaucratic 
access points (i.e., access points for HA/DR bureaucrats are readily available during the 
punctuating event and other times and may be evaluated through the notions of timing 
and the information and capabilities they possess and can leverage during these natural 
disaster events).133 
Coding Scheme 
-­‐ Mission versus Structure   
o Simple tally of where interviewees situated themselves on whether 
mission drives structure or structure drives mission 
-­‐ Implementation and Assessment  
o Code comments dealing with interagency relations  
o Code comments regarding how mission requirements and success are 
assessed 





                                                
133 I also used Miles and Huberman’s (1994) “start list” (p.58), and a combination of their “pattern codes” 
(p.69) and “pre-structured case” (p.83).  Furthermore, I considered their discussion of data reduction, data 
display, conclusion drawing, and verification in developing this coding scheme (1994).  In addition, Corbin 
and Strauss (2002) explain how patterns, themes, and processes are revealed through coded categories’ 
frequency and strength.   
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-­‐ Access Points  
o Simple tally of those who experienced bureaucrats accessing 
bureaucrats and those who did not during the punctuating event/natural 
disaster or at other times 
o Code the incidences of timing of access during the punctuating 
event/natural disaster or at other times 
o Code the incidences of information being accessed or provided during 
the punctuating event/natural disaster or at other times 
o Code the mentions of capabilities that HA/DR entities possess in terms 
of a resource that create opportunities for access during the 
punctuating event/natural disaster or at other times 
o Code the leverage HA/DR bureaucrats express they have and employ 
(i.e., based on timing, information, and capabilities, or other variable) 
during the punctuating event/natural disaster or at other times 
 
The project’s research design helps to explain naturally occurring phenomena in a 
naturally occurring state.   This approach understands relationships as interconnected parts 
with the whole being greater than the individual parts.  Change in one leads to changes 
among all parts and the bureaucratic system.  This design will answer how and why the 
HA/DR system functions as a whole, regardless the differences between OFDA and the 
DOD.  Furthermore, the coding scheme allowed the themes of bureaucratic access points, 
leverage, and assessment measures to emerge.  The following chapters provide strong 
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interview and case study evidence of these themes and create tight linkages between the 
findings and the emerging theory. 
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Chapter 3:  Research Design 
Bureaucratic access points theory, and an emerging theory of leverage, help us 
understand how policies are successfully implemented in the midst of bureaucratic 
challenges resulting from organizational roles and responsibilities and contrasting 
assessments.  Bureaucratic access and leverage enables a more unified implementation of 
over-arching HA/DR policy by disparate agencies with unique missions, resources, 
capabilities, and assessment measures.  The existing literature does not fully capture how 
such agency differences are mitigated and overcome in implementing policy that spans 
multiple entities.  This project helps to fill important gaps in the implementation and 
policy change literature.  
I use qualitative methods because I want to study the access and leverage 
phenomena in detail.  I am able to access in great depth a precise case in Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and DOD interagency relations.  And, in this 
particular case, qualitative methods will help us learn more about this topic than 
quantitative methods (e.g., budget data does not allow me to investigate why or how 
bureaucratic access influences interagency relations).  I have focused my project by 
establishing limited research problems geared to specific features of the instrumental case 
study (i.e., to provide insight into access point theory and apply it in a novel approach).  
This project is valuable because it reveals a gap in the grounded theory of policy 
implementation and change, bureaucratic information, and organizational structure and 
mission – bureaucrats accessing and leveraging bureaucrats.  I am using the qualitative 
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data (e.g., interviews, reports, and seminars) to show this accessing not only occurs, but it 
has a unifying influence on policy implementation.  
Qualitative Methodology  
This study uses qualitative methodology to investigate bureaucratic access points 
in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) arena.  HA/DR policies, 
actors, and organizations are viewed as being in a fluid state.  Therefore, qualitative 
methods are better suited for my purposes.  Quantitative methods are appropriate when 
viewing the social world as a fixed, or concrete, structure.134  Morgan and Smircich argue 
that social scientists who manipulate data through quantitative approaches are “in effect 
attempting to freeze the social world into structure immobility and to reduce the role of 
human beings to elements subject to the influence of a more or less deterministic set of 
forces,” and that “once one relaxes the ontological assumption that the world is a 
concrete structure, and admits that human beings, far from merely responding to the 
social world may actively contribute to its creation, the [quantitative] methods become 
increasingly unsatisfactory, and indeed, inappropriate.”135  Furthermore, they argue 
“narrow empirical snapshots of isolated phenomena at fixed points in time, does not do 
complete justice to the nature of the subject.”136  None of this is to suggest that one 
method is superior to another method, generally.  In this study, however, qualitative 
                                                
134 Morgan, G. and Smircich, L. 1980. “The case for qualitative research.” Academy of Management 
Review, 5(4): 491-500. And Gephart, R. 2004. “What is qualitative research and why is it important?” 
Academy of Management Journal, 47(4): 454-462. 
135 Morgan, G. and Smircich, L. 1980. “The case for qualitative research.” Academy of Management 
Review, 5(4): 491-500, p.498. 
136 Ibid., p.498. 
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methods are more appropriate for various reasons. 
I study the bureaucratic access phenomena in which they naturally occur – in the 
HA/DR policy implementation environment (e.g., USSOUTHCOM headquarters) – and 
use the bureaucrats’ actions and meanings to understand the phenomena.  Qualitative 
methods emphasize qualities of actors and the processes, actions, and meanings that 
occur naturally.137  Qualitative research builds social science constructs and develops 
theory from actors' meanings and actions.  It focuses on the socially constructed nature of 
reality and naturally occurring meanings that are difficult for quantitative research to 
access and capture.138  Vital to this study of bureaucratic access is the understanding that 
qualitative research can “rehumanize research and theory by highlighting the human 
interactions and meanings that underlie phenomena and relationships among variables 
that are often addressed in the field.”139 
Qualitative research is not easily accomplished.  I have addressed the following 
challenges presented by Gephart.140  First, my dissertation is a project within a larger 
program of study that will continue in the future.  In particular, the findings in the 
HA/DR policy domain may be highly generalizable to the environmental policy domain, 
as will be discussed in the final chapter.  Second, this paper’s literature review is not only 
thorough and relevant to the topics within the study, it provides a foundation for offering 
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Oaks, CA: Sage. 
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new theory (i.e., bureaucratic access points and leverage).  Third, I clearly state explicit 
goals, objectives, and research questions that call upon the existing literature, frame the 
study, guide data collection and analysis, and present findings in a manner that allows me 
to develop new theory and discuss the implications of my research findings.  Fourth, the 
concepts underlying my questions are grounded in existing literature and well defined.  
They are precise and clearly relate to the methodology used and guide data analysis.  
Finally, the methodology is specific, and the discernment of themes from the data is 
precisely described.  Data are analyzed and interpreted, not merely presented, and linked 
directly to the research questions and provide the foundation for future investigation.  
Methods 
This project’s methodological approach follows that of Barker’s in his study of 
“concertive control.”141  Barker found that self-managed teams developed a value system 
that controlled their work and norms, with the value system (i.e., consensus) becoming 
the normative rules for existing and new workers.142  He uncovered the phenomenon of 
rationalized control without the previous hierarchy (i.e., peer control was more subtle, 
more effective, and more coercive than supervisory control; and workers policed one 
another in accordance with, and deference to, the organization’s goals and objectives).143  
His stated goal (in a later writing) was to create or provoke debate about the value and 
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effectiveness of teams.144  He was questioning an existing, readily accepted theory, that 
of concertive control in self-managing teams.  I found a similar gap in the access and 
bureaucracy literature in regards to why – with such different organizations, resources, 
and measures of mission success – the HA/DR entities are able to work together and 
mitigate interagency conflict.  
I began my research at the time the Obama Administration announced efforts to 
reduce future USG annual budgets.  President Obama had tasked the U.S. national 
security apparatus to reduce its budget by 400 billion dollars through fiscal year 2023.  At 
present, the armed forces are facing budget and personnel cuts.  Based on personal 
experience, U.S. military medicine helps to increase national security and offers unique 
diplomatic tools and should not suffer budget reductions in the general area of HA/DR.  
The DOD and USAID are striving to capture the effects of their HA/DR efforts, and 
measures of effectiveness are actively being sought in order to quantify those efforts with 
designs on ensuring their slice of the budgetary pie.   
My interest in HA/DR efforts came from my own experiences in Iraq and other 
locations in the Middle East.  I have served as a Medical Service Corps officer 
specializing in aeromedical evacuation and medical logistics.  Prior to returning to 
graduate school, I was involved with “Iraqi Engagement” efforts in 2010 in the area north 
of Baghdad, Iraq.  My responsibilities gave me a well-informed perspective on initiatives 
similar to HA/DR efforts and associated bureaucracies (e.g., Department of State, 
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USAID, NGOs, and host nation).  My first interaction with OFDA personnel was at a 
seminar and conference they conducted in San Antonio, Texas, in 2011, called the Joint 
Humanitarian Operations Course.   
Data Collection 
I traveled to various OFDA and DOD locations in 2011 and 2012 for research and 
then to conduct thirty-three interviews to augment and provide the reality of the HA/DR 
bureaucrats’ perspective to the myriad reports, documents, and other information 
gathered through data collection and conferences.  The interviews and related data 
collection were conducted in August through December 2012 in San Antonio, Texas, and 
at USSOUTHCOM headquarters in Miami, Florida.  The majority of my interactions 
with HA/DR bureaucrats occurred at USSOUTHCOM headquarters and with U.S. Army 
South, the Army service component command for USSOUTHCOM in San Antonio.145  I 
completed follow-up interviews when necessary.  
The HA/DR bureaucrats I interacted with represented both genders and multiple 
races or ethnicities (i.e., white, Hispanic, Latin American, African American, etc.).  
However, only seven of the thirty-three bureaucrats I interviewed were female.  The 
interviewees ranged in age from 25 to 61 years.  All had earned at least an undergraduate 
degree from a college or university, and nearly one-third of those I interviewed held a 
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graduate degree.  Over eighty percent were active duty military or had served in the U.S. 
military in some capacity (i.e., retired, Guard member or Reservist, served and left 
military service prior to retirement).  Their HA/DR experience ranged from 1 to 29 years, 
but most had been in their present job for less than two years.  That fact that nearly half 
of those I interviewed were active duty military or Reservists certainly accounts for the 
high number of those who had only a year or two worth of experience in their current 
positions.  I chose a purposeful sampling strategy in order to learn a vast amount of in-
depth information about the issues of bureaucratic access (i.e., in terms of 
communication, timing, resources and capabilities, and leverage), mission and structure, 
and assessments and how these issues influence HA/DR policy implementation.  
“Studying information-rich cases yields insights and in-depth understanding rather than 
empirical generalizations.”146  In purposeful (or purposive or judgment) sampling, the 
researcher decides what purpose respondents will serve and finds the appropriate, specific 
group of respondents.147 
The preceding demographical information is offered to provide context.  This 
project does not consider gender-, race-, ethnic-, or education-specific ramifications to 
the central question of bureaucratic access.  However, future research may be valuable in 
the areas of communication patterns in a predominantly male-dominated environment 
and the fact that the education level of the actors is rather high.  (Note:  More detailed 
demographic information is not available due to attempts to ensure the anonymity of the 
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interviewees, and, again, those data have nothing to do with the study at hand.)  My 
interactions with HA/DR bureaucrats in San Antonio occurred outside of their place of 
work.  I met with these bureaucrats individually at such locations as coffee shops, 
restaurants, and the conference center of the aforementioned OFDA seminar.  Due to the 
fact that most of my interactions occurred at USSOUTHCOM, the following discussion 
focuses on those experiences. 
Through my connections within the U.S. Air Force, I found an excellent active 
duty officer who became my point of contact at USSOUTHCOM.  This officer, who will 
remain anonymous due to IRB stipulations, was a tremendous resource in terms of 
reports, networking (i.e., snowball sampling for interviews, the OFDA seminar, etc.), and 
personal experience in various HA/DR capacities in the past decade.   
When I first arrived at USSOUTHCOM, I was introduced as a graduate student 
interested in writing about interagency relations in the HA/DR arena and between OFDA 
and the DOD, specifically.  Although I was in uniform and hold the appropriate security 
clearance to have gone almost anywhere in the headquarters, I was a visitor and therefore 
had to be escorted at all times.  I had no issues with this and, in many ways, appreciated 
the constant interaction and benefits of being escorted by people familiar with many 
others – people I would have passed with a nod or a “hello” but not talked with – 
throughout the headquarters.  Being escorted was an unforeseen benefit that enabled 
more discussion and interaction than I would have otherwise experienced.  I could not 
carry a cell phone, electronic tablet, or laptop.  Instead, I used pencil and paper and jotted 
field notes in a notebook and on summary sheets I had developed.  (Please see the 
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summary sheet in the Appendix.)  I talked with members from the medical, planning, 
programming and budgeting, humanitarian assistance (which houses the OFDA liaisons), 
partnering, and foreign disclosure directorates, or departments, to name the most relevant 
sections to my study.   
Interviews 
I chose qualitative interviewing as a means for data collection because I wanted to 
investigate bureaucratic access and HA/DR policy implementation through the 
bureaucrat’s perspective.  Qualitative interviewing assumes that the “perspective of 
others is meaningful, knowable, and able to be made explicit.”148  I wanted to solve the 
cognitive problem of finding out what policy implementation, access, mission and 
structure, and assessment are about, beyond the level of espoused theory.149  The 
establishment of the access storyline introduces some ambiguity to the HA/DR policy 
arena and creates the need for sensemaking.150  The sensemaking implications found in 
this study are discussed in more detail in the final chapter.  Standardized interviews assist 
with bringing clarity to the ambiguous setting. 
I developed a standardized, direct interview approach that consisted of a set of 
questions carefully worded and arranged for the purpose of taking each respondent 
through the same sequence, asking the same questions, and using essentially the same 
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words.151  This helps ensure that each interviewee receives the same stimuli in the same 
way and order.  Please see the interview questions in the Appendix section.   
This approach limits flexibility in probing, but I wanted to minimize variation in 
the questions posed to interviewees in order to increase validity.  I understand the danger 
of being too deductive (e.g., my directed questions).  But I was looking for particular 
themes, ideas, and experiences rather than soliciting a free flow of ideas and then 
"discovering" those common themes in a more inductive approach.  Because I knew the 
structure of the answer (i.e., because it is specific to access, mission, etc.), I could be 
more deductive and specific with my questions and what I analyzed from the interviews.  
My project is more a matter of being precise, but I also left enough room in the questions 
to discover other issues and phenomena that I may not have been aware of through the 
literature review or have not yet experienced in my professional career.  
The benefits of a standardized, direct approach are substantial.  The exact 
instrument of evaluation (i.e., the list of questions) is available to anyone who wishes to 
use the findings of the study.  Similarly, critics and evaluators of this study know 
precisely what is and is not asked in each interview.  This reduces the likelihood of the 
data being questioned later because certain questions were omitted or asked in the wrong 
way.152  This approach also makes data analysis easier.153  For example, and as will be 
discussed in greater detail below, clustering or factoring techniques uncover themes in 
the data quickly and accurately because each respondent’s answer to the same question 
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may be found easily.  Organizing questions and answers that are similar is also made 
more efficient and useful for comparison purposes.  Furthermore, the focused nature of 
this interview approach ensures interviewee time is used efficiently.154  And due to the 
fluid nature of the HA/DR bureaucrats’ schedules and deployments to HA/DR event 
locations (i.e., it may only be possible to interview participants once for a short, fixed 
time155), the standardized approach established priorities for the interview.  
I attempted to strike a balance between an insider (emic) perspective and an 
outsider (etic) perspective in my interviews and interactions with HA/DR bureaucrats.156  
After general pleasantries, I focused the interview by explaining my purpose.  I explained 
that I was investigating how organizations and their employees influence policy 
implementation.  Referring to them as employees allowed each individual to decide how 
to self-identify (i.e., as a bureaucrat, as a military member, as a government employee, as 
an HA/DR expert, etc.).  I further explained that my focus was on the relationship 
between U.S. HA/DR agencies and associated DOD medical components that have 
responsibilities with HA/DR events and other efforts.  Further, I stated that of particular 
importance were interagency relationships and how bureaucracy may influence 
implementation.  I theorize that interagency conflicts and bureaucratic challenges are 
largely due to different missions and different assessment measures carried out by the 
agencies and the DOD components.   
I am not concerned about the framing and priming implications because I am 
                                                




familiar with the HA/DR medical field due to my responsibilities as a healthcare 
administrator specializing in aeromedical evacuation and understanding medical logistics 
in the U.S. Air Force.  Also, the HA/DR bureaucrats I interviewed may be considered 
“elites” or “experts” due to their intimate knowledge of HA/DR policy and mission 
planning and outcomes.  Most were leaders and managers (i.e., field grade officers, 
branch chiefs, coordinators, directors, etc.) of departments or groups.  “In working with 
elites, great demands are placed on the ability of the interviewer, who must establish 
competence by displaying a thorough knowledge of the topic or…by projecting an 
accurate conceptualization of the problem through shrewd questioning.”157  The benefits 
of a direct purpose statement not only narrows the focus of the interview saving my and 
their time and elicits particular information and data, but it also offers me credibility with 
the respondents.  
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The thirty-three interviews ranged from ten minutes to 105 minutes, with the 
average being twenty-five minutes from start to end.  The relative brevity was largely due 
to my direct questions and familiarity with the topic, the acronyms, and general 
vernacular of the interviewees.  The interviews were efficient as a result of having 
gathered information from the OFDA seminar and the myriad DOD and USAID reports.  
Conducting interviews and having time to analyze the data in conjunction with finding 
and being given new reports enabled an effective and efficient iterative process.  I 
analyzed data, wrote, revised research questions, studied new reports, and conducted 
more interviews.  I repeated this process for the better part of nine months.  A qualitative 
methods course taken in the fall semester of 2012 provided the tools to not only hone my 
qualitative research design but also allowed me to revisit my previously collected data 
from a fresh perspective.  The timing and content of the course could not have been better 
in terms of this project’s development and focus.   
When my data collection ended, I had accumulated 115 research hours, not 
including associated literature reviews.  Even with the constraints of voluntary 
participation, anonymity, and limited time in Miami, the interviews produced valuable 
data.  During all phases of my data collection, my informed observer role with the 
HA/DR bureaucrats did not change.  I informed everyone with whom I came into contact 
that I was an active duty Air Force officer studying and writing about HA/DR policy and 
its implementation.  They were very cooperative and exceedingly gracious with their time 
and expertise.   
This chapter has presented the rationale for using qualitative methods and 
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interview techniques.  Chapter Four builds on this thorough background and offers an 
analysis of the accumulated data.  Applicable HA/DR missions case studies provide 
clarity and further expound upon the data in Chapter Five. 
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Chapter 4:  Interview Data Analysis 
My analysis began with my basic questions, "are bureaucrats accessing 
bureaucrats, and what are the policy implementation implications?”  These basic 
questions allowed specific themes about access (i.e., leverage, information, timing, 
resources and capabilities), structure and mission, and assessment to emerge from my 
data.  While I found few themes of timing and structure and mission, an unforeseen 
theme that I refer to as “semantics” did emerge.  I compared, revised, and refined my 
ideas as I gathered more data and became more familiar with my study.   
The particular themes and data analyses I present here stem from my use of ideas 
presented by Miles and Huberman, Dutton and Dukerich, and Silverman and Marvasti 
and the various theories covered in my extensive literature review.158  From this analysis 
I developed an analytical understanding of the general character of leverage, information, 
resources and capabilities, assessment, and semantics as it became apparent during my 
interviews and research of HA/DR agencies and bureaucrats.  To help ensure the validity 
of this analytical conceptualization and its associated claims, I cross-checked my 
interview data with my field notes, contact summaries, and relevant reports and 
information gleaned from the OFDA seminar.  Finally, I reviewed my analysis and ideas 
with colleagues not familiar with or participating in the study and had an associate 
independently code twenty-five percent of the interviews to ensure validity and 
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Table 5.  Coding Scheme:  Categorical Counts 
Category Incidence Rate as Mentioned by Interviewees 
1) Mission or structure Mission drives structure: 33 
Structure drives mission: 0 
2) Implementation and Assessment Interagency relations: 28 
Mission requirements and success assessed: 31 
Tension: 16 
Cooperation: 24 
Notion of “healthy tension”: 22 
3) Access Points (including the 
emerging notion of leverage) 





The result of my analysis focuses on the following discussion of access in terms 
of information, timing, resources and capabilities, and assessment in regard to measures 
of effectiveness, and the unforeseen semantics theme.  The interesting findings regarding 
structure and mission are also discussed.  The weaker themes, including timing and 
resources and capabilities, will be addressed in the discussion portion of the final chapter.  
I begin by offering the relevant findings of access and leverage, assessment, and 
semantics, describe the structure and mission curiosity, and conclude with an assertion of 
internal and external validity. 
Factoring and Semantics 
I noticed recurring comments about roles and responsibilities, improving HA/DR 
planning and policy, and communication.  I coded the data according to the coding 
                                                
159 Please see earlier discussion of the project’s coding scheme at the end of Chapter Two. 
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scheme and developed these three factor clusters (i.e., overlapping variables that exhibit 
communal aspects160).  Through these factor clusters, I found patterns and themes.161  
These factor clusters are discussed in higher-level constructs below and in the final 
chapter.   
The HA/DR bureaucrats had developed a common language that I refer to as 
“semantics.”  The semantics used to describe roles and responsibilities included, “checks 
and balances,” “dovetail” efforts, “[OFDA] is there for the party, not the cleanup,” and 
“end state.”  The checks and balances refer to OFDA’s role as the USG’s lead agent in 
disaster relief events and the DOD’s responsibilities once OFDA requests assistance.  
The OFDA and DOD personnel regularly commented that OFDA’s lead agent 
designation was vitally important in terms of command and control of the event.  One 
comment succinctly addressed this concern (from both OFDA and DOD perspectives): 
“the DOD will overwhelm you” in terms of capabilities and taking control when given 
the opportunity.  Therefore, dovetailing HA/DR efforts is important.  OFDA is aware of 
other nations’ and NGOs’ initiatives and can inform the DOD of any duplication of effort 
and make suggestions regarding the role the DOD may fill in humanitarian assistance 
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161 Ibid. I also consulted Communications literature for information on conducting keyword searches after 
reviewing Downs’ 1972 article “Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue Attention Cycle.”  Many authors 
present various views and procedures, which are defensible.  I chose to use the work of Roderick P. Hart, 
Political Keywords: Using Language That Uses Us (2004) and Modern Rhetorical Criticism (1990), as my 
guide.  The former work delves into keywords as a “cultural barometer” (p.5) and presented instructive 
methods to uncover meanings of words based on context.  The latter work’s “Word Choice” chapter in 
which style was an important aspect was helpful.  Hart has also developed a powerful search tool called 
DICTION that uses over 30 dictionaries, or “word-lists” to search text for five distinct qualities including 
certainty, activity, optimism, realism, and commonality (DICTION website).  The categorization and 
nuanced meaning of words based on context was a fascinating concept and helped me choose meaningful 
words with which to search for themes in the interviews and other articles.  How the words are used is the 
key component added by Hart’s work. 
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situations, especially.  Finally, OFDA’s mandate is to return the host nation or region to 
the condition it was in one minute prior to the disaster, not to improve its lot or nation-
build.  Both OFDA and DOD personnel regularly made comments about this end state, 
noting that reduced budgets would not allow nation building.  OFDA and DOD will 
monitor the affected region and may choose to conduct humanitarian assistance in it, but 
NGOs and the host nation are clearly responsible for future progress. 
Discussion of improving HA/DR efforts and policy included comments such as, 
“clearly express [to decision makers] what we do,” “proactive,” and “steady glide 
pattern.”  The vast majority of these comments were in response to a question asking 
what, if anything, they would change about their HA/DR mission.  Assessment and 
measures of effectiveness are hot-button issues for both USAID/OFDA and the DOD.  
The budget concerns demand accountability, in some sense.  OFDA and DOD personnel 
lamented the difficulty in capturing, or quantifying, the benefits of their HA/DR efforts.  
Merely telling decision makers and budget managers that “good” was done is no longer 
enough.  Measures of effectiveness are being developed, with the proactive approach 
(i.e., every dollar of training and prevention equates to seven dollars of disaster relief 
expenditure162) drawing much attention.  But the validity of those measures is difficult to 
specify.  Therefore, a common theme emerged from the interviews that called for sticking 
with a plan or initiative for more than a couple of years in order to evaluate its success or 
failure (i.e., a “steady glide pattern”).  Much frustration in these interviewees was evident 
due to the lack of measurable data and what HA/DR efforts truly wrought.  (Note: In 
                                                
162 Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC), 2011. 
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what may be related to these assessment and measurement concerns, USAID has selected 
The University of Texas at Austin to be a partner in a five-year, 25 million dollar grant to 
develop tools to more effectively target, monitor, and evaluate foreign aid globally.)    
Not surprisingly, all respondents reported that they had accessed or been accessed 
by other HA/DR bureaucrats through various communication mediums (e.g., face-to-
face, telephone, and electronic mail conversations, and shared databases and electronic 
information systems).  The semantics influencing communication included words and 
phrases such as, “funneling information,” “information conduit,” and a “healthy tension” 
between OFDA and their DOD counterparts.  A pattern for use of the word 
“communication” in terms of clear articulation of resources, processes, and capabilities 
was a cluster-factoring theme.  Again, OFDA, as lead agent, was the funnel or conduit for 
information during HA/DR events.  That lead agent role and the vast capabilities of the 
DOD created what nearly all interviewees referred to as a healthy tension between the 
two entities.  So long as each stayed in its proverbial lane, the tension remained 
beneficial.  The push (i.e., DOD) and pull (i.e., OFDA) approaches maintain the 
aforementioned checks and balances, as well.  But, according to the interviewees, the 
tension becomes counterproductive when OFDA is perceived as not filling its lead agent 
responsibilities or the DOD oversteps its responsibilities beyond those that OFDA has 
requested.  The “healthy” adjective is extremely reliant upon access and open lines of 
communication.   
A few interviewees noted the importance of OFDA liaisons being embedded in 
DOD organizations.  Interestingly, it was during an interview at USSOUTHCOM that I 
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discovered that it was the first DOD combatant command to have an OFDA liaison.  It 
was in response to 1998’s Hurricane Mitch relief efforts and the associated 
communication issues between the responding agencies, in particular USAID/OFDA and 
the DOD.  According to those at USSOUTHCOM at the time, it was a difficult and, at 
times, contentious relationship that had its growing pains.  But, nearly all said that the 
relationship has been running smoothly with only slight missteps over the past few years.  
Every interviewee reported that the OFDA liaison is a “must have” and a benefit in 
nearly every situation.  And each interviewee stressed that communication between the 
OFDA liaison and her or his DOD counterparts was personality dependent and driven.  
This general comment harkens back to the healthy tension that various interviewees 
mentioned, as well.   
Finally, the communication semantics pattern revealed that the HA/DR 
bureaucrats I spoke with were, in many ways, describing communication as a resource.  
In other words, the actions of bureaucrats are choices – in this case choosing to work 
together (i.e., personality dependent).  Human actions and choices determine how, or if, 
information is shared.  That critical information may well determine the outcome of 
HA/DR events and be a measurable phenomenon that determines mission success or 
failure.  For example, future research could include a longitudinal study of those 
combatant commands with or without an OFDA liaison and the institutional history of 
the relationships between OFDA liaisons and DOD personnel through the years and the 
associated success or failure of ensuing HA/DR events and efforts.  The following tables 
provide examples of the more telling findings from the interviews. 
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Table 6.  Bureaucratic Access Points – Evidence from Interviews  
Type of Access Example Comments Meaning or Relevance 
Timing 
 
(When a disaster occurs) we all need 
information yesterday…in five 
minutes is too late. 
 
The systems (i.e., data clearinghouses 
and depositories) must be real-time so 
everyone is on the same page. 
Timeliness of information 
and data is critical when 
carrying out planned 
response activities; HA/DR 
bureaucrats must be able to 
access the current, accurate 
data provided by other 
bureaucrats concurrently 
from multiple locations. 
Information 
Sharing information – accurate 
information – is the key to a 
successful response. 
 
They (i.e., other HA/DR bureaucrats) 
better come to me!  I have 
information they need to make the 
right decisions.  
Communication during 
HA/DR events is critical; 
the ability to access other 
bureaucrats and share the 
right information at the 
right time enables effective 




They know what we bring to the 
table, and we know what they bring to 
the table.  They need us, and we need 
them. 
 
Our relationship and, ultimately, 
mission success is predicated on 
knowing who to reach out and touch 
(i.e., request particular resources and 
capabilities) and get what is needed 
when it is needed. 
 
HA/DR bureaucrats must 
be aware of other entities’ 
resources and capabilities; 
they must be able to access 
other bureaucrats when 
necessary in order to obtain 










Table 7.  Bureaucratic Leverage – Evidence from Interviews  
Type of Leverage Example Comments Meaning or Relevance 
Organic 
The whole thing (i.e., the HA/DR 
policy domain and policy 
implementation) works a lot better 





OFDA brings a lot of experts to 
bear on an HA/DR event…and does 
a good job when left to it (i.e., 
without outside influence).  But it 
gets muddy fast when (outside 
influences) think they know best or 
someone wants some attention. 
The HA/DR policy domain 
needs OFDA to be the 
LFA; efficient, effective 
policy implementation 
occurs when OFDA 
provides expertise and 
responsibility in a closed 
circuit construct.  See urban 




undermine OFDA’s ability 
to serve as LFA; confusion 
occurs in an open circuit 
construct in which outside 
influences begin to adjust 
HA/DR policy 
implementation.  See 
international commerce 
policy case study on page 
113. 
Purposive 
The DOD will overwhelm you, 
when given the opportunity… if 






Big HA/DR events, like Haiti (i.e., 
the Port au Prince earthquake), draw 
a lot of interest.  It makes it really 
difficult to do our job when they 
(i.e., outside influences) get 
involved. 
If OFDA fails to act as 
LFA for whatever reason, 
other entities within the 
HA/DR policy domain will 
attempt to fill that role and 
responsibility in a closed 
circuit construct.  See 
economic (security) policy 
case study on page 114. 
 
Outside influences 
compromise the ability of 
the HA/DR policy domain 
actors to carry out their 
responsibilities in an open 
circuit construct.  See 
energy and defense policy 
case study on page 116. 
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Table 8.  Assessment Measures – Evidence from Interviews  
Type of Assessment Example Comments Meaning or Relevance 
Push (DOD) 
The DOD brings a lot (to HA/DR 
responses)…sometimes too much.  
Best intentions aside, making a 
mountain out of a molehill is not 
the way to go. 
 
(The DOD) tends to see them (i.e., 
HA/DR events) as opportunities to 
make things better in the end state 
when that’s not the goal, in most 
cases. 
The DOD assesses based 
on what it can do, not 
necessarily what is needed. 
Pull (OFDA) 
OFDA is there for the party, not 
the clean up. 
 
As LFA, OFDA must coordinate 
the response in the most efficient 
way possible.  Time is of the 
essence.  Only tapping (the 
resources of other entities in terms 
of) what is needed is the key.  Too 
much is not always a good thing.  
In fact, it can turn into a mess. 
OFDA assesses on needs; 
what needs to be done to 
return the host nation back 
to the state it was in one 
minute before the disaster 
occurred. 
 
Mission and Structure 
Professional or self-identity was an unanticipated theme that became very 
apparent with every interview.  Every interviewee answered the mission and structure 
question with the understanding that mission drove structure.  Nearly one-quarter of the 
way through the total number of interviews I began handing the participant a piece of 
paper with a single box on it (i.e., the start of a box diagram for showing their 
understanding of how organizational structure and mission may be related).  I asked them 
to fill in the relationship between their mission and the structure of their organization.  I 
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also alternated the order of “mission” and “structure” in my request so I was not 
inadvertently priming the interviewees by stating “mission” before “structure” in each 
interview.  Interestingly, the interviewees I asked to fill in the blank box diagram 
recreated their organizational structure in the typical hierarchical construct that is 
associated with U.S. military organizations, yet each of them stated that the mission was 
the driving factor.  The comment, “mission comes first” was a common response from 
interviewees.  A few commented that they did not understand what organizational 
structure had to do with HA/DR policy implementation, that it was their mission and the 
organization was constructed to accomplish that mission.163  The results were not what I 
anticipated; yet this is an interesting observation in terms of bureaucrats’ behavior.   
There are various questions stemming from this finding.  Is this strict adherence to 
a “mission first” mindset and the inherent formality of organizational structure a product 
of their environment in a military setting?  Is their professional identity based on a 
hierarchical structure in which “mission comes first?”  What explains the OFDA 
                                                
163 Nearly halfway through the total number of interviews I handed the participant a blank sheet of paper 
and asked them to draw their understanding of how organizational structure and mission may be related.  I 
thought the box diagram might be limiting their conceptual understanding.  Again, recreations of their 
organizational structure were produced, and every interviewee stated that mission drove the entire process 
and organization.  With the final five participants I turned the paper over and asked them to write “Disaster 
Event” on the far left side of the paper and “Lessons Learned” on the far right side.  Then I asked them to 
fill in the “timeline.”  Each of these interviewees filled out the timeline with the process itself – bureaucrats 
following SOPs and rules.  None wrote of a “real world” example or recounted a particular experience 
although each made a comment similar to “this is how it’s supposed to work, but each event is different.”  
Four of these final five participants happened to be civilian employees, rather than uniformed military 
members, but I have no reason to believe that made a significant difference in the findings.  I considered 
giving the participants the piece of paper with the single box on it with instructions to place themselves, 
their agency, or whatever entity they chose in it and then draw lines and other boxes or circles, placing 
other entities or agencies in those figures, to show how they saw the relationships.  I chose against this plan 
because I felt it was too leading.  I wanted them to have the freedom to recreate their understanding of 
mission and structure as unencumbered as possible, rather than dictating or forcing a relationship between 
mission and structure upon them. 
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personnel who responded in the same manner?  Are all of these participants self-
identifying as bureaucrats in a hierarchical setting with rules and SOPs that guide their 
understanding of their roles and responsibilities?  If so, are they unaware of how the 
structure has come to define them and their thinking, and does it matter in terms of 
HA/DR policy implementation?  All of these questions could be considered moot to an 
observer who believes the approach was flawed.  However, I am confident that 
requesting the participants to “[T]ell me about the relationship between your mission and 
the structure of your organization” and then handing them a piece of paper with a box on 
it and, later, a blank piece of paper is an open-ended approach.  More on the implications 
of these findings will be discussed in the final chapter. 
The HA/DR bureaucrats I spoke with largely resembled a team who were socially 
constructed by the HA/DR system itself, one created with humanitarian goals and 
intrinsic values at the forefront.  Although a few mentioned that access and 
communication was at times personality driven, they willingly accept their roles and 
appeared willing to sacrifice their own power and authority within the system if it were 
for the good of the given HA/DR effort.  This symbiotic relationship may be a 
manifestation of the typical philosophies and personalities that are drawn to such 
endeavors as HA/DR work and that were discussed in Chapter Two.  It seems natural, 
then, that they would list the mission as the driving factor, rather than organizational 
structure.  They work effectively because of the common goal, not the rigid structure 
typical of USG entities.  The common goal may be the most important factor in the 
interagency relationships I observed.  Finally, the underlying current running through 
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these interview data reveals bureaucratic access and leverage to be across-structure and 
across-mission phenomena.  That bureaucrats in the line of authority access one another 
is obvious; that they cross organizational boundaries and leverage other bureaucrats is a 
novel idea.  
The multiple incidences of HA/DR bureaucrats mentioning a “healthy tension,” or 
words to that effect, between OFDA and DOD employees were not lost on the 
respondents.  They expressed the understanding that these questioning and evolving 
relationships were good for them and their work.  Those who mentioned the interagency 
relations expressed the need for constant and open communication.  They referenced 
communication problems during 1998’s Hurricane Mitch and the understanding that 
when it comes to an HA/DR event and response it is “one team, one fight” and the 
provision of assistance and relief for the affected peoples is the bottom line.  This is 
certainly a telling example of bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats at work and the positive 
benefits of the phenomenon.  The preceding data analysis offers the conceptual variables 
regarding mission and structure and, especially, “semantics” from the meanings and 
verbiage presented by the respondents, as discussed.  These higher-level constructs will 






Table 9.  Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Policy Domain’s Key Traits 






Characteristic Outputs Outcomes 
1) Mission and 






and Assessment 94% (31) DOD pushes OFDA pulls 




use of resources 
3) Bureaucratic 
Access Points 100% (33) 
Varying resources and 
capabilities combined 




agencies, roles, and 
responsibilities 
 
Internal and External Validity 
Internal validity concerns are mitigated through various methods.  An additional 
benefit to my deductive approach is that the direct questions allow me to avoid asking 
open ended questions that, as a novice interviewer, could have introduced validity issues.  
I asked the same questions in the same order to the participants.164  Furthermore, I 
devised a contact summary form for key interview findings.165  I used factoring and 
clustering techniques to identify themes.166  I developed a coding scheme for coding the 
interview data onto those themes and followed the process throughout the data collection 
                                                
164 Patton, M.Q. 2002. Qualitative research and evaluation methods, 3rd Ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
165 Dutton, J.E. & Dukerich, J.M. 1991. Keeping an eye on the mirror: Image and identity in 
organizational adaptation. Academy of Management Journal, 34(3):517-554. 
166 Miles, M.B. & Huberman, A.M. 1994. Qualitative data analysis, 2nd Ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
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and analysis.167  I had an associate code twenty-five percent of the interviews, and our 
individual coding was over ninety-five percent compatible or in agreement based on the 
coding scheme.  The coding scheme was reliable based on this similar coding.  Finally, I 
also used my personal knowledge of the military environment and familiarity with the 
HA/DR system from a professional standpoint.  
Data from interviews, agency reports, and educational seminars provide 
convergent validity through triangulation and address external validity concerns.168  
Aside from, possibly, the mission and structure findings, there are no issues with 
explicitly poor theory, research questions, or methodology.  The HA/DR policy domain 
and associated OFDA and DOD interagency relationship and environment are 
generalizable to other policy domains.  The generalizability of this study’s findings will 
be discussed in the final chapter.  Regarding the mission and structure findings, it may be 
that the hierarchical organizational structure of this project’s setting and participants 
placed a boundary on that theory. 
In conclusion, the interviews’ findings begin to address this project’s research 
questions.  Interagency conflicts and bureaucratic challenges appear, in many cases, to be 
due to different assessment measures and missions carried out by the agencies.  Policy 
implementation and mission assessment influence interagency relations in terms of 
tension and cooperation between bureaucrats.  Again, the mention of “healthy tension” 
                                                
167 Ibid. And Dutton, J.E. & Dukerich, J.M. 1991. Keeping an eye on the mirror: Image and identity in 
organizational adaptation. Academy of Management Journal, 34(3):517-554. 
168 Silverman, D. and Marvasti, A. 2008. Doing qualitative research: A comprehensive guide. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
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illustrates this concept.  Common concerns about the need for better assessment 
measures, clearer mission requirements, end-state goals, and more efficient and effective 
use of limited resources were also found in the interviews.   
Other findings reveal that HA/DR bureaucrats not only leverage their expertise, 
resources, and capabilities in order to gain access to other bureaucrats, but they maintain 
and increase their own information, resources, and capabilities through strategic 
communication.  A unified HA/DR goal across multiple agencies, roles, resources, 
capabilities, and responsibilities can be accomplished when OFDA uses its LFA authority 
and associated expertise, according to the interviewees.  In other words, the “one team, 
one fight” attitude reveals the positive influence of bureaucratic access points and 
leverage on HA/DR policy implementation. 
The unanimous finding that mission dominates the HA/DR bureaucrats’ approach 
to policy implementation has far-reaching implications.  The evidence from the 
interviews, coupled with tangible illustrations from the forthcoming HA/DR missions 
case studies, provides strong linkages to the emerging leverage theory and construct.  The 
mission-driven approach to policy implementation provides a more nuanced and specific 
understanding of bureaucratic leverage, as will be discussed in the next chapter.  The 
following HA/DR missions case studies show how bureaucrats cross organizational 
boundaries and leverage other bureaucrats in this policy domain. 
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Chapter 5:  Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Missions Case 
Studies 
The overarching case study used to evaluate the bureaucratic access and the 
emergent leverage theory is the HA/DR policy domain with OFDA and USSOUTHCOM 
as the particular actors being investigated.  It is informative from a structural and 
practical perspective to briefly look at specific HA/DR missions case studies, as well.  
The following missions cases help to apply the bureaucratic access and leverage theory.  
The following discussion of the value of case studies clarifies the overarching case study, 
the HA/DR missions case studies, and the generalizability examples in the final chapter 
in which I use examples of “other OFDAs” in four unique policy cases to show how the 
bureaucratic access points and leverage theory may be applied to other policy domains.   
Case studies provide a “roadmap” for building grounded theories.169  They extend 
previous theories’ constructs, provide validity through triangulation, offer within-case 
and cross-case analyses, and clarify the role of existing literature.170  The triangulation 
made possible by the multiple data collection methods I used provides stronger validation 
of constructs and my research questions.  Case studies also help place the developing 
theory into the larger context of political science and public administration research.171  
Theory generation and building are the most valuable contributions case studies 
                                                
169 Eisenhardt, Kathleen. 1989. “Building theories from case study research.” Academy of Management 




make.172  A priori specification of bureaucratic access points – based on existing access 
points theory – helped shape the initial design of my bureaucratic access and leverage 
theory-building research.  Using the notion of access, I was able to focus on pertinent 
reports and other data, attend specific seminars, develop accurate interview questions, 
and identify the most appropriate HA/DR bureaucrats to interview.  As the leverage 
construct emerged, I was able to identify its causes and implications more readily.  This 
process also provides a strong empirical grounding for the bureaucratic access points and 
leverage theory.  Furthermore, because the access constructs were explicitly measured in 
the interview protocol and conversations with specific HA/DR bureaucrats, the 
emergence of the leverage phenomenon is based in defensible, triangulated measures on 
which to ground the emergent theory.   
Early identification of the access research question enabled the precise 
measurement that allowed the subtle shift to discover the leverage construct.  Random 
case selection was unnecessary and, in fact, not preferable.  I chose the HA/DR policy 
domain because it was likely to replicate and extend the emergent bureaucratic access 
points theory.173  The novel bureaucratic access points and leverage theory resulted from 
the choice of this specific, transparent case and the ability to interview the most 
appropriate HA/DR bureaucrats.  My approach allowed an iterative analysis of the data 
                                                
172 Gersick, Connie. 1988. “Time and transition in work teams: Toward a new model of group 
development.” Academy of Management Journal, 31: 9-41.  And Harris, Stanley, and Robert Sutton. 1986. 
“Functions of parting ceremonies in dying organizations.” Academy of Management Journal, 29: 5-30. 
 
173 Eisenhardt, Kathleen. 1989. “Building theories from case study research.” Academy of Management 
Review, 14(4): 532-550. 
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that helped guide subsequent interviews and other data collection.  I was able to make 
adjustments during the data collection process, particularly using theory-building case 
research.  This design helped to shape my research questions and refine the definition of 
the access and emerging leverage constructs as evidence that measured the constructs 
accumulated.  The iterative process of constant comparison between data and constructs 
allowed this evidence from diverse sources to converge on a single, defined construct174 
of bureaucratic leverage.   
The linkage of bureaucratic access and leverage with a variety of bureaucratic, 
organizational structure, and access points literature in other contexts increases 
confidence that I have observed a valid phenomenon within the HA/DR policy domain. 
 It also allows me to elevate the conceptual level of my findings to the more fundamental 
level of bureaucratic access and leverage.  Furthermore, it strengthens the theory’s likely 
generalizability to other policy domains.  My positivist approach enabled a successful 
process “directed toward the development of testable hypotheses and theory which are 
generalizable across settings.”175  The addition of the following missions case studies 
further elucidates the bureaucratic access points and leverage theory. 
HA/DR Missions Case Studies 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 created USAID 
and established that U.S. military forces will assist in HA/DR responses as requested by 
USAID/OFDA, and subsequent policy has further defined that notion of security 
                                                
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid., p.546. 
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cooperation.  DOD entities are also allowed to plan and carry out HA176 projects as part 
of readiness and training operations overseas.  In particular, these projects (i.e., military 
deployments) are designed to provide the necessary training that ensures operational 
readiness in times of HA/DR responses and wartime.  They also help to maintain a U.S. 
military presence in certain regions, which provides access to partner nations’ militaries 
and defense apparatus, civilian ministries, and local populations.  Again, these HA 
projects are governed and authorized by Title 10 of U.S. Code Section 401.177 
HA deployments serve as relatively low cost (in terms of money, time, and 
medical resources), impactful projects that promote the security interests of both the U.S. 
and the host countries and enhance the U.S. military’s operational readiness.  The State 
Department approves these HA projects, and OFDA liaisons offer knowledge and 
suggestions in order to complement, not duplicate, similar social or economic assistance 
efforts provided to the host nation by other USG entities, NGOs, IGOs, etc.  Examples of 
HA projects include medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural host nation 
areas, potable water well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities, basic 
construction and repair of public facilities, and other such medical and engineering 
                                                
176 The acronym HA/DR is used to refer to U.S. humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in 
response to a natural disaster, and in some potentialities a man-made disaster, in which OFDA is the lead 
federal agency for USG involvement; the use of humanitarian assistance (HA) alone is used to differentiate 
U.S. military projects designed for operational readiness and training that are undertaken often in 
coordination and conjunction with OFDA projects, but not led or determined by OFDA.  U.S. military 
documents often refer to the humanitarian civic assistance (HCA) program, funded by Congress through 
Title 10 Section 401, when discussing what I term HA projects.  
177 Also, DOD Directive 2205.02 (December 2008). 
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projects.178  Beyond the positive influence on the educational and medical facilities and 
general quality of life of a HA project’s beneficiary population, these initiatives help to 
advance U.S.-host nation engagement and provide U.S. forces with valuable readiness 
and training opportunities.  
HA medical deployments are collectively known as medical readiness training 
exercises (MEDRETEs).  Medical readiness exercises involving teams consisting of 
doctors, nurses and dentists provide general and specialized health services to host nation 
citizens requiring care.  The two main types of medical training exercises are general 
MEDRETEs, which are two week deployments that provide outpatient medical, dental, 
veterinary care and public health education to remote or rural regions, and Medical Civic 
Action Program (MEDCAPs) projects, which are 3-5 days deployments that provide 
basic medical and dental care, dispense prescriptions, issue glasses, and administer 
vaccinations.  The primary objective is to enhance U.S. military operational readiness 
skills, and an associated benefit is the increased quality of life for the host nation’s 
civilian populace.  U.S. medical personnel benefit by training to provide medical care in 
challenging environments, partner nation medical professionals learn from and share 
medical treatment and modalities with U.S. medical personnel, and the local populace 
receives free, quality medical care.  In fiscal year 2011, U.S. military medical personnel 
conducted 88 MEDRETEs and MEDCAPs in 19 countries, treating nearly a quarter 
                                                
178 This discussion of HA projects and the subsequent HA and HA/DR missions case studies are informed 
by USSOUTHCOM and USAID/OFDA websites (please see bibliography for addresses and dates 
retrieved), conversations with HA/DR bureaucrats, and my personal experiences while serving as a 
healthcare administrator in the U.S. Air Force. 
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million people.  
In addition to the MEDRETEs, USSOUTHCOM plans and executes specific 
HA/DR preparedness exercises and conferences to “improve the collective ability of the 
U.S. and its partner nations to respond effectively and expeditiously to disasters” during 
deployments to rural, underprivileged areas that last for several months.179  The Fuerzas 
Aliadas Humanitarias (Allied Humanitarian Forces) exercise is designed to improve 
regional information sharing and capability by enabling U.S. and partner nation security 
forces to train together in preparation for natural disasters.  HA exercises such as the 
annual Beyond the Horizon and New Horizons programs provide the aforementioned 
engagement opportunities through construction efforts and medical assistance to 
communities throughout the region.  For example, over 85,000 partner nation patients 
were treated, and over 6,000 U.S. military, 500 USG personnel, and nearly 350 partner 
nation personnel were trained through fiscal year 2011 New Horizons and Beyond the 
Horizon exercises.180 
Problems in the HA and HA/DR exercises program that relate to this study, 
specifically, include:  inadequate pre-deployment training to prepare U.S. military 
medical personnel to deliver care that is appropriate for the environment, inadequate 
documentation of care delivered, and lack of appropriate assessments of activities.  These 
shortfalls undermine the goal of capacity building.  In other words, these HA projects do 
not always increase the host nation’s – and U.S. military’s – capability to provide for 
                                                
179 USSOUTHCOM. 2013. “Missions – Training and Exercise” and “Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Relief.” Retrieved on March 20, 2013, at http://www.southcom.mil. 
180 Ibid. 
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basic social and economic needs of the populace.  This capacity building ideal is 
important in terms of mitigation of myriad deleterious effects arising in the aftermath of 
potential HA/DR events.  Again, OFDA estimates that those pre-disaster, capacity 
building efforts save seven dollars in response dollar spending for every dollar spent for 
mitigation initiatives.  The following HA/DR missions provide brief case studies of the 
impact the discussed training and mitigation initiatives have on USG disaster response 
efforts and augment the interviews’ findings by providing tangible examples.  They are 
provided as illustrative examples of the HA/DR policy domain and how the associated 
policy is implemented.  Implications of the bureaucratic access points and leverage 
theory will be presented.  Suggestions on how to improve the planning and assessment of 
these missions will be discussed in the final chapter. 
Hurricane Mitch 
The Hurricane Mitch case reveals profound confusion regarding the LFA and 
interagency relations.  This problem led to the establishment of an embedded OFDA 
liaison in USSOUTHCOM and, eventually, other U.S. military combatant commands.  
The inclusion of an OFDA liaison in U.S. military headquarters has greatly improved 
communication and knowledge sharing as evidenced by interview comments such as 
“sharing information – accurate information – is the key to a successful response” and 
“our relationship and, ultimately, mission success is predicated on knowing who to reach 
out and touch (i.e., request particular resources and capabilities) and get what is needed 
when it is needed.”  Please see table on page 73 for more examples. 
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Hurricane Mitch, in 1998, was one of the worst natural disasters to occur in the 
western hemisphere in the past two centuries.  It swept through Central America (i.e., in 
particular, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador) causing tremendous loss of 
life and damage to the nations’ infrastructure.  It is estimated that the death toll was over 
18,000, with over five billion dollars in property damage, conservatively estimated.181  
Beyond the sheer size and scope of the disaster in terms of devastation and geographical 
area, USSOUTHCOM did not have a pre-existing medical plan, information was nearly 
nonexistent from the affected regions and no common assessment strategy was in place, 
and what little information was available was compromised by a lack of communication 
between governmental agencies.182 
The response to Hurricane Mitch revealed the need for embedded OFDA 
personnel in DOD combatant commands.  Various reasons for the convoluted disaster 
response include ill-defined training strategies, frequent turnover in personnel at both the 
strategic and operational levels creating a lack of standard operating procedures (SOPs), 
norms, and empirical knowledge, and the vertical organizational structures, cultures, and 
assessment measures.  The latter problem concerned how – and by whose assessments – 
information was observed, analyzed, and used.  Disparate organizations faced the 
preceding challenges without a common link.  The mechanism for improving interagency 
                                                
181 “Hurricane Mitch” from History.com, retrieved on March 20, 2013 at 
http://www.history.com/topics/hurricane-mitch. 
182 In addition, most cargo aircraft were diverted to respond to Iraqi aggression in the Desert Fox mission.  
Therefore, most of the disaster response for Hurricane Mitch was accomplished by naval vessels, which 
increased the delay of humanitarian assistance. 
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relations and information sharing became OFDA’s humanitarian assistance advisor 
position embedded in USSOUTHCOM. 
The embedded OFDA liaison in DOD combatant commands is the personification 
of a bureaucratic access point.  The liaison’s express purpose is to be a conduit for 
knowledge sharing during response preparation and communication during relief efforts.  
The liaison alternately leverages and is leveraged by other HA/DR bureaucrats, as a 
lynchpin of sorts, which enables HA/DR policy implementation.  The interview 
comments included in the table on page 73 provide examples of this access and leverage.    
There are various benefits to having an OFDA liaison in DOD combatant 
commands.  The challenges associated with having one entity in charge is mitigated when 
communication is improved.  An OFDA-DOD relationship is better clarified, with OFDA 
as the LFA, when representatives from each organization form professional relationships 
by working directly with one another in a common environment.  Unity of effort and 
familiarity lead to more effective and efficient preparation and relief response.  Better 
preparation and relief response is achieved through mutual planning and resource and 
capability awareness and sharing.  Common assessment measures may be realized 
through this unity of effort when policy implementation focuses on a mutually agreed 
upon outcome.  Recommendations for improved planning, response preparation, and 
assessment will be discussed in the final chapter.  All of these benefits from embedding 
OFDA personnel in DOD combatant commands stem from better information 
management and sharing that is developed through the liaison relationship. 
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Port au Prince, Haiti, Earthquake 
The Port au Prince earthquake HA/DR response is an example of how timely 
medical, logistical, and engineering assistance was provided under the overall direction 
of OFDA.  The lack of coordinated assessment measures created interagency challenges 
as evidenced by interview comments such as, “the systems (i.e., data clearinghouses) 
must be real-time so everyone is on the same page.”  But the central control, 
coordination, and effective communication realized through a common mission goal and 
the expertise exhibited by OFDA as the LFA led to a more efficient HA/DR response.  
One interviewee commented, “the whole thing (i.e., the HA/DR policy domain and policy 
implementation) works a lot better when OFDA is the lead federal agent.” 
The most significant recent HA/DR mission was Operation Unified Response in 
2010.  A 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, destroying much of 
the nation’s capital, Port au Prince, killing an estimated 230,000 persons, trapping tens of 
thousands in the wreckage, and leaving over two million without shelter.  A U.S. military 
force of nearly 22,000 troops, more than 30 ships, and 300 aircraft responded to OFDA’s 
call for assistance.  Together with other USG entities, NGOs, IGOs, and other nations’ 
militaries, it provided medical services and delivered and distributed millions of pounds 
of food and water over the following weeks.183 
From its inception on January 14, Joint Task Force – Haiti (JTF-H) exercised 
command and control over U.S. military assets in support of USAID/OFDA and the 
                                                
183 Information about the 2010 earthquake in Haiti case study is from USSOUTHCOM’s “Operation 
Unified Response: Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief 2010” webpage, retrieved on February 27, 2013, at 
http://www.southcom.mil. 
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government of Haiti to provide emergency disaster relief.  JTF-H coordinated its efforts 
with U.S. embassy staff and OFDA, focusing on the immediate need of search and 
rescue, medical care, and humanitarian assistance.  This collaboration led the USG 
response through the emergency phase and into the relief phase of the mission.  By the 
end of January, 16 different distribution sites had been established providing food and 
water and continuing to provide medical care.  The transition from emergency, to relief, 
to end-state phases was delayed due to complications surrounding the rainy season and 
the thousands of displaced persons who were vulnerable to flood- and water-related 
shelter and medical dangers.  USSOUTHCOM’s New Horizons exercises provided the 
transition to HA projects in Haiti and are an example of the potential benefit of such 
missions.184  
When HA/DR efforts ended in May, 2010, more than 9,000 patients, including 
1,025 surgeries, were cared for, and over 250 were evacuated to higher echelons of 
medical care.  Over 4.9 million meals and 2.6 million bottles of water had been delivered, 
and more than one million people received emergency shelter.  Finally, JTF-H, in 
conjunction with OFDA, planned for Haitian reconstruction and HA relief efforts in the 
form of New Horizons exercises and other medical readiness training exercises.185   
OFDA successfully leveraged its HA/DR expertise and network of HA entities to reduce 
by 55 percent the number of displaced persons less than one year after the earthquake.  
Furthermore, it successfully lessened the potentially devastating cholera outbreak in Haiti 




in late 2010 by again leveraging its authority as LFA to coordinate among various USG 
agencies critical education activities for the susceptible populace.186 
The immense public and political interest in the disaster created a large influx of 
persons from outside of the HA/DR policy domain, each with their own opinions and 
desires regarding how HA/DR policy should be implemented in this case.  An interview 
elicited this comment:  “big HA/DR events, like Haiti, draw a lot of interest…it makes it 
really difficult to do our jobs when they (i.e., outside influences) get involved.”  The 
large U.S. military response provided the conditions in which the DOD could have 
overwhelmed USAID/OFDA responsibilities as the USG lead agency – and some of the 
HA/DR bureaucrats I spoke with suggested it did in various ways.  And the fact that the 
Haiti relief efforts occurred in such close geographical proximity to the U.S. and that it 
became the largest HA/DR mission in modern U.S. military history certainly added to the 
stress within this policy domain creating many implementation challenges.  But, the 
overall effectiveness of HA/DR policy and its implementers’ understanding of their roles 
and profound knowledge were evident amid the fog of confusion and challenges.   
The coordination between the DOD and USAID/OFDA allowed for each to 
leverage one another and for them to collectively leverage those on the outside of the 
policy domain who wanted to influence implementation.  This case reveals how policy is 
implemented through bureaucratic access points and leveraging.  This leveraging enabled 
lives to be saved and suffering to be relieved in a country devastated by a natural disaster.  
                                                
186 OFDA. 2012. “Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2011.”  Document provided by OFDA representative.  
Also available at http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/crisis-
response/resources/fy-2011-annual-report. 
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El Salvador Mission 
An example of an HA missions case study in which training and mitigation efforts 
were a mission priority follows.187  This capacity building initiative illustrates the 
positive influence leverage can have in HA/DR policy implementation and reveals how 
limited military resources and funding, governed by Title 10 stipulations, may be used for 
efficient and effective training and readiness missions.  Along these lines, one 
interviewee commented, “only tapping (the resources of other entities in terms of) what is 
needed is the key…too much is not always a good thing.”   
Members of U.S. Army South and the Army Reserve provided specialized and 
general medical care to more than 5,100 patients in El Salvador over a nine-day period in 
2010 as part of a MEDRETE.  The effort was coordinated with the help of OFDA 
liaisons embedded with USSOUTHCOM.188  Collaboration with Salvadoran military 
members and physicians, dentists, and pharmacists built relationships for better 
communication for future HA missions and possible HA/DR efforts.  This is another 
example of the potential benefits of training and mitigation efforts (i.e., the estimate that 
every pre-disaster, capacity building dollar spent saves seven dollars in HA/DR 
spending).  Again, OFDA is able to leverage its corporate knowledge and status as LFA 
to help ensure useful HA missions and results for DOD readiness and the beneficiary 
population. 
In light of reduced USG budgets, the capacity building efforts discussed above are 
                                                
187 USSOUTHCOM. 2013. “U.S. Soldiers treat more than 5,100 patients in El Salvador.” Retrieved on 
February 27, 2013, at http://www.southcom.mil. 
188 Interview with HA/DR bureaucrats in November 2012. 
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more vital than ever.  Improving partner nations’ ability to confront and deal with their 
own HA/DR challenges will not only improve their peoples’ quality of life before and 
after a disaster, it will offset the reduced humanitarian and civic assistance activities that 
the USG has traditionally accomplished.  HA missions such as New Horizons, Beyond 
the Horizon, Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias, and MEDRETEs are implementation means 
to this policy end.   
However, going too far with HA efforts can create real problems, as well.  This 
observation is illustrated in the interview comment, “(the DOD) tends to see (HA/DR 
events) as opportunities to make things better in the end state when that’s not the goal, in 
most cases.”  For example, the provision of U.S. style medical care can undermine the 
host nation’s ability to provide care due to different expectations after the U.S. leaves.  
U.S. and partner nation military forces have the unique capability to respond within life 
saving time requirements with unmatched logistics capacity and trained and equipped 
personnel.189  Coordination with OFDA as the LFA will help improve knowledge 
management, regional information sharing, and more efficient interoperability among 
relief entities during disasters.  As these brief HA and HA/DR missions case studies have 
shown, OFDA’s leveraging capabilities are key to responding more effectively and 
efficiently to future humanitarian crises in the face of budget constraints. 
                                                
189 Department of Defense. 2012. “Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement.” Retrieved on April 2, 
2013, at http://www.defense.gov/news/WHDPS-English.pdf. 
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Bureaucratic Access Points and Leverage Theory 
As I interviewed and talked with the HA/DR bureaucrats and read the reports and 
researched the disaster relief case studies, I found that the bureaucrats generally “stay in 
their lanes” and rarely deviate from the overall policy rules, regulations, and SOPs.  But 
once outside influences, such as elected officials, become interested, the policy domain 
can lose coherence and ignore HA/DR policy.  Policy is implemented effectively and 
efficiently in most HA/DR responses and HA missions.  But SOPs, communication, and 
actual humanitarian assistance and disaster relief on the ground begins to break down in 
those cases in which outside influences insert themselves and affect the domain.   
It is likely that this is a complex system.  This approach understands complex 
interactions and positive feedback in terms of change leading to, or creating, more 
change.  It also investigates complex interactions through the notion of negative 
feedback, or the idea that change in one direction stimulates counteracting change.190  
Internal policy domain dynamics together with external influences (i.e., inputs) create 
system outputs.  The HA/DR policy domain cycles and implements and creates policy 
within itself, and the disaster response is successful in most cases.  But, in those few 
instances, negative feedback loops are created when outside influences insert themselves 
and desire outputs outside of the policy rules, regulations, and SOPs.  The bureaucrats 
may feel powerless and threatened causing the agencies to diverge from policy and stop 
communicating with one another and become concerned only with the outside influences, 
not their fellow HA/DR bureaucrats.    
                                                
190 Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 2002. “Positive and Negative Feedback in Politics.” In 
Policy Dynamics, eds. Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
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Figure 2.  Model I:  Closed Circuit with little to no outside (e.g., elected official) 






Figure 3.  Model II:  Open Circuit with outside influence.  Red lines and arrows represent 
direct outside interference and negative feedback between and among the HA/DR 







The novel bureaucratic access points and leverage theory is this project’s most 
valuable contribution to political science and public administration literature.  The notion 
of leverage connotes power191, but it can be organic or purposive.  The organic leverage 
idea is that power in this construct that I have described is naturally occurring through the 
                                                
191 The traditional theory of power as described in Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The Semisovereign 
People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.  Bachrach, 
Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1962. “Two Faces of Power.” American Political Science Review 56:947-952.  
And Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1963. “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework.” 
American Political Science Review 57:632-642. 
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structure of the organization and the policy domain, rather than specifically sought, 
manipulated, or even fully cognitively realized by the agencies and bureaucrats.  It occurs 
through the inherent authority that comes from policy and implementation expertise, 
formal responsibilities (e.g., lead federal agent, rulemaking ability, sole inspection or 
evaluation control through assessments, and final arbitration power), and deference paid 
by potential outside influences and fellow policy domain entities.  Organic leverage 
occurs when the entity employing it is left to its own devices and allowed to implement 
policy as it deems appropriate based on its expertise.   
Purposive leverage shares similar attributes with organic leverage.  However, it is 
the leverage mechanism that is realized, sought, and used during those times when 
outside influences inject themselves into the implementation or policy change process or 
when one entity sees an opportunity to better its position within the policy domain.  In 
this way, it has some relationship with Carpenter’s notion of autonomy, but it is a unique 
theory unto itself.  A large caveat to the purposive leverage construct is that the “OFDA-
type” entity has much difficulty being able to use its leverage because the other entities 
question, undermine, or simply ignore its authority.  Because nearly every policy domain 
has its own OFDA-type entity, this study and the emerging leverage theory is particularly 
valuable in that it ties the aforementioned authority to observable actions and practical 
application.  
The HA/DR policy domain models above, henceforth referred to as the “OFDA” 
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models for descriptive purposes,192 hold according to the explanatory chart of the 
typologies of bureaucratic leverage below.  A 2x2 may be used to compare several 
categories at once and to move to a uniform guideline, which permits clearer modeling 
and generalizability.  The HA/DR policy domain study and its emerging leverage theory 
are generalizable to other policy domains, particularly environmental policy, as will be 
discussed in the final chapter. 
Table 10.  Organic and Purposive Leverage 
 Organic Leverage Purposive Leverage 
Closed Circuit A B 
Open Circuit C D 
 
A: Organic Leverage / Closed Circuit: natural state is lack of interference (i.e., 
trust and reliance on expertise); "OFDA" leverage is expertise- and LFA-based; rules and 
SOPs are of less concern and importance due to recognized and accepted expertise; 
efficient, implicit and explicit power in ideal construct 
 
B: Purposive Leverage / Closed Circuit: "OFDA" exerts and exercises LFA power 
and authority; other actors acquiesce to “OFDA’s” expertise or authority; rules and SOPs 
are formalized and dictate roles; efficient, explicit power 
 
C: Organic Leverage / Open Circuit: unstable "OFDA" construct due to outside 
influence and lack of LFA adherence and accepted expertise; rules and SOPs are ignored 
and other actors’ desires take precedence; inefficient, little power or autonomy 
 
D: Purposive Leverage / Open Circuit: "OFDA" construct is compromised due to 
inability to maintain LFA status, power, and authority due to outside influence and other 
entities’ desires; rules and SOPs are ignored while other actors’ desires are considered; 
inefficient, no power or autonomy  
 
                                                
192 The term “OFDA” connotes the bureaucratic agency or entity within a policy domain that has the 
inherent authority that comes from policy and implementation expertise, formal responsibilities, and 
deference paid by potential outside influences and fellow policy domain entities.  It is the term for the 
agency or entity employing organic or purposive leverage. 
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The interviews yielded the unanimous finding that mission dominates the HA/DR 
bureaucrats’ approach to policy implementation.  The evidence from the interviews, 
coupled with the illustrations from the preceding HA/DR missions case studies, provides 
strong linkages to the emerging leverage theory and construct.  The mission-driven 
approach to policy implementation provides a more nuanced and specific understanding 
of bureaucratic leverage.  It appears that organic leverage is available and used in 
mission-driven environments, while purposive leverage may be sought and employed in 
structure-dominated constructs.  For example, a mission-driven approach may rely on 
expertise and a more fluid interaction among bureaucrats during policy implementation.  
This harkens back to the realization that HA/DR bureaucrats share similar attributes even 
though they come from disparate agencies.  On the other hand, structure-dominated 
constructs may see bureaucrats relying on the formality of rules, SOPs, and regulations to 
implement policy.  This study’s mission versus structure findings may be unique to the 
HA/DR policy domain as discussed here, but they may be generalizable to other policy 
domains and, at a minimum, offer interesting future research opportunities. 
In conclusion, the Hurricane Mitch case is an example of purposive leverage in an 
open circuit, structure-driven construct.  It exhibited much confusion regarding the LFA 
and interagency relations.  This problem led to the establishment of an embedded OFDA 
liaison in USSOUTHCOM and, eventually, other U.S. military combatant commands.  
The inclusion of an OFDA liaison in U.S. military headquarters has greatly improved 
communication and knowledge sharing within the HA/DR policy domain.  A comment 
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from one of the interviewees sums this up nicely, “they know what we bring to the table, 
and we know what they bring to the table…they need us, and we need them.”   
The Port au Prince earthquake HA/DR response is an example of organic leverage 
in an open circuit, mostly mission-driven construct.  Timely medical, logistical, and 
engineering assistance was provided under the overall direction of OFDA.  The lack of 
common assessment measures created interagency challenges.  And as one interviewee 
revealed, “OFDA brings a lot of experts to bear on an HA/DR event…and does a good 
job when left to it (i.e., without outside influence)…but it gets muddy fast when (outside 
influences) think they know best or someone wants some attention.”  But the central 
control, coordination, and effective communication realized through a common mission 
goal and the expertise exhibited by OFDA as the LFA led to a more efficient HA/DR 
response. 
The MEDRETE mission to El Salvador is an example of organic leverage in a 
closed circuit, mission-driven construct.  Training and mitigation efforts were a mission 
priority.  Effective planning enabled necessary training and resulted in wellness being 
delivered to a beneficiary population in need of medical care.  This capacity building 
initiative illustrates the positive affect organic leverage can have in HA/DR policy 
implementation.   Furthermore, it reveals how limited military resources and funding, 
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governed by Title 10 stipulations, may be used for efficient and effective training and 
readiness missions.193   
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193 U.S. Code: Title 10, Chapter 20, Section 401.  Funds are authorized for military forces to engage in 
HA activities if they help obtain and advance the security interests of the U.S. and the host nation and 
enhance the operational readiness skills of the military members performing the HA mission. 
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The evidence from the interview data and HA/DR missions case studies 
demonstrates that bureaucratic access points and leverage are key to interagency relations 
and policy implementation.  In particular, leverage is crucial when those agencies have 
different missions and assessment measures but are responsible for implementing over-
arching or over-lapping policy.  The common theme throughout these interview data and 
missions case studies is that bureaucrats cross organizational boundaries and leverage 
other bureaucrats.  The emergent theory helps explain why, when, and how bureaucrats 
leverage one another in their policy implementation efforts. 
Table 12.  Organic and Purposive Leverage Evidence from Interviews and Case Studies 
Organic Purposive 
1. Mission-driven 1. Structure-dominated 
2. Expertise-based 2. Rules- and regulations-based 
3. Overall mission and goal the same 3. Disparate agency missions and roles 
4. OFDA as Lead Federal Agent 4. DOD can “overwhelm” other entities 
5. Implicit power (understood, respected) 5. Explicit power (sought, formal, dictated) 
6. Cooperation (“healthy tension”) 6. Tension 
7. Autonomy 7. Dependency 
8. Little interference 8. More interference 
9. Communication and knowledge sharing 9. Restricted access 
10. One team, one fight 10. Different assessments 
11. Shared resources and capabilities 11. Title 10 funds restrictions 
 
The final chapter discusses what the preceding findings mean from a theoretical 
and practical perspective.  In particular, the bureaucratic access points and leverage 
theory is shown to be highly generalizable to other policy domains.  Policy 
recommendations, project limitations, and ideas for future research conclude the study. 
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Chapter 6:  Theory, Policy Recommendations, Project Limitations, and 
Future Research 
The final chapter revisits the study’s research questions and explains how they 
were answered.  The broader implications and importance of the findings are the key 
contributions of this study.  After a review of the research questions, the first part focuses 
on the novel theory of bureaucratic access and leverage.  It presents brief case studies that 
reveal the generalizability of the leverage theory to other policy domains.  It concludes 
with an explanation of how the ideas of bureaucratic access and leverage are missing in 
the implementation and policy change literature.  The significant contribution this project 
makes is filling that gap in the existing literature with the innovative theory, which 
generates exciting opportunities for future research in my larger program of work.  The 
second part of the chapter offers policy suggestions and practical application ideas for 
bureaucrats and for the political science field.  The third part makes known the 
limitations of the project and offers ideas for improving my future research designs.  The 
fourth part expands upon the lessons learned from the limitations by discussing future 
lines of investigation in my larger program of work and other research ideas.  Finally, a 
brief conclusion sums up the important implications and contributions of this project. 
Research Questions Revisited:  Bureaucratic Access Points and Leverage 
Bureaucrats access bureaucrats directly in the policy implementation process (i.e., 
in terms of outputs); therefore policy outcomes and subsequent policy assessment will be 
affected.  The evidence from the myriad reports, seminars, interviews, and HA/DR 
missions case studies certainly reveal that bureaucrats access one another directly during 
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the implementation stage.  Access and the emergent leverage phenomenon are vital to 
successful HA/DR efforts as seen in the Hurricane Mitch and Haiti earthquake cases.  
The semantics finding (e.g., “checks and balances,” “dovetail” efforts, “end state”) and 
further evidence from the interviews (i.e., tables on pages 73, 74, and 75) provide 
tangible examples of bureaucrats accessing and leveraging one another, as well. 
Interagency conflicts and bureaucratic challenges are largely due to different 
missions and different assessment measures carried out by the agencies.  Policy 
implementation and mission assessment influence interagency relations in terms of 
tension and/or cooperation between bureaucrats.  How are mission requirements and 
success assessed?  The evidence from the interviews and cases studies show that the 
missions, while somewhat different, are not the larger cause of interagency conflicts or 
bureaucratic challenges.  The goal of delivering life saving care and humanitarian 
assistance is the same for all of the HA/DR agencies, and it creates a rather uniform 
mission across entities.  The assessment measures, as noted earlier, are a source of 
conflict and challenges, however.  Part two of this chapter will offer various assessment 
measure suggestions and evaluation of what is success in the HA/DR policy domain. 
Does mission drive structure, or does structure drive mission?  How does this 
understanding influence policy implementation?  The mission versus structure construct 
was not found to be a factor in this study, but it led to other important findings.  All of the 
HA/DR bureaucrats that I interviewed expressed the idea that mission drove structure.  
As was thoroughly discussed in the two previous chapters, there are various possible 
reasons for this finding, but it does not appear to have negatively impacted this study.  In 
 107 
fact, the mission-driven and structure-dominated notions help to further define and 
articulate what is organic leverage and purposive leverage.  The limitations portion below 
will investigate the initial research question further. 
HA/DR agencies’ bureaucrats have the unique opportunity for access points to 
other bureaucrats during the disaster event itself and at times of policy implementation 
(e.g., lead agent responsibilities, humanitarian assistance missions).  Timing (in terms of 
opportunity for the HA/DR agency and criticality of the response time itself in saving 
lives and property) creates an access point for HA/DR bureaucrats based on their 
information, resources and capabilities, and leverage.  The evidence from the reports, 
seminars, interviews, and case studies all reveal that access points are readily available 
during the disaster event and policy implementation.  Communication of vital 
information is crucial to successful HA/DR responses and HA missions.  The inherent 
communication creates access points, and those HA/DR bureaucrats I interviewed 
expected and sought to be access points and conduits of communication.  The implication 
of timing appeared to simply be a part of the disaster response, rather than a separate, 
observed phenomenon.  The time-sensitive nature of HA/DR responses makes this 
research question largely moot. 
Information is key to interagency relations when those agencies have different 
missions and assessment measures but are responsible for implementing over-arching or 
over-lapping policy.  Similar to the previous interagency relations research questions, the 
assessment measures play a large role in implementing over-arching and over-lapping 
policy.  And, similarly, the shared goal of delivering life saving care and humanitarian 
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assistance is the same overall mission for all of the HA/DR agencies.  This shared goal 
has a unifying influence when it comes to implementing over-arching or over-lapping 
policy in this domain. 
  The capabilities and resources that agencies possess create opportunities for 
bureaucratic access at times of policy implementation (e.g., lead agent responsibilities, 
humanitarian assistance missions).  The evidence from the interviews and case studies 
yielded a connection between sought after capabilities and resources and access and, 
more apparently, leverage.  As discussed earlier, when OFDA needs an agency’s resource 
or capability as LFA, they necessarily become an access point.  The bureaucrats’ 
semantics and the comments that the DOD can “overwhelm” a situation or environment 
also reveal the leverage opportunities presented by prized capabilities and resources.  The 
expansive DOD response – in terms of personnel and capabilities, but also command and 
control – to the earthquake in Haiti is an example of leverage in this particular area.  
Bureaucrats leverage information (including timeliness of information) and 
resources and capabilities in order to access other bureaucrats and maintain their own 
information, resources, and capabilities.  The emerging leverage theory is the most 
valuable contribution this study makes.  Accordingly, the discussion portion of this 
chapter is devoted to the theory. 
Discussion 
Bureaucrats directly access other bureaucrats in the policy implementation 
process, and the subsequent leverage that is brought to bear on the actors and agencies is 
the instrument by which governance is accomplished.  This project presents a novel 
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bureaucratic access points and leverage theory that not only explains this mechanism but 
how bureaucrats may recognize and use it in policy implementation proceedings.  This 
new theory augments existing public administration literature and fills a critical gap in 
policy implementation and change literature in the political science field.  It is the 
descriptive theory that helps to explain the HA/DR policy domain, and it is highly 
generalizable to other policy domains.  
The notion of leverage is different from that of coordination.  Leverage connotes 
the idea that bureaucrats manage or manipulate other bureaucrats, agencies, and actors, 
along with their resources, capabilities, missions, and priorities.  Coordination is the 
design of hierarchy within the policy domain – the organizational structure of the domain, 
if you will.  Leverage goes beyond coordination to address resources, capabilities, and 
information and how those tools at the bureaucrat’s disposal are used to manipulate other 
bureaucrats and agencies in order to implement policy according to the intentions and 
interests of the policy domain actors. 
Policy is frequently developed and written in a way that undermines the 
bureaucratic entity’s authority and constrains its ability to address the beneficiary’s actual 
needs or requirements.  This project offers a different way to understand outputs and 
outcomes.  The outputs generated by manipulating the written policy are the result of 
bureaucratic access and leveraging.  The outcomes, in terms of what policymakers 
“really” intended or wanted from the policy, are garnered through manipulation of the 
written policy during the implementation process through leverage.  In this way, 
leveraging is a pooling of resources, capabilities, and information.  It goes well beyond 
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coordination and draws out what is needed from everyone within the policy domain, 
providing a compass and building synergy, allowing the bureaucrat to see all of this and 
manipulate it to an effective end of policy implementation.  
Furthermore, leverage theory would help a bureaucrat answer questions about the 
value and importance of an OFDA-type agency or entity.  The conception of management 
or manipulation afforded by leverage theory helps answer those questions while theories 
of coordination fail.  For example, an upper-level manager may ask a mid-level niche 
expert about a particular agency or entity in terms of what it provides, what it is 
responsible for, and whether to support it at a budget hearing.  Would it be more 
advantageous for that bureaucrat and her agency if the OFDA-type entity was better 
funded or eliminated?  This can be evaluated on the tactical level (e.g., the street-level 
bureaucrat) and the strategic level (e.g., upper management and decision makers).  
Leverage theory is extremely flexible in terms of how it can be employed and used as an 
evaluation tool.  In terms of the practical implications of the theory, understanding the 
power of leverage, who holds it, and how, when, and why it is used provides great 
advantage to bureaucrats in this and similar policy and public administration examples. 
Traditional public administration organizational process models are based on 
bureaucrats following SOPs, rules, and system norms.  In conjunction with the 
aforementioned bounded rationality phenomenon, these mechanisms largely determine 
organizational decisions.  For instance, preference or utility theory helps explain 
individual and organizational attitudes about risk.  Bureaucratic access points and 
leverage theory may help explain when bureaucrats are willing to take more risk.  An 
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OFDA bureaucrat may be willing to move outside of her proscribed SOPs and leverage 
her expertise in a closed circuit construct.  Conversely, she may be more risk averse in an 
open circuit construct in which outside influences are trumping her expertise.   
The decision process is further influenced by the structure of the organization.  
For example, a hierarchical or vertically structured organization will likely produce 
centralized decisions from the top down, whereas a flatter organization structure may 
generate more diffuse participative decisions from the bottom up.  The decision making 
process is also based on bureaucrats’ experience, experimentation, and research and 
analysis.  The personal differences (i.e., experience, perceptions, and personalities), 
knowledge, expertise, and institutional components (i.e., structure, mission, SOPs) 
influence decision making.  Vital sources of bureaucratic decision making power are 
delegated authority and administrative discretion.194     
Congress grants bureaucrats vast responsibility and authority for making 
decisions it cannot or will not make itself about policy implementation.  Beyond this 
delegated authority, bureaucrats exercise administrative discretion when they decide how 
to implement policies among various options.  When it comes to policy implementation 
decision making, bureaucratic authority and discretion may be explained by organic and 
purposive leverage.  Organic leverage shifts power and the authority to perform 
assessments and implement policy to expert and street-level (i.e., disaster-level) 
bureaucrats from policymakers, planners, and programmers during HA/DR training and 
                                                
194 Rosenbaum, Walter. 2008. Environmental Politics and Policy, 7th Edition. Washington, D.C.: CQ 
Press. 
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response activities.  Purposive leverage explains power and authority resting with 
policymakers, planners, and programmers who introduce and embed standard operating 
rules into the management systems governing what the HA/DR agencies and street-level 
bureaucrats do during training and response activities.  Four distinct policy examples 
spanning environmental, urban, economic, international commerce, energy, and defense 
policy are offered as examples of this theory’s generalizability and explanatory 
capability.  Please refer to the organic and purposive leverage table and open and closed 
circuit models in Chapter Five. 
 
Brief Policy Case Study Examples 
Urban Policy and Environmental Policy 
An example of an “organic closed” construct involves the urban policy and 
environmental policy domains.  Boston's urban renovation and environmental justice195 
case saw the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) organization exercise its 
organic leverage in a closed circuit construct to implement a positive policy outcome.196  
The OFDA-like DSNI worked within the existing policy and SOPs and viewed the 
Dudley Street community and environment as a collective entity, which yielded 
considerable organic leverage over elected officials and the property developers.  In fact, 
the DSNI was the first community group in U.S. history to be granted the power of 
imminent domain, which was granted by the Boston Redevelopment Authority through 
                                                
195 Environmental justice includes eliminating environmental hazards, enforcing environmental 
regulations equitably, and developing safe, affordable housing and clean jobs. 
196 Layzer, Judith. 2006. The Environmental Case: Translating Values Into Policy, 2nd Ed. Washington, 
DC: CQ Press. 
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the support of the Boston mayor and his Public Facilities Department.197  The DSNI 
achieved urban renewal due to its recognized and accepted expertise.  This case study 
presents an organic closed construct and shows that the “OFDA” entity does not 
necessarily need to be a governmental entity.   
Few urban renewal initiatives have an OFDA-like DSNI exercising organic 
leverage, and they generally do not attain their goals as a result.  Two examples are the 
Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St. Louis and the Cabrini–Green and Robert Taylor Homes 
public housing developments in Chicago.  While much of these housing projects’ failure 
were the result of a volatile combination of racism, white flight from inner cities, and the 
movement away from an urban industrial economy,198 the fact that a public or private 
organization similar to the DSNI did not exist in the St. Louis and Chicago renewal 
initiatives reveals the influence of bureaucratic leverage, or lack thereof. 
   
Economic (Security) Policy and Environmental Policy 
A “purposive closed” construct example involves the economic (security) policy 
and environmental policy domains.  The controversy surrounding drilling for oil in the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska provides an example of how a U.S. 
House or Senate committee could be an “OFDA” attempting to wield purposive leverage 
in a closed system.  While the policy being implemented remains the status quo, which is 
                                                
197 Ibid.  Also, the DSNI eventually formed the Dudley Neighbors, Incorporated, an urban redevelopment 
corporation and community land trust, in 1988. 
198 Cohen, Adam, and Elizabeth Taylor. 2000. American Pharaoh. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and 
Company. 
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not drilling, two Alaskan representatives attempted in 1995 to use their respective 
committee’s leverage to open up ANWR for drilling.   
Senator Frank Murkowski, chairman of the Senate Environment and Natural 
Resources Committee, and Representative Don Young, chairman of the House Resources 
Committee, attached ultimately unsuccessful drilling provisions to the omnibus budget 
bill.199   The environmental-conscious policy is still being implemented mainly because it 
is difficult to reverse policy, but politicians – especially from Alaska and the energy 
committees – are dominating the policy discussion based on extra-environmental issues 
and desires.  In this case, partisanship is the reason the OFDA-like committees were not 
successful in changing the policy.  Purposive leverage in a closed system helped the pro-
drilling bills reach floor votes.  
  
International Commerce Policy and Environmental Policy 
An example of an “organic open” construct involves international commerce 
policy as it relates to the environmental policy domain.  The issues of climate change and 
international trade as it pertained to the protection of dolphins and turtles in the tuna 
fishing and shrimping industries, respectively, provide examples in which the OFDA-like 
entities are interest groups and think tanks.200  The interest groups and think tanks are 
                                                
199 Layzer, Judith. 2006. The Environmental Case: Translating Values Into Policy, 2nd Ed. Washington, 
DC: CQ Press.  And Murkowski introduced similar bills as recently as 2012. 
200 Ibid.  This case study also includes a governmental OFDA-like entity, the Commerce Department’s 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).  The NMFS was charged with carrying out the mandates of the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972.  The MMPA provided the NMFS with the authority to 
ensure the maintenance of “optimum sustainable populations” (p.318) of marine mammals through various 
regulatory tools, such as setting fishing practice standards, issuing permits, and conducting inspections.  
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experts, but only for one side of the issue.  This enables the policy makers (i.e., the Bush 
and Clinton Administrations in this case) to choose a particular policy implementation 
strategy based on a side, rather than consideration of all of the evidence.  The construct is 
organic in that the implementation follows precisely a line of thinking with little problem 
when only looking at the issue from that particular perspective.  It is an open circuit 
because it is only considering one perspective, therefore, the disconnect is that the other 
side is not heard or considered.   
Environmental groups such as Greenpeace and Environmental Defense along with 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change were on one side of the climate change 
debate, while business interest groups and the George C. Marshall Institute were on the 
other side of the dispute.201  The Bush Administration used the arguments and data from 
the latter OFDA-like entities to formulate and implement policy.  The Clinton 
Administration then did the same with the arguments and data from the former entities.  
Similarly, environmental groups such as the Earth Island Institute and Humane Society 
raised awareness regarding the slaughter of dolphins and turtles, while tuna fishing and 
shrimping industry interest groups along with the world leaders who administered the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (i.e., the predecessor to the World Trade 
Organization) were on the trade side of the issue.202  All of the interest groups and think 
tanks used organic leverage based on their particular expertise, not any formal authority, 
in an open system to persuade policy makers according to their desires.        




Energy Policy, Defense Policy, and Environmental Policy 
An example of a “purposive open” construct involves the energy policy, defense 
policy, and environmental policy domains.  The Department of Energy’s Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) dominated the nuclear energy and weapons development policy and, 
specifically, administered Colorado’s Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant.  The AEC was 
initially effective in blocking attempts by Rocky Flats citizens, environmental interest 
groups, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to address environmental 
issues.203  However, due to its attempts to wield purposive leverage in an open system, 
the AEC could not maintain its LFA status, power, and authority.  The outside influence 
and other policy domain entities’ desires and mandates (e.g., the EPA is charged with 
protecting the environment and seeking punishment of those who contaminate it) 
undermined and ultimately eliminated the AEC’s policies and authority.  The preceding 
case studies reveal the bureaucratic leverage theory’s generalizability.  The following 
discussion places the theory within the existing policy process literature and fills gaps 






                                                
203 Ibid.  The environmental issues included dumping chemicals and radioactive plutonium waste 
contaminate the soil and groundwater surrounding the Rocky Flats plant. 
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Policy Process Frameworks and Theories 
The policy process includes problem definition, agenda setting, formulation, 
implementation, analysis, evaluation, and feedback.  While this study of the HA/DR 
policy domain deals with the implementation stage, in particular, it reveals a vital gap in 
policy implementation and change that is now filled by bureaucratic access points and 
leverage theory.  The study of policy processes includes the advocacy coalition 
framework, the institutional analysis and development framework, multiple streams 
approach, punctuated equilibrium theory, and the social construction theory.  Each 
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framework or theory is briefly discussed below with specific attention paid to the 
advocacy coalition framework, which has particular relevance to the leverage theory.   
The frameworks and theories are generally grounded in the bounded rationality204 
approach in which humans are perceived to be adaptable to changes in information and to 
consider outcome uncertainty.  Decision makers reduce uncertainty by using heuristics to 
inform their behavior and choices.  Humans also make trade-offs in which they weight 
some information to a greater degree than other information, or they weight some choices 
more than other choices.  This is all due to human cognitive limits.   
Serial processing is a vital phenomenon due to the premise that bounded 
rationality assumes cognitive limits determine how humans process information, choices, 
and tasks.  Humans engage in serial processing but do not possess the ability to engage in 
broad parallel processing.  Humans are capable of focusing on only one or a few pieces 
of information at a time.  Organizational decision making is based on this foundation, as 
well.  Therefore, organizations use heuristics and engage in serial processing, resulting in 
similar decision making patterns as do individuals.  The brief discussion of the policy 
process approaches are grounded in this understanding. 
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) deals with problems of goal conflicts, 
multiple levels of government and the associated actors, and technical concerns.205  
Policy actors choose from and position themselves into subsystem advocacy coalitions 
based on belief systems.  Elites form these coalitions.  Members gain access to resources 
                                                
204 The bounded rationality discussion is informed by various works from Herbert A. Simon and Bryan D. 
Jones. 
205 Sabatier, Paul, ed. 2007. Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd Ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
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and allies and develop strategies that transform their shared beliefs into collective policy 
change before their opponents (i.e., “devil shift”).  ACF coalitions are generally mature 
due to their elite composition, but new coalitions appear with new subsystems.  Policy 
learning and exogenous shocks change beliefs and policy within the ACF.  Policy 
learning206 results from the actors’ experience and familiarity with the policy, and 
incremental changes in the policy provide new information.  Exogenous shocks are 
natural disasters, regime change, and market failures, to name a few.  
The institutional analysis and development framework (IAD) focuses on how a 
community’s rules, conditions, and attributes influence individual’s incentive structures 
and subsequent outcomes.207  This framework understands institutions as sets of rules and 
norms that guide individuals, rather than as governmental entities of authority.  It focuses 
on how these institutions utilize and address common pool resources.  Self-organization 
and repeated interactions within the same environment enable individuals to learn, adapt, 
and ultimately mitigate some of their cognitive limitations.  The IAD approach provides 
much opportunity for comparative evaluation, enables multiple levels of investigation, 
and can reveal causal relationships.  Furthermore, in common pool resource division 
environments, self-organization leads to more optimal use of common resources than 
when organization and rules are imposed by a central authority.  Communication among 
members is key; learning, adapting, and reducing the negative affects of cognitive 
limitations leads to shared norms, trust, and more favorable outcomes for those involved 
                                                
206 May, Peter. 1992. “Policy Learning and Failure.” Journal of Public Policy, 12(4):331-354. 
207 Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
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(or potential failure).  Due to these shared values the need for self-maximization 
decreases and the needs and collective good of the community is paramount.  As a result 
of this coordination and self-organization, an apparently inefficient system may actually 
be structured and efficient when viewed from the ends rather than the means.  Policy 
change occurs as different norms and rules take effect over time and changing 
information.  
The multiple streams approach focuses on the conditions of policy change 
through the interaction of the policy stream, the political stream, the problem stream, 
policy entrepreneurs, and windows of opportunity.208  Policy entrepreneurs “couple” the 
streams during windows of opportunity by matching their politically tenable policy 
solution to an important policy problem (i.e., national or public “mood”).  Policy change 
occurs when policy entrepreneurs are able to capitalize on windows of opportunity, 
combining dynamics of the policy and political environment to garner attention and 
support for their preferred policy solution.  
The punctuated equilibrium (PE) approach seeks patterns within agenda setting 
and policymaking.  Baumgartner and Jones209 expand upon Shattschneider’s210 work 
regarding the difficulty of achieving large change and conflict expansion.  They argue 
that policy change follows observable patterns over time (i.e., periods of stasis 
                                                
208 Kingdon, John. 2003. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd Ed. New York: Longman. 
209 Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 2009. Agendas and Instability in American Politics, 2nd Ed. 
University of Chicago Press. 
210 Schattschneider., E.E. 1957. “Intensity, Visibility, Direction, and Scope.” American Political Science 
Review. 51: 933-42.  And Schattschneider, E.E. 1975 (1960). The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View 
of Democracy in America. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press. 
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interrupted by large punctuations).  They find that policy change occurs through the break 
down of policy monopolies caused by new information and policy image shifts.  The 
underlying processes of punctuations are associated with the limitations of boundedly 
rational individuals and organizations and issues related to institutional friction.211   
As seen with the ACF, social construction (SC) theory places much importance 
on individual belief systems.  SC posits that policies determine or dictate how individuals 
see their situation within the system and act according to their interests.212  Political 
participation is determined by how the individual understands her or his position within 
the system.  This is true for those making policy and those affected by that policy.  
Policymakers view groups as either worthy or unworthy, deserving or undeserving.  Their 
policy will be influenced by those beliefs.  Those affected by the subsequent policy will 
believe they are part of the system and participate or feel ostracized and not participate.  
All of these conditions help inform and solidify beliefs and identities, similar to the ACF 
construct.  
While all of this literature does not account for the leverage phenomenon, the 
ACF approach may have the strongest ties to this emerging theory.  ACF focuses on 
particular subsystems, individual beliefs and identities, and policy change.  The ACF 
generally maintains that individuals’ normative beliefs are transformed into rational 
participation in coalitions and other collections, and desired policy changes are realized.  
                                                
211 Jones, Bryan D., Frank R. Baumgartner, and James L. True. 1998. Policy Punctuations: US Budget 
Authority, 1947-95. Journal of Politics 60(1): 1-33. 
212 Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram, eds. 2005. Deserving and Entitled: Social Construction and 
Public Policy. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
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The ACF and multiple streams theory share the attribute of linking decisions and 
actions in various stages of the policy process in explaining new policy and policy 
changes.  But while the multiple streams theory has remained rather consistent after being 
developed from the garbage can model, the ACF has altered its framework quite often 
through the years.  An evolving framework may be better able to incorporate the latest 
theories and realizations within the policy process field, such as the notion of organic and 
purposive leverage.  For example, the ACF struggles to articulate why one advocacy 
coalition finds success and another fails.  The common, yet unsatisfying, conclusion in 
ACF is that of timing – one coalition simply transforms its beliefs into actionable and 
attainable goals by organizing and acting before another.  Adding the leverage theory 
helps explain why and how advocacy coalitions find success or meet with failure.   
Identifying the commonalities within the theories helps to give shape to the 
overall policy process field and unites the seemingly disparate theories and frameworks 
into a coherent collection of fields.  It also reveals gaps in the literature.  The novel 
organic and purposive leverage theory not only helps to fill the gaps in implementation 
and policy change literature, but it augments it.  In particular, the ACF can benefit from 
the inclusion of the notion of leverage.  The next portion of this chapter offers policy 
suggestions and additional practical application ideas for bureaucrats and for the political 
science field.      
Recommendations 
The following section discusses the study’s findings from a more application 
based approach.  Actionable suggestions accompany the lessons learned from the 
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interviews and case studies.  It is important that political science offers possible solutions 
after discovering issues in a policy’s development and implementation.  The importance 
of standardized assessment measures cannot be overstated, and I offer suggestions for 
more effective measures of evaluation.  The need for more developed “cultural awareness 
training” and a more uniform approach to DOD HA/DR capabilities across branches is 
presented.  The concept of “diplomatic currency” is offered to help explain the value of 
HA/DR efforts in terms of national security.  Finally, findings regarding policy efficiency 
and learning lead to suggestions for political science applications. 
Assessment Measures 
Efficiencies come from precise assessment measures.  Effective, efficient disaster 
response that saves lives and offers humanitarian assistance in the most expeditious 
manner is the goal of HA/DR policy.  Wisely expending limited resources is the second 
part of that goal.  Therefore, if the OFDA claim that every dollar of prevention and 
preparation saves seven dollars in response is remotely accurate, measures of evaluation 
are the key to assessing the success of that two-part goal.  Assessments should be 
standardized so all entities have a clear understanding of the measures that determine the 
relief end-state goal.  
Examples of what is assessed in HA/DR efforts include disease surveillance, 
vector control, sanitation, food and water safety and quality, restoration of general public 
health programs, post-traumatic stress, and provision of health services after the U.S. 
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leaves.  Examples of measures of effectiveness for HA/DR events213 include:  mortality 
and morbidity rates, patient evacuation times, outpatient and inpatient statistics, area 
coverage, rate of post-traumatic stress, medical equipment and supplies used, and 
nutritional status of the affected populace.214  While these assessments are valuable and 
the associated measures are standardized across global HA/DR entities, they do not go far 
enough nor ask the right questions in many cases.  And the U.S. HA/DR actors must 
develop standardized U.S.-specific assessment measures in conjunction with those of the 
international community.   
Assessment of what is needed in terms of prevention, preparation, and actual 
HA/DR response should guide policy and its implementation.  For example, the number 
of washing stations and latrines placed is not the key, but rather, the assessment of 
whether the sanitation needs of the distressed populace are being met is the important 
measure.  Whether the need for adequate shelter is being met is the important measure, 
not the number of tents erected.  And difficult resource expenditure questions need to be 
addressed by elected officials in the military-civilian construct.  Should assessment be 
based on humanitarian needs or the amount of strategic access to the host nation it affords 
(i.e., national security interests)?  Should the latter assessment determine DOD 
involvement in HA/DR efforts?  Building partner nation capacity helps to answer part of 
these questions, but better assessment measures that lead to more efficient and effective 
use of resources is vital in the face of reduced budgets. 
                                                
213 Compared to rates prior to the disaster. 
214 The Sphere Project. 2011.  “Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian 
Response.” Retrieved on March 11, 2013, at http://www.SphereHandbook.org. 
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The following are possible measures of DOD-specific HA/DR missions success.  
They could be used in conjunction with the international and U.S. HA/DR policy domain 
evaluation measures.  Please see appendix for additional information on coding and 
scoring schemes for these measures.   
 
The greater the success of individual USSOUTHCOM military medical missions (HA), 
- the lower the crime rate in the area receiving HA; 
- the higher the productivity rate in the area receiving HA; 
- the greater the willingness to work with the U.S. in the area receiving HA; 
- the greater the indices of wellness in the area receiving HA. 
The greater the success of USSOUTHCOM military medical missions (when requested 
by USAID/OFDA humanitarian assistance needs), the greater the increase in its proportion of 
defense funding. 
 
Existing literature is scant on this topic and measurement is accomplished in a 
rather haphazard manner in terms of compiled data.  There is no “clearinghouse” entity 
managing and analyzing all of the data from HA/DR efforts.  For example, the National 
Center for Medical Intelligence, the World Health Organization, the Center for Disease 
Control, the Pan American Health Organization, and USAID/OFDA track the after, or 
secondary, effects of what USSOUTHCOM missions do in terms of wellness results.  
However, these data and systems are not integrated and some information and data are 
not releasable from USSOUTHCOM or the other organizations.  There is no 
comprehensive way to see and evaluate data from the results of these missions.  While 
there is much literature on environmental and domestic healthcare policy measures, there 
is none on military medical capabilities and the provision of healthcare in association 
with environmental challenges policy.  This is one of the important holes in the policy 
literature that future iterations of this study could help to fill.   
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The need for better assessment measures has been established.  Suggestions for 
more effective and efficient measures of evaluation have been presented.  The following 
ideas for correcting the assessment measures and implementing the suggested measures 
of evaluation may help to develop new HA/DR policy.  Returning the host nation to its 
preexisting state (i.e., conditions immediately prior to the disaster) is a guiding principle 
in the U.S. HA/DR policy domain that must be followed for clear end-state goals and 
outcomes.  Training HA/DR entities on how to conduct the standardized assessments is 
crucial to moving the implementation process forward.  Sharing information, developing 
medical plans for dealing with disasters, identifying entities with particular knowledge of 
specific geographical locations and types of HA missions, and establishing pre-disaster 
logistics’ support systems are important preparatory steps for mitigating initial confusion 
and delivering assistance quickly.  All of these initiatives can be accomplished by 
continuing to develop information-sharing tools such as the (Global) Theater Security 
Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS)215 and other data systems for 
storage, analysis, and accessibility of HA/DR information.  These data should include 
human resources and capital, such as nation, region, and HA/DR subject matter experts.  
Finally, similar to an OFDA liaison embedded within DOD combatant commands, a 
DOD medical liaison with administrative expertise and HA/DR policy knowledge should 
be placed in the OFDA headquarters on a full-time basis.  
                                                
215 The (Global) Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) is a DOD 
database accessed through an Internet portal that is a clearinghouse and depository of worldwide TSC 
activities.  It includes such data as population vulnerability and capabilities and disaster resource 
management information. 
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Cultural Awareness and Shared Capabilities Within the DOD 
The need for more developed cultural awareness training was discussed by a few 
of the HA/DR bureaucrats.  Guatemala is different from Chile.  Venezuela is different 
from Colombia.  These are obvious observations, but HA/DR planning has a tendency to 
rely on a “cookie cutter” approach in that successful efforts in one area can be duplicated 
in another without taking into account the differences between the areas.  It would 
behoove the U.S. HA/DR community to stop viewing host nations, disasters, and quality 
of life conditions from an American perspective, understanding that each country is 
different culturally, economically, socially, and that they are not the United States.  
Awareness and understanding lead to respect and clearer measures of what is success.   
Cultural awareness training would also improve the previously discussed ability 
to perform quality assessments.  The provision of U.S. style medical care can undermine 
the host nation’s ability to provide care due to different expectations after the U.S. leaves.  
Similarly, U.S. building codes and education standards cannot be the measure.  Rather, 
the local codes and standards must be how assessments are performed.  Future training 
should include a much larger focus than just assessment, however.  The idea that a host 
nation can simply reject the medical care, construction, or education the U.S. is offering 
if they do not agree with how the U.S. is doing it is not only short sighted, but dangerous.  
That type of disrespect can lead to restricted access to the country and, possibly, an 
antagonistic relationship with what was once a partner nation. 
The need for a more uniform approach to DOD HA/DR capabilities across 
branches is another finding from the reports, seminars, and interviews.  The “purple suit” 
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idea, in which the capabilities and resources from the Air Force, Army, Navy, and 
Marines may be used interchangeably in an organization or mission, would be highly 
effective in the HA/DR arena.  For example, a “universal” deployable field hospital can 
be staffed by medical personnel from all branches rather than each one being different 
and unique to a particular branch.  Making resources more “mix and match” and 
universal would be cost effective and provide greater flexibility.  This suggestion will be 
difficult to implement, however, because each branch will likely want to maintain its own 
niche capabilities so as to not lose funding and relevance in a particular skill set. 
Diplomatic Currency 
The concept of “diplomatic currency” reveals the value of HA/DR efforts in terms 
of national security.  No one else – no other public or private entity – can perform U.S. 
military medical functions demanded during environmental challenges or in austere 
conditions.  This diplomatic tool of goodwill and healthcare delivery is a real currency 
that demands coherent policy.  The benefits of this diplomatic tool are extensive.  HA/DR 
efforts in Pakistan helped open up more basing and airfield opportunities for the 
prosecution of war in Afghanistan.  The strategic island of Guam and other Pacific 
islands could be easier to access after future HA/DR efforts led by the U.S., especially in 
light of the new defensive strategic policy focusing on the Pacific region.  These are but 
two examples of how diplomatic currency can be utilized in U.S. national security policy. 
The world changed on September 11, 2001.  The events of 9/11 may be seen as 
ushering in a new chapter in the nation’s defense and a new, yet familiar, diplomatic role 
for the U.S. military.  President Bush stated, “America is no longer protected by vast 
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oceans.  We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased 
vigilance at home.”216  Not only did the role and mission of the military change, but the 
way in which it is used was open for change.  As this change relates to military medical 
capabilities, the last decade has seen medical resources being used as a currency for 
greater participation and cooperation with those affected peoples in Iraq and Afghanistan 
in efforts to “win the hearts and minds” of the populace.  Wellness is an intimate 
commodity; if you are unwell, no amount of security will matter.  Beyond money, 
healthcare delivery is the currency used to garner support of a wanting, needing people.   
The U.S. military medical service is charged with facilitating joint (among the 
branches) interagency strategies to address regional health risks and challenges in every 
part of the world.  The goals and objectives of U.S. national security strategy speak to 
denying terrorists access to a willing population of future terrorists.  What better way to 
deny them safe havens and willing recruits than to provide the most valuable of all 
nonmaterialist needs – wellness?  OFDA also engages in diplomatic currency efforts.  For 
example, its hazard mapping initiative has helped Afghanistan mitigate and prepare for 
disasters, such as flooding and associated food shortages.217    
Although 9/11 showed the U.S. is not as secure as once believed, there is a 
lingering perception that it faces few, if any, challenges in the Western Hemisphere.  This 
                                                
216 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 2003. Retrieved on March 11, 2011, from 
http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/govt_docs/public_health_prep/ 
whitehouse/whitehouse_national_strategy_for_combating_terrorism.html. 




is simply not the case, and a policy of diplomatic currency is indeed necessary to 
maintain U.S. security interests in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility.  The key to 
new policy is that intellectual and philosophical elites must lead the way, but how they 
translate the currency into something tangible for the accountants and isolationists will be 
a bureaucratic challenge (i.e., measures of success and productivity balanced by 
practicality).  The notion of diplomatic currency has the potential to redefine the 
military’s role in diplomatic efforts from one of (nearly always) last resort to one that is 
called upon before potential conflicts flare up. 
Wellness as a diplomatic currency involves when, how, and where to use military 
medical capabilities for nation stabilizing and nation enabling.  What the U.S. does now 
is nation rebuilding.  Diplomatic currency goes beyond winning the hearts and minds of 
suffering peoples.  The idea is that providing wellness to affected persons empowers, 
engages, and enables them in the process of helping themselves and being productive and 
self-sufficient on their own.  In other words, capacity building. 
The provision of healthcare to increase wellness and productivity in host nations 
is the appropriate policy approach and use of U.S. military medical capabilities in simple 
cost-benefit, economic terms.  The U.S. is spending valuable resources – military 
members’ lives and taxpayer monies – on these missions.  What is the nation getting in 
return for its investment?  Smaller DOD budgets and fewer resources demand intelligent, 
clearer policy for the most benefit.  Again, empirical measures rather than notional 
feelings that the U.S. are “helping for helping’s sake” and living up to its moral 
responsibilities are needed now.  Beyond the cost-benefit ratios and morality, the values 
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informing these medical mission policies must include a practical approach.  It is not only 
acceptable to have ulterior motives that benefit U.S. interests, it is imperative.  
Theoretical implications of this approach will be discussed in the future research section 
of this chapter. 
Policy Efficiency and Learning 
Findings regarding policy efficiency and learning lead to political science 
applications.  Policy studies often focus on how well the implemented policy attains its 
proscribed goals.  In most cases, policy efficiency is best accomplished through early 
planning and preparation.  Although the mitigating effects of planning and prevention in 
the HA/DR policy domain have been well documented, it is interesting to note that 
waiting until the punctuating event (i.e., the disaster) may create less uncertainty and 
possibly increase efficiency in terms of only asking for and using what is needed.  The 
realization that OFDA pulls and the DOD pushes resources and capabilities makes this an 
interesting study in contrasting organizational behavior and the subsequent policy 
implementation ramifications.  If funding and other resource allocation decisions are 
decided at the time of the natural disaster event, then the subsequent implementation of 
HA/DR policy may very well be more efficient in terms of providing resources based on 
actual assessed needs rather than projected needs.  This is a unique, dichotomous 
phenomenon that may further policy studies research by investigating a policy domain 
that often has two implementation outcomes. 
There is not the impetus to learn in this construct, however.  The immediacy of 
the relief response (i.e., the event itself, the need to respond quickly for preservation of 
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life, and the desire to affect a positive difference or change in the situation quickly) may 
result in different policy implementation "learning" occurring in this policy area.  May’s 
policy learning categories – instrumental learning, social learning, and political learning – 
are an excellent rubric with which to analyze policy. 218  However, they struggle to place 
HA/DR policy because the domain may be more about leverage, adaptation, or advantage 
than learning.   
There appears to be little instrumental and, especially, social learning occurring in 
this domain because the expertise is housed within the relief agencies and is only “tested” 
or evaluated by outside entities at the time of the disaster event.  And any political 
learning appears to be rather fleeting because each disaster is unique and, again, demands 
new information.  Whether or not the legislators or president "forget" from disaster to 
disaster is largely a moot question.  The fact that each natural disaster event is distinctive 
and can only be addressed by those agencies with the expertise and capabilities unique to 
them provides the agencies more autonomy, importance, and latitude.  Instrumental 
learning would be helpful with regard to what the HA/DR agencies ask for (i.e., each 
disaster is an opportunity for more resources, acclaim, autonomy, importance, status).  
More efficient use of resources may result from more instrumental learning. 
But, the immediacy of the event can help with efficiency, too.  Heimer argues that 
efficiency is fundamentally different from reliability.219  If HA/DR agencies are 
acknowledged as reliable and capable of implementing the relief policy it is still not a 
                                                
218 May, Peter. 1992. “Policy learning and failure.” Journal of Public Policy, 12(4): 331–354. 
219 Heimer, Carol. 2008. “Thinking about how to avoid thought: Deep norms, shallow rules, and the 
structure of attention.” Regulation and Governance, 2: 30–47. 
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given that efficiency follows or is assumed by legislators.  Waiting until the punctuating 
event occurs before doling out resources creates less uncertainty that the resources will be 
managed and used efficiently.  Waiting until the event also increases efficiency in terms 
of only requesting, receiving, and using what is needed to provide the relief.   
A valuable extension to the leverage theory and its association with the push (i.e., 
DOD) and pull (i.e., OFDA) assessment criteria is a “capacity” versus “mobilization” 
approach to understanding bureaucracies and policy domains.  A bureaucratic entity’s 
(excess) capacity to perform a task other than its primary mission is on one side of the 
ledger.  An OFDA-type entity’s mobilization ability in taking that other entity on a new 
or separate mission is on the other side.  The diagram below illustrates this leverage idea 
by showing how the OFDA-type entity can “move the median” or “shift the compromise 
point” similar to a negotiation setting in which one side offers extreme proposals so as to 
shift the other’s perspective and make what the offering side really wants more palatable 









Figure 4.  Leverage in a Capacity Versus Mobilization Construct 
 
 
In this example, the DOD's primary purpose is national defense.  Its focus is 
largely one of preparing for and prosecuting wars.  Thus, the one-way arrow begins at 
"National Defense, War" to denote the locus of the DOD's attention, as it views its 
primary purpose (i.e., the solid arrow reaching from the DOD to its mission of National 
Defense, War).  OFDA uses leverage to shift the DOD's attention in the direction of 
HA/DR efforts (i.e., the dashed arrow pointing between OFDA and the DOD and the 
DOD and the HA/DR mission).  The leverage shifts the DOD's attention to a new locus, 
or compromise point, that sees DOD resources, capabilities, and information gathering 
focused on HA/DR efforts in addition to its primary purpose of preparing for and winning 
wars.  The new attention point entails a compromise between those competing missions 
of national defense and HA/DR efforts and the utilization of DOD resources.  
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OFDA's ability to leverage the DOD and shift its compromise point is contingent 
upon the DOD having excess capacity to address the HA/DR efforts.  In other words, this 
shifting can only occur if the leveraged entity can accomplish its primary mission and 
maintain additional capacity to address another mission.  OFDA can and does leverage 
the DOD to perform a mission (i.e., HA/DR) outside of its primary purpose (i.e., national 
defense), and that shift can only occur with excess capacity within the capacity versus 
mobilization construct.  The DOD’s capacity to perform a mission other than wage war is 
on one side of the ledger, and OFDA’s mobilization ability – through its leverage power 
as LFA – in taking the DOD on a separate mission is on the other side.  The preceding 
discussion ties to assessment, and OFDA’s needs based assessment is particularly useful 
under the policy efficiency and learning lenses and the capacity and mobilization 
construct. 
Limitations 
The limitations of this project caused issues with the structure versus mission 
research question and prohibited the emergence of the idea that timing and resources and 
capabilities are leverage-creating phenomena.  While these were disappointing results, 
they do not lessen the importance or value of the overall study or the other findings.  
They did, however, provide very useful lessons learned that will improve future research 
projects within this program of work and beyond.  
It was important to understand that organizational mission and structure may not 
be related in an adversarial way.  And it was not the appropriate framing device for the 
project, but it was integral in developing the frame that was eventually used.  The 
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structure and overall mission of the HA/DR agencies and how that influences the 
implementation of HA/DR policy and its assessment evolved as the frame for this project.   
The frame developed intuitively through questions such as, “what if mission and 
structure are not related, or what if there is a third variable?”  This understanding refutes 
March and Moe, and thereby further develops organizational and bureaucratic theory.  
Beyond the obviously related bureaucratic access points and leverage theory and policy 
assessment, the third variable may be the self- and professional-identity of the HA/DR 
interviewees.   
Strict adherence to a hierarchical structure can stifle critical and creative thinking 
and thereby limit every participant in the system to what is his or her particular role in the 
overall construct.  While self- and professional-identity can produce a feeling of 
coherence and direction, it frames the way interviewees define themselves and their 
environment.220  This sensemaking activity guides responses based on the identity the 
interviewee assumes and necessarily influences the findings derived from the 
interviews.221  Furthermore, humans lack direct introspective access to most of their 
cognitive processes, which can lead to potential problems with self-report methods.222  
Interviewees may tell the investigator something they could not be expected to know 
about themselves.223  These phenomena are not a weakness in the interview methodology, 
                                                
220 Alvesson, M. 2003. “Beyond neopositivists, romantics, and localists: A reflexive approach to 
interviews in organizational research.” Academy of Management Review, 28(1):13-33. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Nisbett, Richard, and Timothy Wilson. 1977. “Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on 
mental processes.” Psychological Review, 84, 231-259. 
223 Ibid. 
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but they must be considered and their possible effects mitigated.   
In this case, they may help to explain the findings from the mission versus 
structure research question.  For example, did the interviewee self-identify as a 
bureaucrat or an HA/DR problem solver and expert?  If it was as the latter, one can cull 
out the bureaucrat-accessing-bureaucrat and leveraging themes from that position of 
authority and expertise.  If the interviewee self-identified as a HA/DR expert, his or her 
responses will likely elicit greater pride or sense of importance and value than if they 
think of themselves as a bureaucrat (i.e., possibly a more pejorative term in today’s 
parlance).  Also, the symbiotic relationship between HA/DR bureaucrats discussed earlier 
may be a manifestation of the typical philosophies and personalities that are drawn to 
such work.  The idea that they would list the mission as the driving factor, rather than 
organizational structure, is more than plausible.  They work effectively because of the 
common goal and professional-identity, not the rigid structure typical in USG entities. 
My two questions that were attempts to uncover the timing as a leverage-creating 
phenomenon did not elicit definitive findings.224  I addressed the responses to these 
questions in the previous chapter and think they reveal enough to keep timing as a 
possible, if not well documented or explicitly found, access point and leverage-creating 
opportunity.  It is possible, too, that timing as an opportunity for access and leverage is a 
                                                
224 Question 3: “If other HA/DR bureaucrats tried to access, what agencies did they represent, when did 
they try, what did they want for the military?  How did they gain access?”  The “when” was an attempt to 
uncover timing, the “what they want” addresses capabilities and resources, and the “how” attempted to find 
whether they tout their success, information, and fact that they are the only ones who could accomplish the 
HA/DR mission – capabilities – as credibility.  
Question 5: “Did HA/DR (and DOD medical) bureaucrats provide relevant information in a timely 
manner?”  This question was for the timing of access and availability of information during the punctuating 
event. 
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given in that when a HA/DR event occurs policy implementation occurs of its own 
volition.   
For example, the earthquake off of the Guatemalan coast on November 7, 2012, 
occurred while I was at USSOUTHCOM conducting interviews.  The HA/DR 
bureaucrats immediately transitioned into their roles and began accomplishing their 
responsibilities without the need of another entity leveraging them or their resources.  
Again, it appears to be a well-oiled machine that is switched on the moment a possible 
HA/DR event occurs.  Either way, timing as a leverage-creating opportunity is likely to 
be found in future lines of investigation with more effective interview questions and 
hypotheses.   
Similar to the timing phenomenon, the lack of findings concerning resources and 
capabilities may be a product of the effective policy domain.  However, it could also be 
considered a given in that OFDA has an understanding of what the DOD brings to the 
table – especially air lift and transportation capabilities – so a more precise research 
question would benefit future studies.  The limitations did not negatively affect this 
project, but the lessons they provide will be invaluable for future investigations in the 
larger program of work.  It will take multiple research projects and much hard work to 
hone the skills of developing theoretically sound interview questions and conducting 
effective interviews.   
Future Research  
Beyond the promising generalizability of organic and purposive leverage, open 
and closed circuits, and assessment measures and how all of these help to investigate a 
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policy domain, future lines of research are available from this project.  A few, general 
questions may help guide those studies.  How does the availability of bureaucratic access 
points relate to and influence responsibility and practicality in public policymaking?  Do 
more access points lead to more responsible bureaucrats, more responsible policy, and 
more practical and efficient policy implementation?  Does the type of leverage and form 
of policy domain have an effect on these outputs?  Do assessment measures play a large 
role in other policy domains?  The following examples are possible directions for 
research and may have application for policy makers as well as political science and 
public administration. 
There may be an opportunity to study how attention and feedback influence 
policy implementation during large, media-intensive events.  As was seen in a few of the 
HA/DR missions case studies and the generalizability case studies, outside influences can 
have dramatic effects on policy implementation and change.  On the other hand, if an 
event does not rise to elected officials' attention or public concern, bureaucrats tend to 
stay in their lanes and implement policy according to the established rules, regulations, 
and SOPs, relying on their expertise.  Because attention and feedback have been studied 
extensively, findings along this line of investigation would not be overly interesting or 
valuable.  But it could shed new light on policy studies if the OFDA-type entity’s 
attention was found to be what “mattered” in a particular policy domain.  The organic or 
purposive leverage that it applied to other actors within the policy domain would likely 
stem from this heightened attention.  
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The diplomatic currency idea, presented earlier, brings in the importance of 
values and morality as they relate to responsibility and practicality in the national security 
policymaking arena.  The idea of responsibility is missing in much of this literature.  Just 
as the legislator and voter are responsible for whom they listen to, bureaucrats are 
responsible for being informed and for their sources of information.  Bertelli and Lynn 
attempt to justify the managerial function, given the inevitability of managerial discretion 
over crucial public tasks.  “Managerial responsibility depends, in a constitutional sense, 
on official respect for the separation of powers and commitment to specific public service 
values: judgment, balance, rationality, and accountability.”225  The hopeful idea is that 
bureaucrats know a sense of responsibility and will temper the information they receive 
with the best interests of their constituents or clients.  The contribution of the HA/DR 
policy investigation helps to shed light on the effectiveness of the medical outreach 
missions in terms of what the policy intends for the missions and how effectively they 
were carried out, as previously discussed.  A “values and responsibility versus 
practicality” study concerning healthcare policy may be further clarified using 
“promethean” and “hippocratic” categories in future lines of investigation.226 
                                                
225 Bertelli, Anthony, and Laurence Lynn, Jr. 2006. Madison’s Managers – Public Administration and the 
Constitution. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.X.  Note: Their idea combines the 
personnel function (i.e., constitutionally qualified public servants recruited, hired, and maintained) and 
administrative law (i.e., collection of rules regarding admin practice within the separation of powers). 
226 Layzer, Judith. 2006. The Environmental Case: Translating Values Into Policy, 2nd Ed. Washington, 
DC: CQ Press.  The Hippocratic and Promethean framework borrows from the Environmentalist and 
Promethean framework used extensively in environmental policy studies.  Layzer uses the term 
"cornucopians" interchangeably with prometheans.  Beyond placing more value on economic growth, 
cornucopian connotes abundance, which is in opposition to an environmentalist perspective. 
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The competing values of healthcare as a right or as a privilege fall under the 
inherent tension between responsibility and practicality.  Approaching them as two 
categories offers clarity:  hippocratic (i.e., right) and promethean (i.e., privilege). 
 Hippocratic is simply based on the (modern) Hippocratic oath that variously states "I 
will prevent disease whenever I can," "[my] responsibility includes these related 
problems [those in which the wellness of one impacts the person's family and economic 
stability]", and "I will remember that I remain a member of society, with special 
obligations to all my fellow human beings.”  Please see index for the entire oath.   
Promethean, on the other hand, is the idea that technological advances in 
pharmaceuticals, genetically modified foodstuffs, disease prevention, etc., will answer 
wellness issues better than – or at least more efficiently than – hands-on treatment.  A 
Promethean’s regard for individual freedom makes personal or national decisions 
important in that those decisions carry ramifications that may make healthcare provision 
a privilege in terms of "deserving" nations and peoples.  In this construct, Prometheans 
view themselves as rational and logical, while they view Hippocratics as irrational and 
something of sentimentalists.  Privilege may be seen in valuing some human lives as 
more important than others.  The translation of this tension into diplomacy and national 
security policy balances the humanitarian and "higher calling" approach with the U.S. 
safety and security – in the midst of reduced budgets – approach. 
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 Wilson argues that human beings have a moral sense that is not entirely 
determined by culture,227 an important argument with regard to the military as an 
organization.  He describes moral sense as an “intuitively or directly felt belief about how 
one ought to act when one is free to act voluntarily (that is, not under duress)”.228  
Wilson’s description is similar to definitions of integrity.  Integrity of the bureaucratic 
policymaker is another key component in this perspective.  Wilson includes sympathy 
(i.e., as a basis for altruism), fairness (i.e., equity, reciprocity, and impartiality), self-
control (i.e., future or larger goals trump current, less important ones), and duty (i.e., 
one’s conscience or responsibility) as examples of shared moral sense.229   
A couple of points need to be explained more thoroughly.  Altruism, as it is used 
in Wilson’s work, may be viewed from the hippocratic perspective.  An important 
divergence from traditional political theory in Wilson’s work is that our shared idea of 
fairness does not demand equal distribution.230  Although his notion of fairness refers to 
property, it can easily be transferred to provision of wellness or healthcare from a 
promethean standpoint.  Wilson’s ideas about duty align with the hippocratic motivations 
of many military members and policy makers and, in particular, healthcare providers’ 
sense of responsibility.  Finally, Wilson delves into the evolutionary underpinnings of 
modern moral sense arguing that various factors have led to a universal understanding 
that everyone – not only those of a specific race, culture, or nation – deserve fair 
                                                
227 Wilson, James Q. 1993. The Moral Sense. New York: The Free Press. 




treatment.  Hippocratics would laud this understanding in terms of providing healthcare 
because it is the fair, equitable policy choice according to their universal beliefs.  These 
concepts are examples of how morality very often trumps practicality in policy making, a 
subtle yet crucial phenomenon that could be a valuable contribution of future projects.   
There may also be an opportunity to evaluate how variations in incidences of 
wellness and crime rate patterns in Latin American and South American countries affect 
HA/DR mission selection and their measures of success.  Using each country as a unit of 
analysis one could test this theory with an adequate number of observations.231  This 
design may yield valuable information that would support the causal inferences between 
wellness and crime rate and mission selection and success.   
Beyond the hippocratic and promethean ideas with regard to wellness, the crime 
rate study has unique ties to the promethean approach.  For example, Prometheans view 
themselves as rational and logical and value individual freedom.  Crime has no place in a 
promethean perspective as it is anathema to individual freedom.  However, a Promethean 
may be convinced to rehabilitate the criminal by integrating him into a society that fosters 
personal strength of character, self-control, and self-awareness.  A reduced crime rate that 
could be a result of healthcare provision would be welcomed from a promethean 
perspective.  A crime rate that did not change or, perversely, increased after U.S. military 
healthcare was provided to a country would likely lead a Promethean to denounce such 
involvement and policy design. 
A promethean approach speaks to humans' ability to use technological advances 
                                                
231 Please see assessment measurement scoring examples in Appendix. 
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to balance or mitigate resources shortfalls.232  This approach works with the HA/DR 
policy study in terms of prevention and preparation (HA) missions that help extend and 
better use limited resources.  Schattschneider's idea that the outcome of every conflict is 
determined by the extent to which the audience becomes involved in it233 helps explain 
this construct.  The HA/DR policy domain actors are the audience in this case, and an 
extension of Schattschneider’s idea is that the actors' perceptions and beliefs can make a 
difference in the implementation of said policy.  If the actors are promethean, they will 
follow the budgetary line of thinking and can be swayed by the OFDA claim that every 
dollar of preventive measures spent saves seven dollars of disaster relief.  The 
hippocratics would follow the humanitarian line of thinking that humans can make the 
world a better place and wellness and security go hand-in-hand.  Both lead to better 
training opportunities, which increase readiness and wartime capabilities, and greater 
access to possibly strategic benefits in particular host nations.   
A variation of clinical pathways explains how both the hippocratic and 
promethean approaches lead to better training opportunities.  The assumption may be that 
while each lead to better opportunities, these opportunities may differ in form and/or 
outcome.  But this may not necessarily be the case.  Better training and HA outcomes will 
result from better planning based on a clinical pathway approach in which a range of 
proscribed practices and modalities will likely result in more favorable outcomes for 
                                                
232 Layzer, Judith. 2006. The Environmental Case: Translating Values Into Policy, 2nd Ed. Washington, 
DC: CQ Press. 
233 Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America. 
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
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patients and trainees, following a hippocratic perspective.  These practices would use 
prospectively defined resources to minimize costs, following a promethean perspective.  
This form of planning and implementation must be based in research, literature, and well-
defined evaluations of previous HA/DR efforts.  A standardized algorithm of the best 
way to manage particular HA/DR events would emerge from this approach, and it would 
incorporate both the hippocratic and promethean perspectives. And it could produce new 
policy initiatives and implementation tools.  
Table 14.  Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Consequences of Hippocratic and  
   Promethean Approach to Training and Capacity Building Policy 
  Hippocratic Promethean 
Attributes 
- Provision of healthcare is an 
obligation, responsibility 
- Healthcare is a right 
- More reliance on hands-on care 
and assistance 
- Provision of healthcare through 
rational, most efficient means 
- Healthcare is a privilege 
- Technology-based delivery of care 
and assistance 
Implementation 
- Shift limited resources to 
critical wellness initiatives, 
rather than war-making 
- Humanitarian approach: 
wellness and security are related 
- Clinical pathway approach 
leads to better patient and 
training outcomes 
- Improved HA/DR training and 
response through effectiveness 
- Balance/mitigate budget shortfalls 
through technological advances 
- Cost-benefit analysis: one dollar 
of prevention saves seven dollars of 
disaster relief 
- Clinical pathway approach 
minimizes costs through efficient 
delivery of healthcare 
- Improved HA/DR training and 
response through efficiency 
  
 
The key is knowledge management and sharing.  Precise assessments and data 
collection before, during, and after an HA/DR effort or training mission can lead to 
 146 
thoughtful planning and cost effective use of resources for future HA/DR responses.  The 
design and implementation of such an approach must be based on an adaptive planning 
and decision support system that can suggest likely outcomes and alternatives and learn 
quickly to produce more effective solutions.  The system should be interactive and web-
based to facilitate the greatest amount of information sharing and data mining.  Because 
training entails more than refining tactics and operations, the new policy and associated 
system would enable the testing of new ideas to improve HA/DR training and response.  
Finally, the advocacy coalition framework is useful to this line of investigation.  
The HA/DR policy domain can be divided into coalitions who focus on the provision of 
hands-on healthcare and humanitarian assistance (i.e., Hippocratics) and technology-
based, capacity building efforts (i.e., Prometheans).  The core beliefs of each dictate the 
range and type of policy instruments put forward for a means to achieve the HA/DR ends.  
The preceding section reveals how this project’s theories and research design have broad 
applications to future lines of study.  
Conclusion 
My analysis suggests that the phenomena associated with bureaucrats accessing 
bureaucrats are valuable findings and, collectively, yield an important theory to add to the 
policy implementation, policy change, and assessment literatures.  Bureaucratic access 
points and leverage theory helps us understand how policies are successfully 
implemented in the midst of bureaucratic challenges resulting from organizational roles 
and responsibilities and contrasting assessments.  Access points allow communication of 
vital information at the time of HA/DR events.  And just as critically in terms of 
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interagency relations, bureaucratic access and leverage enables a more unified 
implementation of over-arching HA/DR policy by disparate agencies with unique 
missions, resources, capabilities, and assessment measures.   
The existing literature does not fully capture how such agency differences are 
mitigated and overcome in implementing policy that spans multiple entities.  Instead, an 
ironic paradox occurs:  the “healthy tension” between OFDA (i.e., minuscule in size and 
resources) and DOD (i.e., massive in size and resources) bureaucrats allows 
communication and an understanding of roles and responsibilities in implementing policy 
that governs both entities.  This access and leverage, coupled with the common end state 
goal of assisting peoples who have experienced disasters, helps create the notion of one 
common mission.  Bureaucratic access points and leverage are the key components to 
HA/DR policy implementation.  
The findings and emerging theory from this project matter.  In March 2013 the 
DOD was facing a nine percent budget cut across all programs due to sequestration.  
Budget cuts not only mean doing more with less, but they demand that only those product 
lines that offer the most value and benefit for the money will escape future cuts.  
Bureaucratic access points and leverage will play a larger role with regard to who gets 
what, when, and how in the fiscally-constrained and uncertain future.  More efficient 
assessment measures and focused capacity building (i.e., mitigation and preparation) 
initiatives are needed now more than ever.  It is paramount that military medicine is used 
appropriately and the skills and capabilities that only it possesses are maintained.  
Bureaucratic access points and leverage theory offers bureaucrats some analytical 
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capability in terms of knowing who is controlling policy implementation, and it also 
presents a tool they can use to maintain and increase their own influence and power 
within a policy domain.  
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Appendix 
USAID Organization Chart.  Note “Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian 




Headquartered in Washington, D.C., USAID’s mission is carried out through four 
regional bureaus: Africa, Asia and the Near East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
Europe and Eurasia. These are supported by three technical (or pillar) bureaus that 
provide expertise in democracy promotion, accountable governance, disaster relief, 
conflict prevention, economic growth, agricultural productivity, environmental 
protection, education reform, and global health challenges such as maternal/child health 




OFDA Organization Chart.  (USAID/OFDA informational compact disk provided at 








Criteria for DOD involvement and flow chart of how OFDA requests DOD resources.  
(JHOC, 2011.) 
    
1) Must be specific, clear mission; 
2) Cannot hinder primary DOD mission/responsibilities; 










Game Theory Example 
 A formal model is useful for this project.  We have an interesting theory (i.e., 
bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats) with a difficult to explain phenomenon (i.e., how do 
street-level, or in this case, "disaster-level" bureaucrats in a minuscule office found deep 
within an independent, sub-cabinet-level agency dictate the role and resource 
expenditures of the massive Department of Defense?) and very little specific literature to 
explain either.  There is freely communicated information in this construction because 
USAID/OFDA wants and needs particular resources for HA/DR responses and the DOD 
does not hide what it wants and needs in their training missions. The following game 
combines a stag hunt game and an asymmetric game. 
 




The bureaucrat(s) in the miniscule office (i.e., OFDA, “Bureaucrat A”) is either 
strong/respected or weak/not respected, and the DOD bureaucrat(s) (“Bureaucrat B”) 
must decide whether the OFDA bureaucrat is approaching the scenario from a position of 
strength or weakness.  Respect (and autonomy, credibility, etc.) makes a difference in this 
game of bureaucrats accessing one another and obtaining and providing resources.  The 
stag-hunt game models a respected agency, and an asymmetric game models an agency 
that is not respected.   
 
Actors:  strong/respected or weak/not respected OFDA bureaucrats and DOD bureaucrats 
Actions:  freely provide accurate information and/or resources/assistance (cooperate)   
   or do not provide accurate information and/or resources/assistance (defect) 
Payoffs:  traditional prisoners’dilemma-based payoffs234  
 
 “Nature” determines the type of OFDA (“Bureaucrat A”) from a set of types i (i ∈ 
T, in which T is {weak, strong}, and θi > 0 and θT = 1).  OFDA (A) understands i and 
chooses an action from {cooperate, defect}, in which cooperate is freely providing 
accurate information and/or resources and assistance and defect is not providing accurate 
information and/or resources and assistance.  The DOD (“Bureaucrat B”) receives 
OFDA’s (A) choice and chooses an action from {cooperate, defect}, with the same 
definitions as above.  The DOD (B) makes its choice with incomplete information (i.e., 
only OFDA knows i) and uses Bayes’ rule to update its beliefs about OFDA’s (A) type. 
 Backwards induction can be used in this game.  The DOD only knows if OFDA 
has defected or cooperated; it does not know how OFDA views itself (i.e., 
strong/respected or weak/not respected).  In the event OFDA defects, the DOD would 
also defect.  For example, if OFDA defects and is strong/respected, the DOD will realize 
a payoff of 2.  If OFDA defects and is weak/not respected, the DOD will realize a payoff 
of 3.  Either way, the DOD’s best response is to defect.  However, if OFDA cooperates 
the DOD has no dominant strategy.  If OFDA cooperates and is strong/respected, the 
DOD will realize a cooperation payoff of 4 and a defection payoff of 3.  If OFDA 
cooperates and is weak/not respected, the DOD will realize a cooperation payoff of 2 and 
a defection payoff of 4.  In this case Bayes’ rule can be used. 
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 U-DOD(action|strong)(strong) / U-DOD(action|strong)(strong)+(action|weak)(weak) 
 
Probability U-DOD(strong|cooperate): 
 U-DOD(cooperate|strong)(strong) / U-DOD(coop|strong)(strong)+(coop|weak)(weak) 
 
 The DOD’s expected utilities for cooperating or defecting are determined by 
multiplying its beliefs about what type of OFDA it is facing with the associated payoff 
contingent on each branch of the game tree.  The stag-hunt game has an equilibrium of 
mutual cooperation.  
 Moving up the game tree, OFDA knows what type it is and knows that if it 
defects (i.e., not providing accurate information) the DOD will defect regardless if OFDA 
is strong/respected or weak/not respected.  This is where the asymmetric information 
comes into play.  When OFDA is strong and defects and the DOD, in turn, defects, 
OFDA realizes a payoff of 2.  When OFDA is weak and defects and the DOD defects, 
OFDA realizes a payoff of 1.  But if OFDA cooperates the worst payoff it can realize is 
2. 
 The following scenarios depend on the DOD’s beliefs about OFDA’s type.  A 
{cooperate, cooperate} equilibrium exists when the DOD’s expected utility for 
cooperating is greater than for defecting.  A {cooperate, defect} equilibrium exists when 
the DOD’s expected utility for defecting is greater than for cooperating.  A {defect, 
cooperate} equilibrium exists when the DOD believes OFDA is weak and defects.  There 
is no {defect, cooperate} equilibrium with the DOD cooperating based on the backward 
induction discussed above.  A mixed strategy equilibrium exists when cooperating and 
defecting are equal to the DOD as illustrated here. 
 
Expected utility for DOD cooperating: 
 EU-DOD(cooperate): (strong|coop)(4) + (weak|coop)(2) 
 
Expected utility for DOD defecting: 
 EU-DOD(defect): (strong|coop)(3) + (weak|coop)(4) 
 
 The portion of time the DOD would have to believe OFDA is strong for it to be 
indifferent between cooperating and defecting can be found by setting these equations 
equal to each other.  By simplifying the above equations, it is apparent that U-
DOD(strong|cooperate) is equal to 2/3.  In other words, the DOD would believe it is 
facing a strong OFDA two-thirds of the time given OFDA’s choice to cooperate.  
Therefore, OFDA has a weakly dominant strategy to cooperate, and the DOD will 
cooperate or defect half of the time given that it believes that OFDA is strong two-thirds 
of the time. 
 This game demonstrates the puzzle of why street-level bureaucrats in a minuscule 
office found deep within an independent, sub-cabinet-level agency can dictate the role 
and resource expenditures of the massive DOD (i.e., mutual cooperation).  In this 
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scenario, beliefs and information are vital in showing how mutual cooperation may be 
realized between two seemingly disparate (i.e., in terms of resources) bureaucratic 
agencies.   
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Contact Summary Sheet 
 
 





















































ROEs/SOPs/Process/Bureaucracy (Note: sheet of paper with a square/blank sheet of 
paper; ask them to “diagram” the HA/DR process as they see it) 
 
- Evaluation of the HA/DR bureaucratic process: 
 
 
























U.S. Military’s Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Efforts in Haiti, 2010 
Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
 U.S. Military personnel (peak level): 22,268 
 U.S. Navy ships: 23 
 U.S. Coast Guard ships: 10 
 Fixed-wing aircraft: 264 
 Helicopters: 57 
 Liters of water distributed: 2,600,000 
 Humanitarian rations packages distributed: 2,900,000 
 Bulk food delivered (pounds): 17,000,000 
 Meals-Ready-to-Eat delivered: 2,700,000 
 Emergency radios distributed: 73,300 
 Hours of emergency radio broadcasts: 660 
 Supported distribution of emergency shelter to 1,170,000 people 
 Supported 16 World Food Program distribution points. 
 Supported development of 2 transitional camps and improvements in 9 camps 
Logistical Assistance 
 Internally displaced persons (IDP) relocated from high flood risk areas: 3,884 
 Number of DoD-coordinated flights into Haiti and neighboring Dominican 
Republic from January 12 to March 15, 2010:  3,989 
 American citizens transported out of Haiti: 16,412 
 Air delivered relief (pounds):  More than 36 million 
Medical Assistance 
 U.S. government medical personnel in Haiti (peak level):  1,100 
 Number of hospital beds provided (peak level): 1,400 
 Number of patients aboard all ships (peak level):  543 
 Pounds of medical supplies delivered: 149,045 
 Surgeries performed by U.S. military: 1,025 
 Medical evacuations:  343 
 Patients treated by U.S. military: 9,758 
Engineering Assistance 
 Number of Haitian engineers trained: 160 
 City streets cleared of rubble (cubic yards): 12,724 
 Number of structures assessed: (Current as of 23 April 2010):  25,522 
 Seaport Flow:  Port re-opened on January 22, 2010 with U.S. Military 
assistance 
 Ship containers off-loaded: Twenty-foot Equivalent units (TEU): 8,867 
 
Source:  USSOUTHCOM “Operation Unified Response: Support to Haiti Earthquake 






1. What and/or who are the most important influences on resource/budget decisions? 
 What were the most important issues, topics, concerns, capabilities to ensure? 
 
2. In your experience, do other bureaucrats (outside of the DOD or OFDA) try to 
access you/your organization and decisions?  If so, with what are they concerned? 
 
3. If other HA/DR bureaucrats tried to access, what agencies did they represent, 
when did they try, what did they want for the military?  How did they gain 
access?  (NOTE:  The “when” gets to timing, the “what they want” addresses 
capabilities and resources, and the “how” finds whether they tout their success, 
information, and fact that they are the only ones who could accomplish the 
HA/DR mission – capabilities – as credibility.) 
 
4. In your experience, did the access provide information that you wouldn’t have 
otherwise received?  IF SO:  What was its impact; or how would you characterize 
this access?  (NOT if it was helpful or a hindrance, as that is too 
leading/dichotomous.) 
 
5. Did HA/DR (and DOD medical) bureaucrats provide relevant information in a 
timely manner?  (NOTE:  This question is for the timing of access and availability 
of information during the punctuating event.) 
 
6. In your experience, what were examples of successful (and unsuccessful) access? 
 IF ANSWERED:  Were resourcing/budget decisions changed due to them?  IF 
SO:  What were those resourcing/budget decisions?  (NOTE:  The resourcing 
questions address capabilities.) 
 
7. In your experience, is there the right amount, too much, or too little access from 
other bureaucrats?  IF THE ANSWER IS "TOO MUCH": How would you 
“check” access, if needed? 
 
8. Would more bureaucratic access be a positive influence for creating better policy, 
budgets, or ensuring medical response capabilities?  (NOTE:  I use the word 
"better" here to discover whether the subject believes improvements can be made; 
I am not concerned with what "better" entails or how s/he defines it.  It also 
primes question 9.) 
 
9. What, if anything, would you change about the HA/DR mission?  And how do 
you see budget cuts impacting that mission and the implementation of HA/DR 
policy?    
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10. Tell me about the relationship between your mission and the structure of your 
organization.  (NOTE: This relates to whether the HA/DR mission defines the 
agencies (including the DOD components) or do the agencies (structure) define 
the mission?) 
 
11. What are the measures of mission success?  Are they different from bureaucrat to 
bureaucrat?  Does assessment of the situation (i.e., punctuating event) or mission 
success matter in terms of how much access is granted or denied?  Does the 
assessment, including who performs the assessment and with what measures, 
matter in terms of HA/DR policy implementation?  (The second-to-last question 
attempts to discover inter-agency relationships and how they may be leveraged.  
The last question speaks to the implementation and assessment relationships, if 
any.)  
 






























Scoring of Assessment Measures 
 
If a medical humanitarian relief or readiness training mission provides a benefit in 
terms of decreased crime rate, increased productivity, increased cooperation, and 
improved indices of wellness it would be coded as a success for those four measures. 
 
 
1. Does crime (e.g., crimes associated with lack of resources and productivity) decrease in the 
area after a medical readiness/outreach mission?  
2. Does productivity (e.g., agrarian, industrial, etc.) increase after the medical 
readiness/outreach mission due to a more well population that is able to be more productive 
after receiving healthcare?  
3. Is there increased willingness to work with U.S. forces in security efforts after a medical 
readiness/outreach mission?  
4. Do the measured incidences of wellness (e.g., recurrence rate of disease, number and type of 




For example, if the crime rate is reduced after a HA mission it will be coded according to 
the scale in the following table.  Similar scoring and coding will be used for the other 
























USSOUTHCOM Mission Pre-Mission Post-Mission 
Success 
1 - Crime rate a concern 
(i.e., security, U.S. national 
security interests) 
2 - Productivity rate a 
concern (i.e., unable to 
produce on their own due to 
wellness issues) 
3 - Willingness to work 
with U.S. a concern (i.e., 
security, U.S. national 
security interests) 
4 - Indices of wellness a 
concern (i.e., general 
humanitarian relief 
concerns) 
1 - Crime rate reduced 
2 - Productivity rate 
increased 
3 - Willingness to work 
with U.S. increased in 
terms of greater security (as 
measured by U.S. military 
indices) 
4 - Improved indices of 
wellness (i.e., as measured 
by a traditional patient care 
construct) 
Failure 
1 - Crime rate not a concern 
(i.e., security, U.S. national 
security interests) 
2 - Productivity rate not a 
concern (i.e., wellness not 
affecting productivity) 
3 - Willingness to work 
with U.S. not a concern 
(i.e., security, U.S. national 
security interests) 
4 - Indices of wellness not a 
concern (i.e., general 
humanitarian relief 
concerns) 
1 - Crime rate same or 
increased 
2 - Productivity rate 
decreased 
3 - Willingness to work 
with U.S. decreased in 
terms of greater security (as 
measured by U.S. military 
indices) 
4 - Worsened indices of 
wellness (i.e., as measured 




MEASUREMENT SCORING EXAMPLE – CODING FOR CRIME RATE 
Scale Success Based on Percentage of Improvement (or Failure to Improve Crime 
Rate) 
4: >15% decrease in crime rate after medical readiness/outreach mission 
3: 11-15% decrease in crime rate after medical readiness/outreach mission 
2: 6-10% decrease in crime rate after medical readiness/outreach mission 
1: 1-5% decrease in crime rate after medical readiness/outreach mission 




Hippocratic Oath: Modern Version (italics added) 
 
I swear to fulfill, to the best of my ability and judgment, this covenant: 
I will respect the hard-won scientific gains of those physicians in whose steps I walk, and 
gladly share such knowledge as is mine with those who are to follow. 
I will apply, for the benefit of the sick, all measures [that] are required, avoiding those 
twin traps of overtreatment and therapeutic nihilism. 
I will remember that there is art to medicine as well as science, and that warmth, 
sympathy, and understanding may outweigh the surgeon's knife or the chemist's drug. 
I will not be ashamed to say "I know not," nor will I fail to call in my colleagues when 
the skills of another are needed for a patient's recovery. 
I will respect the privacy of my patients, for their problems are not disclosed to me that 
the world may know. Most especially must I tread with care in matters of life and death. 
If it is given me to save a life, all thanks. But it may also be within my power to take a 
life; this awesome responsibility must be faced with great humbleness and awareness of 
my own frailty. Above all, I must not play at God. 
I will remember that I do not treat a fever chart, a cancerous growth, but a sick human 
being, whose illness may affect the person's family and economic stability. My 
responsibility includes these related problems, if I am to care adequately for the sick. 
I will prevent disease whenever I can, for prevention is preferable to cure. 
I will remember that I remain a member of society, with special obligations to all my 
fellow human beings, those sound of mind and body as well as the infirm. 
If I do not violate this oath, may I enjoy life and art, respected while I live and 
remembered with affection thereafter. May I always act so as to preserve the finest 
traditions of my calling and may I long experience the joy of healing those who seek my 
help. 
- Written in 1964 by Louis Lasagna, Academic Dean of the School of Medicine at Tufts 
University.  Retrieved from: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-
today.html#modern,  March 11, 2013. 
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